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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I examine the effects of deaccenting - the removal of phonologi-
cal accent from a constituent - on interpretation. In general, deaccenting of an element
is possible only if that element is salient in the discourse context. Salience alone, however,
is not a sufficient condition for deaccenting. The discourse context in (1) makes salient
both the verb hit and the NP John, and it is consequently possible for these elements to
be deaccented in (la,b). However, in (Ic), it is not possible to deaccent both of these
elements simultaneously. (Focus is indicated by CAPITALIZATION, deaccenting bysmall
italics.)
(1) Mary hit John. Then,
a. BILL hit SUE.
b. BILL KICKED Mary.
c. #BILL hit Mary.
Deaccenting of both the verb hit and its direct object Mary in (ic) requires that the
discourse context make salient a hitting of Mary, but this condition is not met in (1).
To account for the facts illustrated above, I propose that deaccenting plays a role in
identifying the focus-related topic of a sentence, where it is a necessary condition for a
sentence to be felicitous in a given context that the focus-related topic of that sentence be
instantiated in the context. The focus-related topic of a sentence is generated (roughly)
by replacing all focused constituents by variables and combining the resulting structure
so as to end up with the smallest structure within which all properties of the remaining
lexical elements are satisfied. The resulting structure will be instantiated in a context
if there is another element in the context with which it is non-distinct, where variables
count as non-distinct from other elements of the same semantic type. By this process,
the sentences in (1) will have the focus-related topics in (2).
(2) a. a hit y
b. Mary
c. : hit Mary
The representations in (2a,b) are instantiated in the context consisting of the sentence
Mary hit John in (1) above, and hence (la,b) are felicitous. (2c), however, is not instan-
tiated in this context, and hence is infelicitous.
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The analysis sketched above provides an explanation for the felicity or infelicity of a
sentence in a larger discourse context based upon the focus structure of the sentence and
the composition of the context. While the analysis is of some interest by itself, even more
important is the use to which the analysis can be put in accounting for certain phenomena
typically associated with VP deletion. Since Sag (1976) and Williams (1977), it has
standardly been assumed that restrictions on pronominal interpretations in VP deletion
contexts are to be explained in terms of the mechanism that assigns an interpretation to
an empty VP. However, we find that identical restrictions appear in contexts in which a
VP has been deaccented but not deleted. Thus, parallel to the sentence in (3a) which
has only a strict and a sloppy reading available for the (deleted) pronoun, we find an
identical restriction for the deaccented pronoun in (3b).
(3) a. John; said hei is a genius because Bill did.
b. Johni said hei is a genius because Bill said he's intelligent.
No analysis of VP deletion in the current literature is capable of accounting for this
parallelism. If we assume that a phonologically deleted VP is represented in the LF
representation of a sentence as a deaccented VP, however, it becomes possible to account
for this parallelism in a principled fashion by assimilating the deletion cases to the deac-
centing ones.
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Title: Professor of Linguistics and Philosophy
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Chapter 1
VP Deletion: The Problem
1.1 Introduction
It has long been noted that deletion of a verb phrase requires that there be a suitable
"antecedent" VP in the discourse, and that the interpretations available for a deleted
VP in a VP ellipsis construction are constrained by the interpretation assigned to the
antecedent.1 Sag (1976) observes for example, citing Chomsky (1965,1968), Ross (1967),
Lakoff (1968) and Hankamer (1971), that ambiguities do not multiply in VP ellipsis
contexts. He gives the following examples of VP ePipsis in which the antecedent VP is
two ways ambiguous, and points out correctly that in each case the sentence as a whole
is only two ways ambiguous.
(1) (= Sag's (2))
a. John likes flying planes, and Bill does too.
b. Betsy divulged when Bill promised to call me, and Sandy did too.
c. The chickens are ready to eat, and the children are too.
The elided VP in each of these sentences is ambiguous just as its antecedent is, but
the interpretation assigned to the elided VP has to be identical to that assigned to the
antecedent. While one might be tempted to attribute this identity of interpretation to
1Here and throughout this chapter, I will refer to the licensing VP as the antecedent. I do not,
however, intend to thereby commit myself to there being a direct connection between the licensing VP
and the elided VP, and will in fact be arguing in chapter 3 that no such relation is directly represented
in the grammar.
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the presence of the word too in each of these sentences, the examples in (2) argue strongly
against any such account.
(2) a. John likes flying planes because Bill does.
b. Betsy divulged when Bill promised to call me because/before Sandy did.
c. The chickens were ready to eat when the children were.
None of these examples contains the word too, and yet in each case we find that the
interpretation of the elided VP must be identical to the interpretation of the antecedent
VP.
Analyses like those of Sag (1976,1977) and Williams (1977) are based on the premise
that identical interpretation of a deleted VP and its antecedent should follow from the
analysis of VP deletion itself. For Sag, VP ellipsis is analyzed as a deletion process which
is subject to a constraint that the interpretation of the deleted VP must be present
already in the previous discourse. For Williams, VP ellipsis is treated as a reconstruction
process which copies an antecedent VP onto an elided VP. Since the interpretation of
the antecedent VP must already be resolved before deletion is licensed (Sag) or before
reconstruction occurs (Williams), given a particular interpretation for the antecedent VP
in sentences like (1) and (2), the interpretation of the elided VP under either of these
analyses is predicted to be fixed.
In all of the above examples, the antecedent VP was syntactically two ways ambiguous
and obviously so, giving rise to a two way ambiguity for the sentence as a whole. However,
as has long been known, examples in which an antecedent VP contains a pronoun can
also give rise to an ambiguity in VP ellipsis. In particular, in certain cases in which the
pronoun in the antecedent VP is understood as coreferent with some other expression
in that sentence, the corresponding VP ellipsis sentence can receive any of a number of
non-equivalent interpretations, and yet the interpretation of the antecedent VP does not
on the surface appear to be similarly ambiguous. Examples illustrating this point are
given in (3), where the coindexing in the antecedent VP is meant to indicate intended
referential identity between the pronoun he and the R-expression John.
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(3) a. John- thinks he/ is brilliant and Bill does too.
b. Johni thinks hei is brilliant because Bill does.
c. Johni said he; is brilliant before Bill did.
In all of these sentences, fixing the intended referent of the pronoun as that of the matrix
subject John would appear to yield an unambiguous interpretation for the antecedent
VP. The corresponding pronoun in the elided VP, however, gives rise to an ambiguity
in the interpretation of these sentences: the elided pronoun can either be interpreted as
referring to John (a strict interpretation), or it can be interpreted as referring to Bill (a
sloppy interpretation). Sag and Williams reduce this case to the previous set of cases
by arguing that the antecedent VP is in fact ambiguous. Pronouns, they argue, can
be given either a bound variable interpretation or a referential interpretation. When a
pronoun is given a bound variable interpretation in an antecedent VP, Sag's identity
constraint on VP ellipsis forces a bound variable interpretation in the deleted VP as
well, while Williams' reconstruction analysis copies a bound variable, giving rise to a
sloppy reading. When a pronoun is given a referential interpretation in an antecedent
VP, Sag's identity constraint forces a referential interpretation in the deleted VP as well,
and Williams' analysis copies a referentially interpreted pronoun, giving rise to a strict
reading. 2
Central to the above analyses - and to virtually every other analysis of these facts
within the generative tradition - is an assumption that the resolution of ambiguities
arising in VP deletion contexts should be made to follow directly from the analysis
of VP deletion itself. (Cf. for example Sag (1976), Williams (1977), Lappin (1984),
Haik (1985), Ristad (1991), Fiengo and May (1991), Dalrymple, Shieber and Pereira
(1991), and Dalrymple (1992), among others.) There are only two exceptions to this
generalization that I am aware of. The first of these is Kitagawa (1991), who argues
that VP deletion should be handled via reconstruction of syntactic material (similar
to Williams' approach) with pronominal interpretation within VP deletion environments
2I ignore the distinction between deictic uses of a pronoun which introduce a new referent into
discourse and other referential uses in which a pronoun is used to refer to some individual previously
introduced into the discourse.
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constrained only by Binding Theory constraints which operate independently.3 The other
exception to the above generalization is found in a suggestion made in Chomsky and
Lasnik (1992). They argue that deletion should be treated as an optional phonological
rule which applies to deaccented material (i.e. material which lacks phonological accent).
Accounting for the constraints on ambiguity resolution in VP deletion contexts for them
falls under the more general problem of accounting for parallelisms of interpretation
found quite generally in deaccenting environments. In this chapter, I will argue that
these latter theories are correct in not locating the source of parallelism of interpretation
directly in the mechanisms posited to account for the interpretation of deleted material
in VP deletiot contexts.
The argument I will present is of a very general nature. My first concern will not be
to argue against any particular analysis of VP deletion. Rather, it will be to show that
all of the above mentioned analyses (including those of Kitagawa and of Chomsky and
Lasnik) have too narrowly delimited the problem to be solved. I will show, following the
lead of Chomsky and Lasnik, that a large fraction of the problems involving parallelism
of interpretation which are central in motivating analyses of VP deletion arise in an
identical fashion when the "dependent" VP is deaccented rather than deleted. This is
true both of the basic cases which parallel those illustrated in (1) above and of the more
complicated cases of pronominal interpretation, as well as of cases discussed in Lasnik
(1972) and Lakoff (19??) (cited in Chomsky and Lasnik) involving quantifier scope. None
of the above-mentioned analyses can be directly extended to cover the facts that obtain
in the VP deaccenting cases without the addition of several ad hoc stipulations. Since
one of the primary reasons for adopting any of these theories has been their ability to
account for both the parallelism of interpretation in the ambiguous antecedent cases and
for the ambiguities of pronominal interpretation within an ellipsis site, this failing calls
the analyses themselves into question. I will argue that any account of the parallelism
between the ellipsis cases and the deaccenting cases must treat the deaccenting cases as
basic.
3As we will see below, however, there do appear to be constraints on pronominal interpretation in VP
deletion contexts which are completely independent of Binding Theory constraints, for which Kitagawa
offers no explanation.
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The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In section 1.2, I will outline
three competing theories of VP ellipsis, those of Sag (1976,1977), Williams (1977) and
Dalrymple, Shieber and Pereira (1991). The purpose of this section will be to underscore
the dependence present in each of the theories between ambiguity resolution in VP ellipsis
contexts and the analysis of VP ellipsis itself. In the following section, I will show that
parallel restrictions on ambiguity resolution obtain in deaccenting environments, and
will furthermore show that the account given of the restrictions in the VP ellipsis cases
cannot be extended directly to cover these cases as well. I argue that any analysis which
accounts for the parallelism between the VP ellipsis cases and the deaccenting cases in
a principled fashion must treat the deaccenting cases as basic and reduce the analysis
of ambiguity resolution in VP ellipsis cases to that in their corresponding deaccenting
cases. I develop such an analysis in chapter 2. There I show that the basic function of
deaccenting is to identify the topic of a sentence, with topics serving to relate a sentence
to a context of utterance. Finally, in chapter 3 I return to the problems raised above and
show how the analysis of ambiguity resolution in deaccenting and ellipsis contexts can
be given a natural explanation in terms of the analysis of topics developed in chapter 2.
1.2 Previous Analyses of VP Ellipsis
In this section, I review three theories of VP ellipsis - Sag (1976,1977), Williams (1977),
and Dalrymple, Shieber and Pereira (1991). The review in this section is far from exhaus-
tive, meant more to illustrate the basic ideas motivating these theories rather than the
details of how they are worked out. As such, I will only be applying these theories to the
basic examples given above that illustrate restrictions on interpretation of a deleted VP.
A somewhat more detailed examination of restrictions on interpretation in VP ellipsis
contexts will be taken up in chapter 3.
1.2.1 Sag: A Deletion-based Analysis of VP Deletion
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, Sag (1976,1977) treats VP deletion
as deletion. That is, he assumes that the base generated form of a VP deletion sen-
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tence contains a full-fledged VP in the ellipsis site, and that this VP gets deleted in the
phonological component of the grammar. To illustrate, consider the following sentences:4
(4) a. John said he is brilliant before Bill did.
b. John likes flying planes because Bill does.
The facts in need of explanation for these sentences are the following. In (a), if the
pronoun in the matrix VP is understood as referring to John, then the corresponding
pronoun the deleted VP can be interpreted as referring either to John or to Bill,
but cannot be reinterpreted as taking some other discourse antecedent. If the original
pronoun in the matrix clause is given a discourse antecedent, on the other hand, the
corresponding pronoun in the deleted VP must be interpreted as having that same dis-
course antecedent. It cannot be reinterpreted as having a separate discourse antecedent,
nor can it be understood as referring to John or to Bill (unless the discourse antecedent
itself is taken to refer to John or Bill). In (b), the matrix VP is two ways ambiguous
between what we could refer to loosely as an activity reading of flying planes and what
could be called an object reading of that phrase. The deleted VP shows the same ambi-
guity. However, the interpretation of the deleted VP is dependent on that of the matrix
VP - the two VPs must be interpreted identically. Thus the sentence is only two ways
ambiguous, and not four ways as one might expect if the two VPs could be interpreted
independently.
On Sag's analysis, these sentences have an underlying representation containing a
full-fledged VP in the subordinate clause, as illustrated below.
(5) a. John said he is brilliant before Bill said he was brilliant.
b. John likes flying planes because Bill likes flying planes.
This representation is the input to both the phonological component of grammar and the
logical component of grammar. In the phonological component, the VP in the subordi-
nate clause gets deleted. In the logical component, both VPs enter with their complete
41 ignore problems related to tense and/or to the presence or absence of do here and throughout this
section. These problems are by no means trivial, though they are irrelevant to considerations of this and
the following section.
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structure intact. If interpretation of the two VPs were left unconstrained, then in the
first example we would expect the interpretation of the pronoun in the matrix VP and
that of the pronoun in the subordinate VP to independent, and similarly in the second
example, we would expect each of the VPs to be interpreted separately, giving rise to
a potential four way ambiguity. We noted above, however, that in sentences like (4a)
interpretation of the pronoun in the deleted VP is restricted, while sentences like (4b)
are only two ways ambiguous. The VPs in the subordinate clause cannot receive an
interpretation which is independent of the interpretation assigned to their antecedents in
the superordinate clause.
In order to make a deletion account viable, Sag argues that deletion in the phono-
logical component must be semantically constrained. In particular, he argues that a VP
can be deleted only if its interpretation is identical up to the point of alphabetic variance
with that of its antecedent. He states this constraint as follows:
(6) (= Sag's (12))
With respect to a sentence S, [VP deletion] can delete any VP in S whose rep-
resentation at the level of logical form is a A-expression that is an alphabetic
variant of another A-expression present in the logical form of S or in the logical
form of some other sentence S', which precedes S in discourse.
Alphabetic variance is defined as:5
(7) Formulae qb and 0' are alphabetic variants if there are formulae ,0, q1.. . .n
such that q0 is q, q, is 0', and, for each i from 1 to n, qi is formed from Oi-1 by
replacing some constituent A-expression [Aa~tci] by an immediate alphabetic
variant [Aa·iMI] thereof.
(8) [Aaio] and [Aa'iý'] are immediate alphabetic variants if and i?' are
alike except that 4' contains free occurrences of a' at all and only those places
where 4 contains free occurrences of a.
In order for the restriction in (6) to do the work it is intended to, both the deleted
VP and the antecedent VP must be represented as A-expressions at the level of logical
5This definition is based on a definition given in Quine (1947), modified to apply to a language with
A-abstraction. To keep things simple, I assume that the formal representation of quantification involves
a A-abstracted predicate as an argument of a quantified expression.
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form. We must thus assume that in the derivation of logical forms, A-abstraction applies
at least optionally to all VPs. This assumption alone suffices to ensure proper inter-
pretation of (4b) - the LF representations of the superordinate and subordinate clauses
will be alphabetic variants of each other only if they are structurally identical. Since the
ambiguity in question is itself structural, forcing identity of structure at LF will result in
identity of interpretation, giving the desired two readings of the sentence. To generate
the strict and sloppy readings available in (4a), however, two further assumptions are
required. First, it is necessary to assume that pronouns are potentially ambiguous be-
tween a bound variable interpretation and a referential interpretation.6 Second, we must
assume that pronominal interpretation is obligatorily resolved prior to application of the
constraint in (6). With these assumptions, derivation from the base generated structures
in (5) of logical forms which license deletion of the subordinate VP will proceed as follows:
R.eferring to the second type of interpretation available for a pronoun as "referential" is misleading,
though the practice is commonplace throughout the literature. Within a syntactic theory, the notion of
reference can play no role. Reference is an inherently semantic notion, linking an occurrence of a singular
term with a real world object. Syntax, on the other hand, abstracts away from the real world, and so
the symbols used in syntactic representations are necessarily abstract as well. Calling an interpretation
of a pronoun referential, then, clearly cannot mean substituting an actual referent - i.e. a real world
individual - in for the pronoun in the syntactic representation of the sentence containing the pronoun.
The simplest way of avoiding this confusion while maintaining the basic insight of Sag and Williams
analyses is to treat the so-called referent as a discourse referent of the sort posited in Kamp's Discourse
Representation Theory, or as a file in Heim's theory of file change semantics. While I will continue to
use the term "referential" in identifying this type of interpretation, I do not intend the term to be taken
literally in these contexts.
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(9) a. (underlying structures)
i. John said he is brilliant before Bill said he is brilliant.
ii. John likes [PRO flying planes] because Bill likes [PRO flying planes]
John likes [NP flying planes] because Bill likes [NP flying planes]
b. (A-abstraction of the (relevant) VPs)
i. John Ax[x said he is brilliant] before Bill Ay[y said he is brilliant]
ii. John Ax[x likes [PRO flying planes]] because Bill Ayy[y likes [PRO flying
planes]]
John Ax[x likes [NP flying planes]] because Bill Ay[y likes [NP flying planes]]
c. (pronominal interpretation)
i. John Ax[z said x is brilliant] before Bill Ay[y said y is brilliant]
John Ax[x said John is brilliant] before Bill Ay[y said John is brilliant]
John Ax[x said Sam is brilliant] before Bill Ay[y said Sam is brilliant]
ii. (does not apply)
d. (check for identity between VPs)
Only those derivations which pass Sag's identity constraint are given. In the first
representation in (9c.i), the pronouns have been interpreted as bound variables, giving
a sloppy interpretation. In the second and third representations in (9c.i), the pronouns
have been interpreted referentially. In each of these representations, in order for the two
VPs to be alphabetic variants, it is necessary for the two pronouns to be interpreted
identically. No other combination of pronominal interpretation in the matrix and sub-
ordinate VPs will result in the two being alphabetic variants of one another, and hence
the impossibility of any substantively distinct interpretation for the VP deletion sentence
in (4a) is derived. For the second sentence, since the logical forms associated with the
different interpretations of the VP are structurally distinct, the sentence as a whole will
only pass Sag's identity criterion if each of the VPs iss assigned the same structure, and
hence given the same interpretation. We thus account for the fact that the VP deletion
sentence in (4b) is only two ways ambiguous, as desired.
An obvious characteristic of Sag's analysis is that it makes essential use of semantic
information to constrain what on the surface would appear to be a phonological process of
deletion. If such constraints are found to be necessary, however, then the overall organi-
zation of the grammar will have to be radically revised. Under most current conceptions
16
of the organization of grammar, the phonological component and the interpretational
component are related only indirectly via S-structure. Accordingly, properties of a rep-
resentation which are exclusively present in the post-S-structure levels of one branch of
syntax (e.g. the interpretational branch) are in principle unavailable to the other branch
(e.g. the phonological branch). Since the constraints on phonological deletion posited by
Sag make essential reference to aspects of a derivation which are purely interpretational,
adopting his analysis would require us to abandon our underlying assumptions about the
organization of grammar. Such a drastic measure should be avoided if possible. If we
maintain our assumptions about the organization of grammar, however, it follows that
Sag's analysis cannot be maintained without modifications.
To give an overview, Sag's analysis can be seen as an attempt to salvage what is
probably the simplest account of VP deletion one could imagine, one in which deletion is
constrained by identity. He notes, however, that there are restrictions on interpretation
of a deleted VP when the antecedent VP is ambiguous or when it contains a pronoun. To
account for these restrictions, Sag proposes that the notion of identity which is important
for determining when a VP can be deleted is that of identity of interpretation, not merely
phonological identity or identity of underlying form. Using identity of interpretation to
condition VP deletion, however, comes at a theoretical cost, since deletion for Sag is a
phonological rule and phonological rules cannot under current conceptions of grammar
be subject to purely semantic constraints.
1.2.2 Williams: A Reconstruction-based Analysis of VP Dele-
tion
The analyses of Sag (1976) and of Williams (1977) are similar in several respects, though
they are not notational variants of one another. With respect to the interpretation
of pronouns, the two theories are alike. However, whereas Sag argues for a deletion
based analysis of VP ellipsis, Williams argues for a reconstruction based analysis. Like
Sag, Williams forms A-abstracts from VPs in logical form. Rather than utilizing these
A-expressions for checking identity between two VPs, however, Williams assumes that
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the elided VP is base generated with empty terminal nodes, and that the A-expression
representing the antecedent is copied directly onto this empty VP. To give a sample
derivation, consider once again the examples examined in section 1.2.1, repeated below.7
(4) a. John said he is brilliant before Bill did [e].
b. John likes flying planes because Bill does [e].
Consider first the derivations allowed for the sentence in (4a). At LF, A-abstraction
applies to the matrix VP yielding a representation like that given in (10a) below. At
this point, the pronoun is interpreted, and as was the case with Sag's analysis, it can
be interpreted referentially as in (10b.i-ii), or it can be interpreted as a variable bound
by a A-operator as in (10b.iii). Finally, the interpreted VP of the superordinate clause
is substituted for the empty VP in the subordinate clause, leading eventually to the LF
representations in (10c).
(10) a. Johni Axz( said he; is brilliant)
b. i. John Axz( said John is brilliant)
ii. John Az(x said Sam is brilliant)
iii. John Axz( said x is brilliant)
c. i. ... before Bill Az(x said John is brilliant)
ii. ... before Bill Axz( said Sam is brilliant)
iii. ... before Bill Axz( said x is brilliant)
Of these three interpretations, the first represents a strict reading of the pronoun, the
second a variant strict reading, and the third a sloppy reading, which as we have already
seen exhaust the range of possible interpretations for this sentence.
For the sentence in (4b), the derivation is equally simple. Since the matrix VP is
structurally ambiguous, there will be two underlying representations for this VP, as shown
in (11a) below. At LF, A-abstraction applies to the superordinate VPs as illustrated in
7As mentioned, Williams assumes that the empty VP following doesis generated with the full syntactic
structure of the antecedent with empty terminal nodes. Since this part of his analysis is irrelevant to
the present discussion, however, I will represent the empty VP simply as [e].
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(llb), and the resulting A-expressions are copied onto the empty VP in the subordinate
clause as shown in (11lc).
(11) a. (underlying representation)
i. John likes [PRO flying planes] because Bill does [e].
ii. John likes [NP flying planes] because Bill does [e].
b. (A-abstraction)
i. John Ax[z likes [PRO flying planes]] because Bill does [e].
ii. John Ax[x likes [NP flying planes]] because Bill does [e].
c. (reconstruction)
i. John Ax[x likes [PRO flying planes] because Bill does Ax[x like [PRO flying
planes]]
ii. John Az[z likes [NP flying planes]] because Bill does Axs[ like [Np flying
planes]]
Since at the level at which reconstruction applies the antecedent VP is no longer am-
biguous, it follows straightforwardly that there will only be two readings available for the
sentence as a whole.
The similarities between Williams' and Sag's analyses are quite apparent. There
are, however, impoitant distinctions between the two. For Sag, the fact that an identity
constraint applies in the case of VP deletion is in a sense accidental - there is no necessary
connection between deletability of an expression and identity between that expression and
some antecedent, nor is there any reason to suspect that a similar constraint would not
apply to other phonological processes. For Williams, on the other hand, the identity
constraint is built into the very mechanism which accounts for the interpretation of a
deleted VP. This constraint comes about by requiring the interpretation of an antecedent
VP to be fully determined prior to copying it onto an empty VP.
1.2.3 Dalrymple, Shieber and Pereira: VP Deletion as Pronom-
inal Interpretation of an Empty VP
Dalrymple, Shieber and Pereira (1991) (henceforth DS&P) present an analysis of VP
deletion which is couched in a more general theory of ellipsis resolution. Like Williams,
DS&P derive the intarpretation of an empty VP from an antecedent. However, the
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mechanism by which they do so is quite different from that of Williams. Rather than
treating ellipsis resolution as a copying procedure applying to syntactic representations,
they treat it as a form of pronominal interpretation in which the interpretation assigned to
the empty VP is calculated from the semantic interpretation of some antecedent sentence.
The basic analysis splits a VP deletion sentence into two semantic components, the first
consisting of the interpretation assigned to the overt material of the sentence (e.g. of a
subject NP), and the second consisting of an empty predicate whose interpretation needs
to be provided. A parallel division is then imposed on the antecedent sentence, where the
first part must be semantically composed of items parallel to those contained in the overt
part of the VP deletion sentence, and the predicate of the second part when applied
to the first must yield the original interpretation of the (antecedent) sentence. The
interpretation of the empty VP of the VP deletion sentence is then identified with this
predicate which constitutes the second part of the antecedent sentence. When applied to
the overt part of the VP deletion sentence, the interpretation of the VP deletion sentence
as a whole is derived. This procedure can be schematized as follows. Analyze a VP
deletion sentence ?b as a function P which applies to a list of arguments a*, where a*
contains all the overt material of the sentence. Then, identify an antecedent sentence p
which can be similarly broken down into a function P' and a list of arguments a'* such
that P'(a'*) = the interpretation of p, and such that a'* and a* are parallel (in some
sense yet to be specified). The interpretation of the VP deletion sentence can then be
given by identifying P with P' and applying P to a*.
The analysis of ambiguities related to pronouns under this analysis derives from an
indeterminacy in the value of P'. DS&P assume that all pronouns receive a uniform in-
terpretation, which for our purposes can be identified with the referential interpretation
of Sag and Williams. A sentence which contains a pronoun and which is otherwise unam-
biguous will thus have a unique semantic interpretation for each referential value assigned
to the pronoun. The potential for ambiguity in a VP deletion sentence arises whenever
the antecedent sentence contains two referential expressions which have the same seman-
tic value, one of which is contained in the parallel pLt a'* and the other of which is
not. Under such circumstances, there will in gen i be two values for P' which are
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non-equivalent but which applied to a'* yield the same original semantic interpretation
as that of yp.
To illustrate the above mechanism for ellipsis resolution, consider once again our
familiar cases of VP deletion from (4), repeated below.
(4) a. i. Jch!n said he is brilliant before Bill did [e].
ii. John likes flying planes because Bill does [e].
Since the interpretation of the elided VP is derived from the partial semantic inter-
pretation of the VP ellipsis sentence and the complete semantic interpretation of the
antecedent sentence, the first step in deriving the interpretation of the elided VP is to
give these semantic interpretations. I give these interpretations below, where I restrict
my attention in (i) to interpretations in which the pronoun is interpreted as john.
(12) a. i. said(john,brilliant(john))
ii. likes(john,flying(john,planes))
likes(john,flying-planes)
b. i. Q(bill)
ii. Q(bill)
The next step in generating an interpretation for the empty material in the subordinate
clause is to split the VP deletion sentence into two semantic parts, one consisting of the
interpretation of the overt subject Bill (= a*) and another consisting of the interpretation
of the empty VP (= P), represented above as the variable Q. Having made this division
in the VP deletion clause, we next impose a similar division in the antecedent clause,
where the element(s) corresponding to Bill (i.e. a*) in the antecedent clause must be
parallel to this element (where parallelism can be taken to be defined structurally for our
purposes). DS&P refer to such parallel elements as primary occurrences, which in our
examples are the subjects John and Bill. Thus, corresponding to the division in the VP
deletion clause will be a division of the antecedent clause into a (list of) parallel element(s)
a'c consisting of the single element john and a predicate P' which when applied to a'*
must yield the relevant interpretation in (12). That is, P' will have to satisfy one of the
following equations.
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(13) i. P'(john) = said(john,brilliant(john))
ii. P'(john) = likes(john,flying(john,planes))
P(john) = likes(john,flying-planes)
In solving for P', DS&P put two restrictions on the solution. First, all primary occur-
rences in the interpretation of the antecedent sentence must be A-abstracted, and second
all controlled arguments must also be A-abstracted. I indicated these expressions in (13)
by writing them in italics. To account for the control structure in (ii), DS&P additionally
assume that all identically interpreted occurrences that get abstracted get substituted
for by the same variable. The restrictions on P', however, stop there. In our current
examples, this leaves us with a choice of solutions for the value of P which includes the
possibilities given in (14e).
(14) i. P' = Axz.said(x,brilliant(john))
P' = Az.said(z,brilliant(z))
ii. P' = Ax.likes(x,flying(x,planes))
P' = Ax.likes(x,flying-planes))
For the (i) example, the two (classes of) solutions to this equation given are non-
equivalent. In the one solution, the non-primary occurrence of john in (13i) keeps its
referential value. In the other solution, this non-primary occurrence of john gets ab-
stracted along with the primary occurrence, and thus gets treated as a variable bound
by the same A-operator. For each of the two equations given in (13ii), all solutions for
P' come out equivalent. Solutions to the first equation will be equivalent to the value
of P' given in the first equation in (14ii), while solutions to the second equation will be
equivalent to the value of P' given in the second equation in (14ii).
We have now generated the interpretations which are to be equated with the inter-
pretation of the empty VPs in the subordinate clauses in our original sentences in (4).
The interpretations assigned to these sentences as a whole can be given by applying the
predicate P' just generated to the parallel element in the phrase containing the ellipsis
site, in our examples Bill. This step is illustrated in two parts below, with substitution of
P' in place of P (= Q from (12) above) illustrated in (15a) and the result of A-conversion
given in (15b).
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(15) a. i. z.said(z,brilliant(john))[john] before Az.said(x,brilliant(john))[bill]
Axz.said(x,brilliant(x)) [john] before Axz.said(x,brilliant(z))[bill]
ii. Ax.likes(z,flying(x,planes))[john] because Ax.likes(x,flying(x,planes))[bill]
Az .likes(zx,flying-planes))[john] because Az .likes(zx,flying-planes) )[bill]
b. i. said(john,brilliant(john)) before said(bill,brilliant(john)) (strict)
said(john,brilliant(john)) before said(bill,brilliant(bill)) (sloppy)
ii. likes(john,flying(john,planes)) because likes(bill,flying(bill,planes))
likes(john,flying-planes)) because likes(bill,flying-planes)
As can be seen, this procedure generates the exact same range of interpretations for
the sentences in (4) as do Sag's and Williams' analyses. The strict/sloppy ambiguity
intduced by the pronoun in the antecedent clause in the (i) example, however, is given
a distinct explanation. As mentioned above, the pronoun itself is assumed to be inter-
preted in one and only one fashion, equivalent to the referential interpretation of Sag
and Williams. The ambiguity in interpretations assigned to the empty VP comes from
the mechanisms available for generating interpretations applied to an antecedent VP in
which all ambiguities have already been resolved.8
8 The mechanism outlined above for generating interpretations for VP deletion sentences faces what I
believe to be an insuperable problem. As I mentioned above, ambiguity of interpretation in VP deletion
sentences is predicted whenever a sentence contains two referring expressions with the same semantic
interpretation, one of which is contained in the parallel portion of the antecedent sentence (i.e. in a*)
and the other of which is used to generate the predicational portion (i.e. P'). In all such instances,
there will be two options for how to treat the second such expression - it can either retain its original
interpretation, or it can be abstracted along with the primary occurrence in a*. For the cases considered
above, this flexibility yields the correct results. However, the analysis predicts that the interpretation of
the ellipsis sentence should be independent of the manner in which the interpretation of the antecedent
sentence is generated. In particular, whether the interpretation P' is generated from a pronoun or from
an R-expression in the antecedent sentence should be entirely irrelevant to the range of readings they
predict to be available. Thus, the two sentences given below, for example, should on their view come
out as completely synonymous - each should have both a strict reading and a "sloppy" reading.
i: John's mother loves him, and Bill's mother does too.
ii: John's mother loves John, and Bill's mother does too.
What we find, however, is that only the first case, where the interpretation assigned to P' originates
from a pronoun, is a sloppy reading available. DS&P could account for these facts by stipulating that
aside from primary occurrences, no other occurrences of R-expressions can be abstracted. Making such
a move, however, would first be highly stipulative, and second violate the spirit of the analysis. The
status of an expression as a pronoun or as an R-expression is only part of the syntactic representation
of that expression, and does not show up in the semantics (on their analysis). Since the interpretation
assigned to P' is derived from the semantic representation of a sentence and not from some syntactic
representation, this distinction is thus in principle unavailable. Making such a distinction would then
be to admit defeat. For this and other reasons, I do not believe that the analysis offered by DS&P is
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The analysis of DS&P is somewhat less constrained than the analysis of Williams and,
to some extent, that of Sag. This is so since DS&P assume that the general procedure
outlined above can be used for generating interpretations of overt pronouns as well as for
empty material. Thus, the connection between "deletion" and interpretation assignment
is in one sense fairly loose. However, the possibility of restricting the interpretation of
an empty element is crucially dependent on the possibility of assigning to this empty
element the interpretation generated from some discourse antecedent, and in this regard
the connection between deletion and interpretation is quite rigid. In this respect, DS&P's
analysis is closer to Williams' than to Sag's.
1.2.4 Summary of the Three Analyses
To summarize, we saw that each of the above analyses can account for the core cases of
interpretation restrictions in VP deletion environments. While details of the mechanisms
used to account for these restrictions differ among the three analyses, they do share
some things in common. In all three analyses, the restrictions on interpretation are tied
directly to the mechanisms for interpreting empty VPs. For Sag, the connection is simply
stipulated, while for Williams and DS&P it is an integral part of the analysis that such a
connection exists. The looseness of the connection in Sag's theory shows up in his having
to posit an overt identity restriction on deletion, while for Williams and DS&P, identity
of interpretation follows from deriving the interpretation of the deleted material directly
from (a phrase containing) the antecedent.
1.3 VP Deaccenting
The above analyses account for a large range of facts, including the facts (i) that pronom-
inal interpretation in VP deletion contexts gives rise to a restricted range of ambiguities,
and (ii) that ambiguity in general does not multiply in VP deletion contexts. Sag ac-
tenable, nor do I see a simple way of fixing it up so as to retain the essence of the analysis and overcome
these problems. Since I am not interested either in defending the analysis or in modifying it, I will not
make further comments on its adequacy or inadequacy except with respect to the problem of accounting
for restrictions on deaccenting.
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complishes this by only allowing a VP to be deleted when that VP has a logical form
which is identical up to the point of alphabetic variance with the logical form of some
antecedent VP in the preceding discourse. Williams' accounts for these facts by copying
an antecedent VP onto an empty VP, stipulating that this copy operation can only apply
after all ambiguities in the antecedent have been resolved. Strict and sloppy readings for
pronouns fall out from the assumption that there is an ambiguity inherent in pronominal
interpretation, pronouns in general being capable of receiving either a bound variable
interpretation or a referential interpretation. DS&P account for these facts in a manner
similar to that of Williams in that they resolve all ambiguities in the antecedent prior
to deriving the interpretation assigned to an empty VP. They differ, however, in inter-
preting pronouns unambiguously, deriving the restrictions on pronominal interpretation
by allowing for some flexibility in the "reconstructed" predicates which can be derived
from an antecedent sentence which contains a pronoun. All three analyses assume that
the facts in question should be handled by the mechanism responsible for interpreting
the empty VP. It is somewhat surprising under these analyses, then, that these same
restrictions show up identically in cases in which a VP is deaccented but not deleted.
To illustrate this fact, compare the interpretations available for the sentences in (4)
above with those available for the sentences in (16) below, which differ from (4) only in
that the VPs which were deleted in (4) are overt but deaccented in (16).9
(16) a. John said he is brilliant before Bill said he is brilliant.
b. John likes flying planes because Bill likes flying planes.
Here we find that the interpretational possibilities for the pronoun he in the subordinate
clause in (16a) are exactly identical to those for the corresponding pronoun in the deleted
VP in (4a). Similarly, just as (4b) was only two ways ambiguous, we find that the example
in (16b) here with deaccenting instead of deletion is likewise only two ways ambiguous.
These facts pose a serious problem for each of the three theories of VP deletion outlined
above. For Sag, the constraints on interpretation in VP deletion contexts were derived
9 Here and elsewhere, I represent deaccenting by printing deaccented constituents in small italics.
As mentioned earlier, deaccented constituents are pronounced without any phonological accent, which
in the normal case will result in thhese constituents being spoken with a steady low tone with little or
no intonational contour.
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by placing restrictions on when it is possible to delete a VP. The constraint makes no
mention of when it is possible to deaccent a VP. For Williams, matters are even worse.
In order for Williams' account of the facts of VP deletion to go through, it is necessary
for there to be an empty VP onto which the antecedent can be copied, but in neither of
the deaccenting examples in (16) is there any such empty VP. DS&P are similarly in hot
water, lacking an empty VP to assign some interpretation to. Thus, none of the accounts
offered for the restrictions on interpretation in (4) can account directly for the similar
restrictions in (16) as these analyses now stand.
The obvious first attempt at a solution to this problem would be to argue that con-
ditions on VP deaccenting and conditions on VP deletion are identical, i.e. that the two
phenomena differ solely in their phonological aspect. For Sag, this would simply require
extending the analysis of VP deletion directly to deaccenting by claiming that the con-
straint which is applicable in the two cases is identical. For Williams, a more drastic
move would be called for but again the problem could be skirted by allowing copying to
overwrite deaccented lexical items or variables if they are identical to those being copied
in. Such a move would require importing an additional identity constraint into the the-
ory, but at least it could be made to work for the examples under consideration so far.
Finally, for DS&P one might allow the mechanisms of ellipsis resolution to assign inter-
pretations not only to empty elements and pronouns, but to deaccented material as well,
adding again some kind of identity constraint to prevent massive over-application of the
mechanism. No such solution could be maintained for the following examples, however.
In these examples, we find that it is possible to deaccent a phrase when deletion of that
same phrase would be impossible.
(17) a. John said he is brilliant before Bill said he is a smart guy.
b. John likes soaring gliders because Bill likes flying aircraft.
Here, the VP in the subordinate clause has been deaccented, licensed (as I will argue
below) by the VP in the matrix clause. The only difference between these sentences and
the sentences in (16) is that in (16) the superordinate and subordinate predicates are
identical whereas in (17) they are distinct. Crucially, all of the restrictions on pronom-
inal interpretation found in the previous examples carry over without exception to the
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sentence in (17a), and likewise with the restrictions on ambiguity resolution for the sen-
tence in (17b). The simple-minded extensions of Sag, Williams and DS&P floated for
consideration above, however, would be unable to account for the possibility of deaccent-
ing in these examples for the simple reason that the antecerdent VP and the deaccented
VP are not identical.
A last attempt might be made to save the simple-minded extension strategy by argu-
ing that the notion of identity needs to be replaced by some looser notion of similarity.
However, as long as deletion and deaccenting are both taken to be subject to the same
constraints, no such loosening of the identity restriction on deletion/deaccenting can
account for the full range of facts in need of explanation. In particular, any such anal-
ysis would inevitably lead to the prediction that the original VP deletion sentences in
(4a) above share an interpretation with the VP deaccenting sentences in (17), which
is patently not the case. To see why, consider each of the three theories in turn. For
Sag, who treats VP deletion as a deletion process, the problem is this: if deletion and
deaccenting are both subject to the same restrictions, and if these restrictions allow for
the phrase said he is a smart guy to be deaccented in (17a), then this phrase should be
allowed to be deleted as well. Since deletion itself does not change the interpretation
assigned to a VP, we would then predict that a possible interpretation of the VP deletion
sentence in (4a) should be the interpretation naturally assigned to the sentence in (17a).
That is, VP deletion sentences would be predicted to be wildly ambiguous in ways in
which they clearly are not. For Williams, the problem with extending the VP deletion
analysis directly to deaccenting is in a sense the opposite. Recall that Williams relies on
a copying mechanism for restricting the interpretation of empty VPs. If we attempt to
account for those same restrictions in deaccenting cases by allowing the copying opera-
tion to apply here as well constrained by some notion of similarity, we would once again
predict that VP deletion sentences like that in (4a) should be interpreted identically to
any sentence which differs from it solely in having a deaccented VP instead of a null VP.
In particular, we would expect the sentence in (17a) to be interpreted identically to (4a).
Unlike Sag, however, who would suffer from a massive overgeneration of interpretations
for VP deletion sentences, Williams' problem would be the opposite - for Williams, all
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sentences containing a deaccented VP with the same antecedent should be interpreted
exactly as we naturally interpret the corresponding VP deletion sentence. Again this
result is not consistent with the facts. For DS&P, the problems are essentially identical
to what they are for Williams. By trying to account for the restrictions on interpretation
in the deaccenting case by applying the mechanism of VP deletion resolution directly to
a deaccented VP, the prediction that a deaccented VP should be interpreted exactly like
a deleted VP becomes unavoidable. In short, a simple-minded extension of the analyses
which treated VP deletion and VP deaccenting ide ically would run afoul for the simple
reason that the possibilities for interpretation of a deleted VP are more restricted than
are those for a deaccented VP.
A second obvious solution to try would be to maintain that the essence of at least
one of the three analyses under consideration is correct, and argue that the constraints
which apply to VP deaccenting are a subset or subpart of the constraints that apply to
VP deletion. For Williams and DS&P, it is not at all clear that any extension along these
lines is possible without forcing essential changes to be made to the theories themselves.
Under their analyses, the constraints on interpretation which exist in ellipsis cases are
inherent to the mechanism by which an interpretation is assigned to the elided VP from
some antecedent, making the identity between interpretation of the antecedent VP and
interpretation of the elided VP necessary. For Sag, on tL.1 other hand, such an extension
is in principle possible provided that it is possible to maintain the identity constraint
he gives in (6) for VP deletion while constructing a suitable constraint for deaccenting
which is implied by this constraint. To see what such a solution would have to look like,
consider this constraint once again, repeated here.
(6) (= Sag's (12))
With respect to a sentence S, [VP deletion] can delete any VP in S whose rep-
resentation at the level of logical form is a A-expression that is an alphabetic
variant of another A-expression present in the logical form of S or in the logical
form of some other sentence S', which precedes S in discourse.
The type of analysis we are envisioning should be derivable from (6) by either eliminating
conditions from this constraint or by making some of these conditions less restrictive.
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There is no motivation, however, for assuming that the conditions on the antecedent
phrase are any different for the deletion cases and the deaccenting cases, nor is it plausible
to assume that the two types of cases differ in whether or not the VPs are subject to
A-abstraction at logical form. This leaves only the condition of alphabetic variance to
play around with. Eliminating this condition is not an option since without it - or some
variant of it - there will be no explanation at all of the restrictions on interpretation
which apply to deaccented VPs. This type of solution will only be possible, then, if the
notion of alphabetic variance itself can be weakened in an appropriate manner.
To see whether this is possible, consider once again the definition of alphabetic vari-
ance given in (7), repeated below.
(7) Formulae 0 and 0' are alphabetic variants if there are formulae 'o, '1 ... O'n
such that 'o is 't, ', is 0', and, for each i from 1 to n, 'ti is formed from 'i-i by
replacing some constituent A-expression [Aadi'i] by an immediate alphabetic
variant [Aai44] thereof.
(8) [Aacb] and [Aa'r'] are immediate alphabetic variants if 0b and ib' are
alike except that if' contains free occurrences of a' at all and only those places
where 7i contains free occurrences of a.
Recall that Sag needs this definition in the form it is in to account for the VP deletion
facts. Hence we cannot alter the notion of alphabetic variance itself. What we can do,
however, is formulate a derivative notion - call it containment variance - which has the
property that if ' is an alphabetic variant of '', then ' is also a containment variant of
0'. As an approximation to this condition, consider the following definition.
(18) Formulae is a containment variant of '' if there are formulae 'to, '1 · n
such that 'o is ', 't is t', and, for each i from 1 to n, 'i is formed from '_t1 by
replacing some constituent A-expression [Aaii'] by an iammediate containment
variant [Aa'ib] thereof.
(19) [Aao,] is an immediate containment variant of [Aa'if'] if 'f and ' are
similar except that 'i' contains free occurrences of a' at all and only corre-
sponding places where if' contains free occurrences of a, and the interpretation
of [rAa'f'] is contained in the interpretation of [Am/c].
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Of course, the notion of semantic interpretation in question here would have to be more
than merely an extensional notion, or any true sentence would be predicted to be able to
license the deaccenting of any other true sentence, which clearly is not the case. Further-
more, the notion of two formulae being similar would have to be spelled out in such a way
that the position of an expression in p could correspond to the position of some position
in 0b without po and 0 having to be syntactically identical. I will assume for the sake of
argument that this problem can be overcome. If so, then given a sufficiently articulated
notion of semantic interpretation, the above definition of containment variance could be
used in a constraint similar to that given in (6) for licensing VP deletion. An illustration
of what such a constraint would look like is given in (20) below.
(20) With respect to a sentence S, deaccenting can apply to any phrase in S whose
representation at the level of logical form is containment variant of another
expression present in the logical form of S or in the logical form of some other
sentence S', which precedes S in discourse.
There are two problems with such an approach. The first is that the notion of
containment required cannot be defined in purely syntactic terms, i.e. in terms which
make reference only to the formal properties of the abstract symbols involved. As we
will see in chapter 2, no purely syntactic analysis can account for the deaccenting of the
second VP in sentences like the following (modelled after sentences considered in Lakoff
(1972)).
(21) John called Mary a republican, and then BILL insulted Mary.
The implication which is felt to hold between calling Mary a republican and insulting
Mary in this example clearly does not follow directly from the meanings of the terms
involved. It rather requires some degree of reasoning to establish the connection, reason-
ing which obligatorily makes use of non-linguistic knowledge. The reasoning process is of
course fairly straightforward: John called Mary a republican; being a republican is a bad
thing; therefore John called Mary something bad; to call someone something bad is to
insult them; therefore John insulted Mary.'o However, as I will argue in chapter 2, it is
LoThe premises may not all be universally held to be true, but the reasoning process is fairly obvious
none the less.
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necessary to appeal to this implication relation in order to explain the acceptability of the
deaccenting in (21). Since syntactic processes operate independently of reasoning pro-
cesses, the fact that reasoning is required to explain the felicity of this example indicates
that any analysis which simply compares the syntactic representation of the antecedent
sentence with that of the deaccented sentence in determining the felicity of a discourse
fragment such as (21) cannot be correct. The second objection to the above approach is
of a theoretical nature. The accounts given for the two phenomena are clearly similar,
but the similarity is not a principled one. That is, even if the account could be made to
work, it would answer the question of when deletion and deaccenting are possible (to the
extent to which it gets the facts right, of course), and it would also answer the question of
what constraints on interpretation obtain in the two cases, but it would leave us without
an explanation for why these constraints are virtually identical.
1.3.1 Further Evidence
The arguments I have just given in the previous section all indicate that the general
approaches taken to VP deletion over the past many years have been misguided. If the
parallelism noted between restrictions on interpretation in VP deletion and VP deaccent-
ing environments hold up in the end, then the argument is quite strong. The argument
is not, I repeat, that the analyses in question do not capture the facts they are intended
to capture. Rather, the argument is that each of the analyses fails to capture a broader
generalization. Two sets of data are intuitively subject to identical restrictions, and yet
all of the analyses presented can only account for one of the two sets in a principled
fashion.
I have until now only considered in detail the interpretational possibilities of a limited
number of sentences. For these sentences, the evidence was clear that a parallelism truly
does exist between restrictions on interpretation in VP deletion and VP deaccenting
environments. In this section, I will examine a wider range of cases of VP deletion and
deaccenting, and will show that the parallelism holds in each case. This will offer a strong
piece of support to the argument against previous analyses of VP deletion made in the
previous section.
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As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, any account of VP Deletion has
to take into account the fact that sentences like those in (1) (repeated here) as well as
sentences like those in (2) (also repeated here) are only two ways ambiguous.
(1) a. Betsy divulged when Bill promised to call me, and Sandy did too.
b. The chickens are ready to eat, and the children are too.
(2) a. Betsy divulged when Bill promised to call me because/before Sandy did.
b. The chickens were ready to eat when the children were.
While the antecedent VP in each of these examples is ambiguous, whatever interpreta-
tion is assigned to that VP must also be assigned to the deleted VP. Similar observations
have been made elsewhere in the literature regarding a wide range of ambiguities. Lasnik
(1972), for example, considers (22a) which shows this same property in a do so construc-
tion, while Chomsky and Lasnik (1992) make the same point (citing the earlier work of
Lasnik (1972) and Lakoff (19??)) with the sentence in (22b). Each of these sentences
parallels their VP deletion counterparts in (23).
(22) a. John wants to catch a fish and so does Bill.
b. John said that he was looking for a cat, and so did Bill.
(23) a. John wants to catch a fish and Bill does too.
b. John wanted to catch a fish before Bill did.
c. John said that he was looking for a cat, and Bill did too.
d. John said that he was looking for a cat because Bill did.
In all of these examples, we find that the interpretational parallelism between the deleted
VP and its antecedent which motivated previous analyses of VP deletion hold identically
in cases in which the dependent VP is deaccented but not deleted. For example, each
of the sentences below exhibits the same two way ambiguity as its counterpart(s) in (1),
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(2) and (23) above.1"
(24) a. Betsy divulged when Bill promised to call me, and Sandy divulged when Bill
promised to call me too.
b. Betsy divulged when Bill promised to call me before Sandy divulged when Bill
promised to call me.
c. The chickens are ready to eat, and the children are ready to eat too.
d. The chickens were ready to eat when the children were ready to eat.
e. John wants to catch a fish, and Bill wants to catch a fish too.
f. John wanted to catch a fish before Bill wanted to catch a fish.
Lasnik attributed the parallelism between (22a) and (24e) to properties of conjunction
structures, since the examples he was considering all contained conjunction. However,
consideration of the full range of examples given here clearly indicates that this charac-
terization of the source of the parallelism is incomplete at best. Chomsky and Lasnik
(1992) argue that the parallelism derives from constraints on deaccenting, and that VP
deletion is no more than an extreme case of deaccenting. However, just as we found
that deaccenting was possible even when the two VPs were not identical in the exam-
ples considered in detail in the previous section, here again we find that identity is not
required for deaccenting. Once again, despite the lack of identity between the VPs, the
same restrictions on interpretation apply to the deaccented phrase here as applied above.
These facts again support the first half of Chomsky and Lasnik's analysis according to
which parallelism of interpretation derives from constraints on deaccenting. They would
appear to be inconsistent with the second half of their analysis however, which reduces
VP deletion directly to deaccenting.
11I find the examples paralleling (22a) and (23a,b) in (24e,f) less convincing than the other examples
under consideration. If the indefinite expression a fish is given a non-specific interpretation in the
antecedent VP, then the only possible interpretation available for the corresponding deleted expression
is a non-specific interpretation as well. However, if given a specific interpretation in the antecedent VP, I
find both a specific and a non-specific reading available for the corresponding deleted expression, though
the former is perhaps easier to obtain than the latter. The judgment is unfortunately subtle, so I hesitate
to hang much on it, though I do believe the additional non-parallel reading is present. I do not find this
additional reading to be problematic, since if it does exist it can be explained as an instance of the types
of interpretational mismatch illustrated in (25) below. Since the judgment is so delicate, however, I will
ignore this possibility here and throughout this dissertation.
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(25) a. Betsy divulged when Bill promised to telephone me, and Sandy said when Bill
promised to get in touch with me too.
b. Betsy divulged when Bill promised to call me befoxe Sandysaid when Bill promised
to get in touch with me.
c. The chickens are prepared to eat, and the children are ready to consume too.
d. The chickens were prepared to eat when the children were ready to consume.
e. John wants to spear a marlin, and Bill wants to catch a fish too.
f. John wanted to spear a marlin before Bill wanted to catch a fish.
Like their counterparts in (24), each sentence here is only two ways ambiguous (although
see previous footnote). It appears, then, that the arguments made in the previous section
generalize to quite a wide range of data, offering firm support for the conclusions reached
there.
The facts just considered indicate that the explanation for restrictions on interpre-
tation in VP deletion contexts should be identical to that given for similar restrictions
on interpretation in deaccenting contexts. There are two principled ways in which these
explanations can fall together. One can either show that each of the classes of interpre-
tational restrictions is based on a single underlying notion and that it is this underlying
notion which is responsible for the similarities between the two sets of data, or one can
show that the explanation for one of the sets of data reduces to that for the other set. I
have argued that it is impossible to reduce the deaccenting cases directly to the deletion
cases since there are cases in which deaccenting of a VP is possible but in which deletion
of that same VP is not possible. If a reduction is to be possible, then, it will have to
be a reduction of the explanation for the VP deletion cases to that for the deaccenting
cases. In chapter 3 I show how such a reduction is possible. Before getting to that point,
however, it is necessary to first develop an analysis of the restrictions which apply in
deaccenting environments. It is this task that I turn to now.
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Chapter 2
Deaccenting and Presupposition
2.1 Introduction
We saw in chapter 1 that ambiguity resolution in VP deletion contexts is largely par-
alleled in corresponding deaccenting cases. We concluded from this observation that a
complete theory of ambiguity resolution in such contexts has to start from an account of
the deaccenting cases, with the VP deletion cases being handled as a sub-case of deac-
centing. In this chapter, I will look more in detail at the process of deaccenting. There
are two main questions I will be addressing: (i) is deaccenting identical to lack of focus,
or are focus and deaccenting distinct processes; and (ii) what are the conditions under
which a given element or collection of elements in a sentence can be deaccented? The
standard assumption in the literature regarding (i), implicit or explicit, is that deaccent-
ing is identical to lack of focus, and hence I will approach the problem of accounting for
constraints on deaccenting from this perspective.
The relation between focus and discourse context has been widely studied. For our
present purposes, I take as a starting point the analysis laid out in Chomsky (1971).
There it was proposed that for a given sentence S which contains a focused constituent
F (S = ... F ... ), the (focus-related) presupposition of S is the existential closure of the
expression generated by replacing F with a variable, i.e. 3x[...2...]. A sentence like (26)
under this theory thus presupposes (27) on the interpretation in which the Yankees is
taken to be focus.
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The Red Sox played the YANKEES
(27) 3z[ The Red Sox played z]
This basic analysis of focus and of focus-related presupposition forms the heart of most
subsequent analyses of the phenomenon, including those of Williams (1980), von Stechow
(1981), Rochemont (1986), Jacobs (1989), and Krifka (1990,1991) among others, and I
will accordingly refer to it as the standard analysis.
While it is rarely made explicit what role focus-related presuppositions play in de-
termining the felicity of a given sentence, it is generally assumed that focus-related pre-
supposition is an instance of a broader class of presuppositions, and that consequently
the analysis of focus-related presupposition will fit into such a broader theory.1 The
only major challenges to this analysis that I am aware of are the analyses of Jackend-
off (1972), Rooth (1985) and Rochemont (1986). For these authors, the contribution of
focus-structure to the acceptability of a sentence does not lie in what is presupposed to
be true but rather in (roughly) what is taken to be under discussion. One of the major
goals of this chapter will be to argue in support of these latter analyses that what has
been identified as the focus-related presupposition of a sentence does not in fact fit into
standard models of presupposition. While the analysis I develop is more in line with
these three non-standard analyses than with the standard analysis, however, I argue that
even these analyses are too restrictive in the role they assign to focused constituents.
I take Karttunen (1974) to be representative of standard analyses of the role that
presupposition plays in determining the felicity of a given sentence. According to Kart-
tunen, the presuppositions of a sentence relate that sentence to a context. The particular
1The classical notion of presupposition is one which applies only to declarative sentences. Since focus
and deaccenting play the same role in questions as in declarative sentences, clearly the classical notion
cannot be used directly to account for the interaction between focus-related presuppositions and contexts.
However, Higginbotham (1991) shows how the classical notion of presupposition can be extended to
questions, making it possible in principle to account for focus-related presuppositions in terms of the
classical notion of presupposition. The argument of the present section is intended to show that even
under such an extension, focus-related presupposition cannot be reduced to classical presupposition.
Since extending the analysis of focus-related presuppositions and of classical presuppositions to questions
does not shed any extra light on the problem at hand, I will not discuss the focus-related presuppositions
of questions in any detail.
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(26)
analysis that Karttunen argues for is that the presuppositions of a sentence must be sat-
isfied by the context of utterance in which the sentence occurs, with satisfaction defined
as follows.
(28) Context C satisfies-the-presuppositions-of A just in case C entails all of the
basic2 presuppositions of A.
Contezt for Karttunen is defined as "a set of logical forms that describe the set of back-
ground assumptions, that is, whatever the speaker chooses to regard as being shared by
him and his intended audience." Like Karttunen's presuppositions, I take focus-related
presupposition to play a role in determining the felicity of a sentence in a given context.
I will argue below, however, that the satisfaction conditions for focus-related presuppo-
sition are distinct from those for standard presuppositions. In a nutshell, I argue that
entailment plays no role in determining when a focus-related presupposition is satisfied.
Rather, the operative notion for satisfaction of a focus-related presupposition is instan-
tiation, a notion more directly related to topic than to presupposition. I will make these
notions more precise below.
In dealing with questions of focus-related presupposition, two aspects of the problem
must be kept in mind - the semantic aspect, and the phonological aspect. It is common
practice to distinguish elements which are phonologically accented from those which are
not by the use of CAPITALS to indicate accent, and I will make use of this convention
here as well. Such elements I take to be uniformly included in a semantic focus of a sen-
tence. It is also common to assume that some of the elements of a sentence which do not
2Karttunen's relativization of satisfaction to basic presuppositions of a sentence derives from the
perspective he takes on the problem of presupposition inheritance. Instead of determining the presup-
positions of a complex sentence from the presuppositions of its parts, Karttunen advocates an approach
to presupposition satisfaction by which the presuppositiozs of a complex sentence are satisfied only if
the presuppositions of its parts are satisfied in their local context. The basic idea is that in a complex
sentence consisting of two conjuncts A and B (in that order), the local context for B consists of the
local context for A augmented by A itself. The presuppositions of the complex sentence as a whole will
then be satisfied only if the presuppositions of A are satisfied by the context of utterance, and those
of B are satisfied by the context of utterance augmented by A. Basic presuppositions, then, will be
those presuppositions associated with the non-complex propositions which make up a (possibly com-
plex) sentence. Most of the sentences I will be concerned with in this chapter will be non-complex, so
that the complexities of presupposition projection can be largely ignored. I adopt Karttunen's treatment
of presupposition satisfaction none the less for the conceptual simplicity it makes possible in relating
sentential properties to contexts.
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receive primary accent can still be included in a semantic focus together with an accented
element, though this distinction is rarely made orthographically. Here, I depart from tra-
dition by using small italics to indicate elements of a sentence specifically intended to be
excluded from the semantic focus of a sentence. It should be emphasized that this con-
vention only makes explicit what other analyses of focus assume implicitly, and does not
constitute a substantive proposal about the mechanisms of focus-assignment. Elements
presumed to be contained within a semantic focus but not phonologically prominent I
write in normal type. Using the sentence in (23) as illustration, this convention can be
used to indicate NP focus as in (29a), VP focus as in (29b), and S focus as in (29c).
(29) a. The Red Soz played the YANKEES.
b. The Red Soz played the YANKEES.
c. The Red Sox played the YANKEES.
This orthographic convention is convenient in that it is compatible with several distinct
theories regarding the exact mechanisms of focus assignment, and makes it possible to
specify in a more precise fashion what assumptions are being made with respect to
the focus structure of a sentence. Implicit in my adoption of this convention is the
assumption that semantic focus assignment is completely disambiguated at some level
of representation. In this chapter, I will assume that differences in semantic focus are
represented at least by the level of LF. In section 2.4, I will argue that in order to relate
phonological accent and semantic focus, semantic focus must be represented by the level
of S-structure as well, or rather, a unique semantic focus must be determined by the
S-structure representation of focus.
2.2 Focus-Related Presupposition as Topic
2.2.1 The Standard Analysis
As mentioned earlier, most if not all current analyses of focus-related presupposition are
based upon Chomsky's proposal which derives a focus-related presupposition by replacing
the foci of a sentence with variables which get existentially quantified. To facilitate
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discussion, I formalize this proposal below, borrowing somewhat from Williams (1980).
(30) Given a sentence S and its foci F1,..., F,, replace each Fi in S by a variable
zi. Call the resulting structure P. The presupposition of S is given by exis-
tentially closing P, i.e. 3zi,... ,z [P].
Fitting this definition of presupposition in with Karttunen's analysis relating presuppo-
sitions to contexts gives the following:
(31) Given a sentence S and an associated structure P as in (30), S can be felici-
tously uttered in a context C just in case C entails 3x2,... xn, [P].
I refer to this analysis as the standard analysis.
We are now in a position to examine this analysis. To start with, consider the sentence
Mary saw John, given below with two distinct pronunciations.
(32) a. MARY saw JOHN.
b. Mary SAW John.
I assume for the sake of discussion that the focused elements are Mary and John in
(a), and saw in (b) (as indicated orthographically), and that the remaining elements
are excluded from semantic focus. According to (30), the focus-related presuppositions
associated with these sentences are those given in (33).
(33) a. 3zy[saw(x,y)]
b. BR[R(mary, john)]
The motivation for pairing the sentences in (32) with the focus-related presuppositions in
(33) is presumably to account for the conditions under which utterance of the sentences
in (32) will be felicitous. If we treat focus-related presupposition together with other
types of presupposition along the lines suggested in Karttunen, then the prediction we
are led to is that the sentences in (32) should be felicitous in contexts which entail the
respective propositions in (33). In many cases, this prediction is borne out. When a
proposition added recently to the context obviously entails the relevant proposition in
(33), the corresponding sentence in (32) is felicitous, as illustrated below.
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(34) a. BILL saw SUE. Then MARY saw JOHN.
b. JOHN called out to MARY. Then, Mary SAW John.
Problems arise, however, when we start to look at the negative cases, i.e. at cases in which
the sentences in (32) should be infelicitous. This should occur whenever the sentences
occur in a context which does not entail the proposed presuppositions. But when will
this situation obtain? The clear intention of the standard theory is that it should obtain
in contexts like the following (# indicates infelicity).
(35) a. JOHN called out to MARY. Then, #MARY saw JOHN.
b. BILL called out to SUE. Then, #Mary SAW John.
In these examples, the first sentence does not entail the focus-related presupposition of
the second. If we assume the standard possible worlds definition of entailment, then a
proposition p will entail a proposition q if and only if the set of worlds in which p is true
is a subset of the set of worlds in which q is true. Applying the definition here, it can be
seen straightforwardly that the first sentence of the examples in (35) will not entail the
second sentence since there are possible worlds in which the first sentence is true and in
which the second sentence is false. In (35a), one such world would be a world in which
no sentient life forms have eyes, and in (35b), one such world would be a world in which
either Mary or John (or both) does not exist.
If contexts were restricted to propositions which have been uttered in a discourse,
no more would have to be said to account for the infelicity of the discourse fragments
in (35). However, the notion of context which Karttunen adopts is not restricted in
this fashion, contexts containing in addition a large number of propositions which can
be viewed as assumed common ground between a speaker and a hearer. If included in
this common ground is any proposition entailing that someone has once upon a time
seen someone else, then the second sentence of (35a) would be predicted to be felicitous,
since then the set of worlds denoted by the context would be a subset of the set of
worlds denoted by the presupposition in (33a). Likewise, if it is part of the common
ground that John and Mary both exist, then the second sentence of (35b) should be
felicitous, since again every world consistent with the context would also be consistent
40
with the focus-related presupposition in (33b). In many instances, however, it would be
unproblematic to include such propositions in the common ground and yet the discourse
contexts would be no more felicitous than they would be if such propositions were not
included in the common ground. Suppose for instance that the discourse fragment in
(35) occurred as the beginning of a conversation between two members of a gang, four
of whose members were Bill, Sue, Mary and John. It will be part of the common ground
between these two speakers that the four other gang members in question exist, and
hence the context should be able to contain a proposition indicating this state of affairs.
However, such a context would then entail the focus-related presupposition of (32b) given
in (33b), and hence (32b) would be predicted to be felicitous in any discourse between
these two speakers, in particular in a discourse such as that given in (35b). Even in such
a setting, however, this discourse fragment is infelicitous - mere common ground cannot
be what satisfies the focus-related presupposition of a sentence, and so positing the focus-
related presuppositions in (33) for the sentences in (32) will not suffice to account for the
infelicity of the discourse fragments in (35) within Karttunen's assumptions regarding
presupposition satisfaction.
2.2.2 Revisions to the Standard Analysis
The first way in which the focus-related presuppositions given in (33) might be defended
in light of the above discussion is to alter the notion of context in such a way that the only
propositions contained in a context are those which can be taken to be somehow "active"
in the minds of the discourse participants. This notion differs from that assumed by
Karttunen in that propositions which undeniably qualify as common ground between two
participants in a conversation will not thereby qualify as being active. Such propositions
as The sky is blue, Africa is bigger than New Zealand etc. will in general be part of the
common ground between speakers, but are not likely to be active except in conversations
about the sky, blueness, geography and the like. Since this notion of context differs
from that assumed by Karttunen, let me refer to contexts viewed in this light as active
contezts. The objections raised in the previous paragraph would then become irrelevant
on the assumption that the only propositions contained in the active context at the
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point at which the second sentences in (35) are processed are the first sentences of those
examples. However, this modification can be seen to be insufficient by consideration of
the slightly more complex sentence given in (36a) below.
(36) a. John BELIEVES Mary's alive.
b. 3R[R(john, alive(mary))]
According to the standard theory, the focus-related presupposition for the sentence in
(36a) is that given in (36b). By the modified analysis above, then, the sentence in (36a)
should be felicitous whenever the active context entails the presupposition in (36b). The
problem with this analysis, however, is that any active context which entails the existence
of both John and Mary and in which the predicate is alive is defined is a context which
will entail (36b), since every world in which these conditions are met will be a world in
which either John thinks Mary is alive or in which it is not the case that John thinks
Mary is alive. Thus, in a context like that given below, the sentence in (36a) is expected
to be felicitous since the active context entails the focus-related presupposition in (36b).
This prediction is clearly not borne out.
(37) Mary doesn't know if John's alive. (However,) #John BELIEVES Mary's alive.
This example shows that if we wish to continue on the assumption that focus-related
presuppositions are what the standard analysis says they are, the role that such pre-
suppositions play in relating a sentence to a context cannot be that assumed for other
instances of presupposition. In particular, the relation which is required to hold between
a context and the presupposition of a sentence which occurs in that context cannot be
entailment.
When considering an example like that in (37), it is fairly clear intuitively what has
gone wrong. The second sentence indicates (at least) that Mary's being alive is under
discussion, and yet the context of utterance for this sentence contains no mention of her
being (or not being) alive. To account for these intuitions and subsequently explain the
infelicity of (36a) in (37), I propose that the focus-related presupposition generated by
the standard analysis be treated (roughly) as a topic rather than as a presupposition.
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The basic idea I would like to pursue is that the focus structure of a sentence indicates
what the utterer of the sentence takes to be under discussion, and not what the utterer
takes to be true..
2.2.3 Toward a Tlieory of Focus-Related Topic
If the main role of what I have been calling focus-related presupposition is to indicate the
topic of discussion rather than a presupposition, then there are some obvious changes that
will have to be made in the analysis of what the focus-related presupposition of a sentence
is. If we were to simply rename the focus-related presuppositions of the standard theory
as focus-related topics and leave the form of these entities unchanged, we would be left
with an analysis which claims that all such topics are existential statements. The focus-
related topic of (32a) would then be that someone saw someone, and that of (32b) that
there is some relation which holds between John and Mary. Until we specify the role that
focus-related topics are to play in relating sentences to contexts, this treatment of topics
cannot be supported or refuted. However, it would certainly be unintaitive to claim that
this is an accurate representation of what is under discussion in the examples in question.
More appropriate would be to say that in the first case, what is under discussion is pairs
of individuals one of whom saw the other, or perhaps the seeing relation itself, while in
the second case what is under discussion is (properties which hold between) John and
Mary. To reflect these intuitions, let us revise the standard theory as followsr
(38) Given a sentence S and its foci Fx,..., F,, the focus-related topic of S is de-
rived by replacing each Fi in the LF representation of S by a variable xi.
Notice that the above definition identifies a focus-related topic as a syntactic represen-
tation possibly containing free variables. Since the role that focus-related topics is to
play in determining the felicity of a given discourse fragment does not require that focus-
related topics be interpretable, allowing the focus-related topic of a sentence to contain
free variables is not problematic. Given the above revision in the characterization of
focus-related topics as well as the envisioned role that focus-related topics are to play in
relating a sentence to a context, the felicity conditions for utterance of a sentence in a
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context will also have to be revised. I propose the following as the general form such a
condition should take, which I refer to hereafter as the felicity condition on focus-related
topics.
(39) A sentence S is felicitous in an active context C only if C instantiates the
focus-related topic of S.
Instantiation is defined in (40).
(40) A context C instantiates a focus-related topic a if and only if C contains
some expression p such that a is identical to some potential focus-related topic
of p.
7 is a potential focus-related topic of / if there is some expression 3'
which differs from / at most in its focus structure such that the focus-related
topic of f' is 7.
According to this definition, a focus-related topic will be instantiated in a context when-
ever the context contains some logical form which in turn contains an instance of the
topic (in the sense in which the logical form for the sentence Mary is alive contains an
instance of z is alive). I give a more detailed discussion of instantiation in section 2.3.1
below, where I justify adopting the definition given here. Notice incidentally that the
notion of context I am assuming to be relevant for the felicity conditions given in (39) is
that of an active context introduced earlier.
The revised analysis given above can handle all of the cases considered so far. To
illustrate, consider once again the examples in (32) and (36), repeated here as (41).
(41) a. JOHN saw MARY.
b. John SAW Mary.
c. John BELIEVES Mary's alive.
aThe felicity condition given here clearly cannot be strengthened to if and only if, since there will in
general be several factors which go into determining the felicity of a given discourse fragment. Thus, in
a discourse fragment like that below, the second sentence may or may not be felicitous in the context of
the first depending on whether the second sentence can be interpreted as being relevant to the first.
i: No one knows whether Mary saw BILL. JOHNsaw Bill.
What the felicity condition in (39) gives is only a necessary condition for felicity, and not a sufficient
condition. What further factors go into determining relevance of one statement to another is a question
which is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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According the the definition given in (38), the focus-related topics for these sentences
will be the following.
(42) a. x saw y
b. john R mary
c. john R [ mary is alive]
According to the felicity conditions for focus-related topics given in (39), the sentences
in (41) should be felicitous only in a context in which their corresponding focus-related
topics in (42) are instantiated. Reviewing the contexts considered earlier, we can see thV.t
the analysis makes the correct predictions for all of these examples. I repeat the relevant
contexts below.
(43) a. Bill saw Sue. Then MARY saw JOHN.
b. John called out to Mary. Then, #MARY saw JOHN.
c. John called out to Mary. Then, Mary SAW John.
d. Bill called out to Sue. Then, #Mary SAW John.
e. John doesn't know if Mary's alive. However, John BELIEVES Mary's alive.
f. Mary doesn't know if John's alive. However, #John BELIEVES Mary's alive.
Consider first the example in (43a). At the point in the discourse at which (41a) occurs,
the active context C consists entirely of the first sentence, Bill saw Sue. As mentioned,
the focus-related topic of (41a) is (42a), i.e. z say y. This focus-related topic will be
instantiated in C if and only if C contains some sentence which has (42a) as a potential
focus-related topic. The sole sentence contained in C satisfies this requirement. If this
sentence were assigned a focus structure in which the subject Bill and the object Sue were
focused and the verb saw was excluded from focus, then the focus-related topic of this
sentence would be (42a), i.e. exactly the same as the actual focus-related topic of (41).
Since (42a) qualifies as a potential focus-related topic of the sole sentence contained in C,
according to the definition of instantiation given above, the focus-related topic of (41a)
is instantiated in C. This sentence thus satisfies the felicity condition on focus-related
topics given in (84) above, and is thus correctly predicted to be felicitous.
When we look at (43b), we find that the focus-related topic of the second sentence (=
(41a) is not instantiated in thhe active context consisting solely of the first sentence (=
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John called out to Mary). The focus-related topic of the second sentence is again z saw y.
There is no assignment of focus-structure to the first sentence, however, which will yield
this same focus-rellated topic, and hence this focus-related topic is not instantiated in this
context. As a consequence, this discourse fragment does not satisfy the felicity condition
on focus-related topics given in (84) and is hence correctly predicted to be infelicitous.
When we look at the other pairs of examples in (43), we find that the same contrast
found to hold between (a) and (b) obtains in each case. The focus-related topic of the
second sentence in (c) (= (42b)) is straightforwardly instantiated in the first, while in (d)
it is not, and similarly for (e) and (f). If we assume that each of these discourses occurs
in an otherwise neutral setting, then the felicity of (a), (c), and (e) as well as the infelicity
of (b), (d), and (f) are exactly what is predicted by the above analysis. Since the felicity
conditions stated in (39) are stated in terms of active context, restricting judgments to
neutral contexts will amount to judging each case as if it were used discourse initially.
Questions of common ground will be of no relevance for the predictions of the theory.
2.3 Problems and Extensions
The analysis just sketched goes a long way toward accounting for our intuitions about
when a sentence with a given focus structure is felicitous. There are three questions
which the theory must answer, however, before it can be considered adequate.
The first question is whether the definition of instantiation given in (40) above is
adequate. I have only considered cases so far in which the question of whether a focus-
related topic is instantiated in a given context has a fairly obvious answer, cases in which
the material in the context which instantiates a focus-related topic trivially contains the
focus-related topic, and cases in which the context does not contain any sentence which
is even closely related to the focus-related topic of the sentence in question. There are
many other instances of felicitous discourse which fall in between these extremes, where
there is some relation which holds between a focus-related topic and a context but where
this relation is non-trivial. A simple illustration can be seen in (44) below.
(44) Yesterday, SAM killed BILL. Today, JOHN died.
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According to the theory outlined above, the focus-related topic for the second sentence
is x died. As the definition of instantiation now stands, this focus-related topic is not
instantiated in the active context, and yet this discourse fragment is perfectly felicitous.
Examples like this would thus appear to call for a modification of the definition of in-
stantiation given earlier. I argue, however, that modifying the definition of instantiation
to account for cases like this would be a mistake - to do so would inevitably lead to a
definition of instantiation which would be too imprecise to be of any theoretical value.
Instead, I argue that the felicity of discoure fragments of this sort whould be explained
by allowing the initial context to be augmented.
This brings us to the second problem the analysis has to face, which is that of re-
stricting context augmentation. If we allow contexts to be incremented freely, then we
would no longer havy e an explanation of why some of the discourse fragments we have
been considering are infelicitous - context incrementation could always save an otherwise
infelicitous utterance. To avoid this problem, I propose that context incrementation be
restricted in such a way that a proposition P can be added to a context C only if the
identity of P can be reasonably determined from contextual clues. The primary way in
which this can happen is if P can be calculated as a conversational implicature of a given
sentence uttered in the context C, along the lines of Grice (1967/87). Whether there are
other legitimate ways in which contexts can be incremented I leave as an open question,
though in this dissertation I will only consider incrementation by conversational impli-
catures. Allowing for context incrementation will provide us with an explanation of the
felicity of (44) of the following form: Sentence S with focus-related topic T occurss in an
initial context C. C does not instantiate T. However, p can be calculated as a conversa-
tional implicature of S in C and hence can be reasonably added to C, and the resulting
context C' = C + cp does instantiate T. Instantiation under this approach remains a
purely syntactic process which compares two syntactic representations for identity while
it becomes possible to explain the felicity of a sentence in a given discourse context even
when the initial context does not instantiate the focus-related topic of the sentence in
question. Felicity in these cases will be dependent on context incrementation, and so a
discourse fragment which requires such context incrementation will only be as acceptable
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as the incrementation itself.
The final question the theory must answer is that of how to deal with multiple focus
constructions. To account for a large number of cases involving multiple foci, the analysis
requires no modification. There is a class of cases, however, in which the analysis cannot
adequately predict when a sentence containing multiple foci will be acceptable. This
class includes examples like (45) in contexts like that given in (46).
(45) JOHN COMFORTED Mary.
(46) MARY was CRYING, so JOHN COMFORTED Mary.
According to the above analysis, the focus-related topic of the second sentence in this
example is x R mary. If we define instantiation in such a way that each part of this
topic must be correspond to some element of the same semantic type contained in the
context (as might seem reasonable), then this topic should only be instantiated in contexts
containing a two place relation one of whose arguments is mary. In the example in (46),
however, this situation does not obtain, and yet the example is still acceptable. To
overcome this problem requires, I will argue, a new characterization of focus-related
topic.
2.3.1 Instantiation
The first problem is that of defining the notion of instantiation. I gave the following
definition of instantiation immediately above based on the contexts considered in (43)
above.
(40) A context C instantiates a focus-related topic a if and only if C contains
some expression f such that a is identical to some potential focus-related topic
of p.
7 is a potential focus-related topic of j if there is some expression /'
which differs from j at most in its focus structure such that the focus-related
topic of /' is y.
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While this definition suffices for those examples, the analysis as it stands is still unable
to account for the acceptability of the example considered in (44) at the outset of this
section. I repeat that example here.
(44) Yesterday, SAM killed BILL. Today, JOHN died.
Here, the focus related topic of the second sentence is x died. However, as we saw above,
there is no potential focus-related topic of the first sentence which is identical to this
expression. There are two approaches one could consider for accounting for the felicity
of this discourse fragment. The first would be to modify the definition of instantiation
so that a context consisting entirely of the first sentence in (44) instantiates the focus-
related topic of the second. The second approach would be to maintain the definition of
instantiation as given, and to find a way to augment the active context in (44) so that
the augmented context instantiates the focus-related topic of the second sentence in that
example.
Although it is no doubt possible to account for the felicity of cases like (44) by
extending the definition of instantiation, from a conceptual point of view I believe it
would be misguided to do so. The main reason for thinking so is that there is an intuitive
distinction between the other cases considered previously of cases and the case of (44).
In the cases considered previously, determining the acceptability or unacceptability of a
sentence within a given context was a fairly mechanical affair. In a sense, there was no
need to figure anything out. With examples like that in (44), on the other hand, more
seems to be required. In particular, it is necessary to be able to reason that when a
person is killed that person dies. For a person who failed to make this connection, the
deaccenting of the second conjunct in (44) would be incomprehensible. The connection is
of course obvious. However, the need to make the connection differentiates this example
from previous examples, where determining whether the focus-related topic of a sentence
is instantiate in a given context could be done purely mechanically, with reasoning playing
no role whatsoever. In order to capture this distinction, I propose that the definition
of instantiation should remain as it is given in (40) above. In order to account for the
felicity of (44), then, it will be necessary to augment the context with some proposition
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which contains an occurrence of the focus-related topic of the second sentence. The
distinction will follow, then, if the process of augmenting a context is one which depends
on a persons ability to reason.
While I believe that this approach to accounting for the felicity of (44) is on the right
track, constraining the way in which a context can be augmented is a fairly intricate
affair. Suppose for example that we decided to allow contexts to contain not only the
logical forms of sentences actually uttered but also entailments of these sentences. Given
such a modification, we could predict the felicity of the discourse fragment in (44), since
the sentence Sam killed Bill entails Bill died, and there is a potential focus-related topic
of this latter sentence which is identical to the focus-related topic of the second sentence
in the discourse fragment. However, such a solution would be far too liberal in what it
allowed, in the same way that the standard analysis couched in terms of focus-related pre-
supposition was too liberal. The problem with such an account is that it is a consequence
of the definition of entailment that any sentence entails a tautology, and consequently
any tautology should be able to be added to the context. For example, Sam killed Bill
entails Either Sam is exactly siz feet tall or Sam is not exactly six feet tall. Under the
proposed extension of the analysis, then, we would expect this second sentence to be able
to be added to any context containing the first, and a discourse fragment like that given
below would thus be expected to be felicitous, contrary to fact.
(47) Yesterday, SAM killed BILL. And now, JOHN's ezactly six feet tall.
In fact, the same trick would allow us to license a sentence with any accenting pattern at
all within any context, since it would always be possible to add to the context a trivially
true proposition which contained an expression having a potential focus-related topic
identical to the focus-related topic of the sentence in question. Allowing entailments to
be added to a context would thus make the analysis vacuous.
A second approach one might consider would be to only allow logical entailments of
a sentence to be added to a context. Such an approach could allow us to account for
the felicity of the discourse fragment in (44) if we adopted a suitable meaning postulate
which related kill to die. However, consideration of examples like the following (modeled
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on similar examples from Lakoff (1972)) indicate that this is the wrong approach to take.
(48) John called Mary a republican. Then, BILL insulted Mary.
The problem posed by this example is that the relation which holds between calling
someone a republican and insulting them is not an entailment relation, and nor would
it be appropriate to add a meaning postulate to the language which licensed such an
entailment relation. While die may well be part of the meaning of kill, insult z cannot
plausibly be considered part of the meaning of call z a republiccn. If we are to allow
augmentation of a context dependent upon material already contained in that context,
restrictions on what can be added in this fashion cannot depend solely on the semantic
meaning of what is present in the context. Rather, restricting such incrementation of
contexts requires appeal to pragmatic notions.
2.3.2 Context Incrementation
We have now seen two examplee associated with focus-related topics in which the focus-
related topic of the example would appear not be instantiated in the local context and
yet the examples are still acceptable. Both examples by hypothesis involved discourse
initial utterances, the first illustrated in (44) and the second in (48), both repeated here.
(44) Yesterday, SAM killed BILL. Today, JOHN died.
(48) John called Mary a republican. Then, BILL insulted Mary.
To these, we could add the following as a third such example.
(??) I HATE computing over telephone lines.
If we consider this sentence uttered as the beginning of a discourse, it is not too difficult
to imagine situations in which the focus pattern illustrated would be acceptable, i.e. in
which the sentence would be felicitous. This example differs from the previous two,
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however, in that there is by hypothesis no linguistic material already present in the
active context at the time of utterance, and hence there can be no issue of redefining
instantiation so as to accommodate such examples. For this example, not only can we
appeal to context incrementation in order to explain its potential felicity, we in fact must
do so.
I would like to suggest that these two problems are essentially identical. In neither case
is the focus-related topic of the sentence in question instantiated in the local context at the
point at which the sentence occurs in the discourse, in violation of the felicity condition
given in (39) of section 2.2.3. However, in both cases it is possible to add a proposition to
the context which does instantiate the relevant focus-related topic. Such incrementation
of contexts can be seen as an extension of Lewis's (1979) notion of accommodation. For
Lewis, the role of accommodation is to add a proposition to the context which will make
what a speaker says true, whereas here, I am extending the notion so that it can apply
to make what a speaker says felicitous as well. This extension is required in light of
the view of focus-related topics proposed above as functioning to determine the felicity
of an utterance, and not the truth value. With respect to the cases discussed in (48)
and (49) above, we could account for the felicity of the first case if we could motivate
accommodating a proposition such as John insulted Mary, while we could account for
the felicity of the second case by accommodating a proposition such as the speaker is
computing over telephone lines.
Before delving into the specifics of licensing accommodation, it is important to keep
two aspects of the overall analysis of felicity with respect to focus-related topics separate.
I argued above that felicity of a sentence in a given context is dependent on the focus-
related topic of that sentence being instantiated in that context. The question of whether
this situation obtains can be answered directly by inspection of the context and the focus-
related topic of the sentence. That is, instantiation of a focus-related topic is defined
with respect to a fized context, so given an initial context, determining whether the focus-
related topic of a sentence is instantiated in that context is a purely mechanical matter.
By allowing for incrementation of contexts, I do not intend to alter this characterization of
instantiation in the least. Incrementation of contexts will simply add some proposition(s)
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to an existing context C to produce a new context C', with this new context serving as the
fixed context for the purposes of determining whether the focus-related topic of a given
sentence is instantiated. Thus, allowing for context incrementation via accommodation
will not affect the formal analysis developed above of the felicity conditions for a sentence
uttered in a context. Problems of accommodation are formally distinct from problems of
instantiation.
I claimed above that we could account for the felicity of the examples in (49) and
(48) above by allowing certain propositions to be accommodated, though I have not
yet specified the procedure by which such accommodation is possible. In specifying
such a procedure, it is necessary to keep in mind two separate classes of cases to which
accommodation can potentially apply. First, there are the cases like (49) and (48) in
which the discourse fragment is perceived to be felicitous, but in which the context does
not instantiate the focus-related topic of one of the sentences in the discourse. Second,
there are discourse fragments like that given in (47) below, which again contain a sentence
whose focus-related topic is not instantiated in the context, but which contrary to the
former class of cases are perceived to be infelicitous.
(47) Yesterday, SAM killed BILL. And JOHN's ezactly six feet tall.
If an analysis in terms of accommodation is to have any explanatory value, it must be
capable of distinguishing between these two classes of cases. The most straightforward
approach to this problem would be to give a formal characterization of the procedure
by which a proposition can be added to a context via accommodation, a procedure
which would be applicable in the former class of cases but blocked from applying in the
latter class of cases. I do not believe such an approach is tenable, however, for reasons
which will become evident shortly. Rather, from a formal perspective, I argue that
accommodation is equally possible in each of the above cases. The distinction between
the two classes of cases indicated above will not come from the formal procedure by which
a proposition is accommodated, but rather from pragmatic constraints on the application
of this procedure.
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Formally, I propose that in order for a proposition to be added to a context via
accommodation for the purposes of licensing the focus structure of a given sentence,
that proposition must be calculated as a conversational implicature of the sentence in
question within the context of utterance, implicatures being calculated along the lines of
Grice (1967,87). As we will see, the restriction this imposes on the propositions which
can be accommodated is only an indirect one. The method used for calculating such an
implicature in the good cases (such as (48), (44) and (49)) can be equally applied in the
bad cases (such as (47)) as well. However, calculating the relevant implicature will in
general require acceptance of some reasoning procedure as valid. The difference between
the good cases and the bad cases will come down to the difference in acceptability of this
additional proposition. The analysis of the acceptability of a discourse fragment which
requires accommodation will have the following pattern: utterance of a sentence S with
focus-related topic T in context C violates the restriction on felicity given in (39) since
T is not instantiated in C. Satisfaction of this restriction is a necessary condition for S
to be relevant within C, and hence S violates the maxim of relevance. If I assume that
the speaker is following the Cooperative Principle, then in order to make the speaker's
utterance conform to the maxim of relevance, it is necessary to augment the context with
some proposition 46 which does instantiate T. There will in general be an infinite number
of such potential propositions. In order to determine a specific one, there must be some
way of determining which such proposition to add. This will be possible in general if C
contains some proposition V and I can attribute to the speaker the belief that 4' follows
from Cp. If attributing such a belief to a speaker is unobjectionable, then accommodation
of j6 will likewise be unobjectionable. If it is objectionable, on the other hand, then
accommodation of 0 will be too, since accommodating 4 is only possible if the speaker
is taken to hold some such belief.
In the case of (48), I assume that the proposition which must be accommodated in
order for the discourse fragment to be felicitous is the proposition John insulted Mary. In
order for this proposition to be accommodated, it must be calculated as a conversational
implicature of the second sentence in (48) in the context of the first. A plausible means
by which this implicature could be calculated would be as follows. Suppose (48) to
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have been uttered by a speaker who is following the Cooperative Principle. The second
sentence uttered by the speaker (i.e. S) has a focus-related topic T of the form x insulted
mary. It is part of the conventional meaning associated with focus-related topics that in
order for a sentence to be relevant within a given context, the focus-related topic of the
sentence must be instantiated in the context. T is not instantiated in the context of the
first sentence of the speakers utterance (= C). In order for S to be relevant it is necessary
to add some proposition to C which does instantiate T. A speaker who utters (48) can
generally be taken to know this to be so and to know that his audience knows this to
be so. His audience can thus plausibly take him to intend for his listeners to add some
proposition 4' to C, where 4' instantiates T, and to be capable of determining which such
proposition he intends them to add. Since the only element which can be taken to be in
C is the proposition John called Mary a republican (= 'p), the speaker must assume that
his audience can figure out what ' is from this context alone. They can do this only if
they assume that the speaker takes the following inference to be valid for some value of ':
0 follows from (p. Taking 4' to be the proposition John insulted Mary, this condition can
be satisfied, since it is not implausible to assume that that speaker considers it insulting
to call someone a republican. They can thus take the speaker to have implicateed first
that calling someone a republican is an insult, and second (and consequently) that John
insulted Mary. This implicature is of a generalized nature - calculating the implicature
does not depend on the specific speaker or on the specific circumstances of utterance.
Since it is necessary to be able to calculate the second implicature (i.e. 4) in order for (48)
to obey the felicity condition given in (39), and since calculation of this second implicature
requires that the speaker believe 4 (= John insulted Mary) to follow from p (= John
called Mary a republican), a person who utters (48) commits himself to the validity of
this inference. Since it is not implausible that a speaker will consider this inference to
be valid, it is relatively easy to accept (48) as a well-formed discourse fragment.
For comparison, consider the case of (47). For this example, calculation of a suitable
implicature - say Someone is ezactly siz feet tall- would proceed exactly as it did above.
The context C consists of the proposition Sam killed Bill (= 'p), and the sentence S
uttered in this context is the sentence JOHN's ezactly six feet tall. The focus-related topic
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T of S is by hypothesis z is exactly six feet tall. It is part of the conventional meaning
associated with focus-related topics that in order for a sentence to be relevant within a
given context, the focus-related topic of the sentence must be instantiated in the context.
T is not instantiated in C, however, in violation of the maxim of relevance. In order to
make S relevant in C it is necessary to add some proposition 0 to C which does instantiate
T. A speaker who utters (47) can generally be taken to know this to be so and to know
that his audience knows this to be so. His audience can thus plausibly take him to intend
for his listeners to add some proposition 4 to C, where V) instantiates T, and to be
capable of determining which such proposition he intends them to add. Since the only
element which can be taken to be in C is the proposition Sam killed Bill (i.e. p(), the
speaker must assume that his audience can figure out what 0 is from this context alone.
They can do this only if they assume that the speaker takes the following inference to
be valid for some value of ': 4 follows from pO. Determining a specific value for 0 will
be difficult, however. To see why, suppose the audience takes j6 to be the proposition
Someone is exactly six feet tall. If this proposition is added to the context, then the
resulting context will clearly instantiate T. However, we can only add this proposition
to the context if we assume that the speaker takes the following inference to be valid:
someone is exactly six-feet tall follows from Sam killed Bill, and this assumption is a
highly implausible assumption to make. Since utterance of (47) would commit a speaker
to some such assumption, it is generally perceived to be unacceptable.
The explanation just given is intended as an explanation for why discourse fragments
like those in (48), (44), (49) etc. are readily considered to be acceptable while discourse
fragments such as that in (47) are not. The explanation given makes the relative accept-
ability of the examples dependent upon an undefined (and in fact undefinable) notion of
plausibility of attributing certain beliefs to a speaker. I do not take this to be a drawback
to the analysis, however, for a simple reason. While under normal circumstances the ac-
ceptability of the discourse fragments under consideration are what they are indicated to
be, it is possible to craft a situation in such a way that the relative acceptability of these
discourse fragments is reversed. For example, if (48) were to be uttered at the democratic
national convention, it would be seen as impeccable, whereas the same example would
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be unacceptable (or rather completely baffling) if uttered amongst republicans who think
that there is no higher praise which could be given of a person than to call that person a
republican. The reason for the distinction is obvious under the analysis given above - in
the former case, it is easy to imagine the speakers committing themselves to the notion
that calling a person a republican is an insult, while in the latter case it is difficult to do
so. Similarly, (47) would be (at least potentially) impeccable if uttered at a convention of
detectives who were united by their belief that all murderers are exactly six feet tall. In
each case, if the assumptions needed to calculate the relevant implicature are acceptable
to the discourse participants, the discourse fragment as a whole will be acceptable, and
if they are not, it will be unacceptable.
According to the analysis just sketched, a sentence with a focus-related topic should
be acceptable in two types of contexts - those in which the focus-related topic is al-
ready instantiated, and those in which a hearer can augment the context with a specific
proposition which he can calculate as an implicature of what the speaker has said in
the context given. In the examples in (48), calculating such an implicature is relatively
straightforward, and only requires attributing to the utter of the example beliefs which
one might plausibly be willing to accept. Likewise, in (49) the calculation will be fairly
simple provided we allow non-linguistic contextual clues to be used in calculating the rel-
evant implicature, though I leave it to the reader to convince himself or herself that this
is indeed the case. In (47), on the other hand, calculation of a suitable implicature will in
general require attributing to the speaker beliefs which are implausible. Unless given in-
dependent justification for attr;buting such beliefs to a speaker in a specific circumstance,
the implausibility of these beliefs makes the discourse fragment itself come across as un-
acceptable. The relative acceptability of the former examples and the unacceptability of
the latter example thus receives the longed for explanation.
In addition to giving us the means to distinguish between the various examples con-
sidered in this section, the analysis just given also allows us to account for the distinction
mentioned earlier between examples like (41) in contexts like (43) and examples like (48).
In the former type of example, determining whether a sentence is potentially acceptable
within a given context is independent of assumptions one makes about the beliefs of the
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speaker. The theory predicts this since in such examples the context already contains
everything needed to determine that the focus-related topic of the sentence is instanti-
ated in the context, and determining whether a topic is instantiated in a given context
is a purely mechanical affair. In the latter type of example, the focus-related topic is
not instantiated in the original context, and hence the example cannot be determined to
be acceptable in such a purely mechanical fashion. If it is acceptable at all, it must be
because the context can be augmented with some proposition which will instantiate the
focus-related topic of the sentence in question. By requiring that propositions added to
the context be calculated as implicatures of a speakers utterance within the context of
utterance, since calculation of an implicature in general is dependent upon attributing
certain beliefs to the speaker, the plausibility of augmenting a context in a given manner
will be dependent on the plausibility of attributing the relevant beliefs to the speaker.
The proposition added to the context will of course have to instantiate the focus-related
topic of the sentence in question, and in this regard both cases will involve the same
mechanical checking procedure to determine whether the focus-related topic is in fact
instantiated. The latter cases, however, will also be dependent on the beliefs attributed
to a speaker. The difference between the two types of cases thus receives a principled
explanation.
2.3.3 Multiple Foci
The final problem that the analysis must face challenges the characterization of focus-
related topic given in (38). As mentioned above, the problem boils down to accounting
for the acceptability of sentences like (45) in contexts like that given in (46), repeated
here.
(46) MARY was CRYING, so JOHN COMFORTED Mary.
This sentence poses a problem for the analysis on the assumption that the sentellce
contains two distinct foci, one containing the subject NP John, and the other containing
the verb comforted. There are two ways this assumption could be cashed out consistent
with analyses of focus-related presupposition in the literature. Under all analyses, the
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subject will be treated as an independent focus, the only question being how to treat
the focus containing the verb. One option would be to treat the focus as consisting
entirely of the verb itself, hence replacing the verb alone by a variable in determining the
focus-related topic of the sentence. A second option, more in line with the analyses of
Chomsky (1971) and Selkirk (1984), would be to treat the entire VP as focus. Under such
a treatment, the variable which replaces the VP in generating the focus-related topic for
the sentence would presumably be constrained to ranging over properties which relate
Mary to a subject. These two options would result in the focus-related topics given in
(49) below.
(49) a. z R mary
b. z 1R, where Rm(z) iff R(x, mary)
What is important for our present purposes is that under either analysis, there are two
variables introduced in generating the focus-related topic of (45). I will remain neutral for
now between the two options. If we take the simple-minded view of instantiation hinted
at above and assume that every variable in a focus-related topic must correspond to an
element in the context of the same semantic type, then this example cannot be handled
by the analysis. In order for either of the focus-related topics in (49) to be satisfied, the
context would have to contain a two place relation holding of Mary and someone else,
and yet the context given contains no such relation.
Two possible solutions suggest themselves for how to avoid the problems posed by
this example. The first is to allow the two foci in (45) to combine into one and replace
the result with a single variable in determining the focus-related topic of the sentence.
The focus-related topic for the sentence would then be one of the expressions given in
(50) below.
(50) a. R mary
b. Rim, where Rm iff R(mary)
Regardless of which of the two representations in (49) we start with, however, it is difficult
to see how to produce either of the focus-related topics given in (50) without violating the
principle of strict coinpositionality. Any solution along these lines would require semantic
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composition of two elements - a transitive verb and its subject - which do not form a
constituent at any level of representation. Going from (49a) to (50a), the violation of
strict compositionality is readily apparent. Going from (49b) to (50b), the violation is less
obvious, yet still unavoidable. As represented in (49b), the variable associated with the
VP ranges over properties which relate Mary to some subject. Combining such a property
with a subject will thus result in a proposition in which Mary is related to the subject.
That is, the resulting proposition will still be represented as a two-place relation holding
between Mary and a subject. Reducing this relation to a one-place relation holding of
Mary requires combining the relational term and the subject term into a single property-
denoting expression, but this is just bringing a violation of strict compositionality in
through the back door. I take these objections to be sufficient grounds for rejecting such
an approach.
The second possible solution to the problem is to modify the way in which we generate
focus-related topics in the first place, so that the focus-related topic generated for a
sentence like (45) is directly instantiated in (46). This is the approach I will pursue. The
basic idea behind this approach is to generate the focus-related topic of a sentence directly
from the deaccented elements of a sentence, ignoring foci except insofar as their presence
is required by some deaccented element. This approach will allow us to generate a focus-
related topic for (45) which consists entirely of the object Mary, since this is the only
deaccented element in the sentence and it does not select any of the foci of the sentence.
The problem of having to combine foci on this approach simply does not arise, and
so neither does the problem of potentially violating strict compositionality. Developing
such an approach to focus-related topic will require making explicit the relation that
holds between syntactic focus assignment, focus-related topic, and phonological accent,
about which I have said little so far. I will develop the alternative analysis sketched
above immediately below. There, I first take a closer look at the interaction between the
semantic and phonological aspects of focus assignment, and after that will return to a
detailed analysis of cases involving multiple foci.
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2.4 Phonological Accent and Semantic Focus
In section 2.3.3, I argued that the generation of focus-related topics must be flexible
enough to allow the focus-related topic of a sentence like (45) to be instantiated in a
context like that in (46) (repeated below). I assumed there that (45) should be analyzed
as containing two foci - one containing the subject and one containing the verb - and
argued that such an assumption makes it impossible to account for the felicity of the
discourse fragment in (46) under an analysis of focus-related topics in which the variables
substituted in for the foci of a sentence play an ineliminable role. The problem, recall,
is that (45) would have to be associated with a focus-related topic equivalent to (51),
but generating such a focus-related topic from a sentence which contains two foci would
inevitably violate the principle of strict compositionality.
(45) JOHN COMFORTED Mary.
(46) MARY was CRYING, so JOHN COMFORTED Mary.
(51) AR[R(mary)]
I claimed that this problem could be avoided by an analysis which generates the focus-
related topic of a sentence directly from the deaccented elements of the sentence, though
I left this claim undefended. In this section, I defend this claim by working out the details
of such an analysis.
2.4.1 Semantic Focus Identification
In order for an analysis along the lines proposed to be viable, it is necessary to be able to
determine what the deaccented elements of a sentence are. I have so far been assuming
that deaccented elements are those elements which are excluded from the semantic focus
of a sentence. However, I have not yet said under what conditions a given element can be
identified as part of the semantic focus, or under what conditions an element can be taken
to be excluded from the semantic focus. There are two general approaches which have
been taken to this question. The first approach is that of Chomsky (1971), according
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to which any constituent which contains a phonologically accented element qualifies as
a potential semantic focus for a sentence. This approach can be seen as a minimalist
approach in that the only restrictions it assumes are restrictions which are adopted by
every analysis. Later analyses such as Selkirk (1984) and Rochemont (1986) have argued
for a narrower conception of semantic focus according to which only a specified subset
of those constituents containing a phonologically accented element qualify as potential
semantic foci. The mechanisms argued for by all these authors for associating semantic
focus and phonological accent are quite different, as are the corresponding conceptions
of semantic focus which underlie the analyses. In order to determine when an element
is or is not contained in a semantic focus of a sentence, then, we must first have an
independent notion of what it means for something to be a semantic focus in the first
place.
2.4.1.1 The Natural Response Test
By far the most common test used for determining the potential semantic foci of a
sentence is what I will call the natural response test. The underlying idea behind the test
is that a sentence will qualify as a natural response to a question/negative sentence only if
the presupposition of a question/negative sentence and the focus-related presupposition
of an answer are identical in relevant respects. Accordingly, by showing that a sentence
with a particular focus structure is a natural response to a question with presupposition
P, it follows that that sentence itself presupposes P. If the arguments of the previous
sections are correct in showing that what have traditionally been assumed to be (focus-
related) presuppositions are really focus-related topics, then clearly this test will have to
be modified if it is to be of any use in identifying the focus-related topic of a sentence.
I will ignore this complication for the moment, however, to illustrate how this test has
been used and what it has be taken to show.
The test itself originates in Chomsky (1971). Although Chomsky himself does not
give an explicit characterization of the test, we can reasonably reconstruct such a test
from the clues he gives as to how it applies. I give such a reconstruction below based
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upon yes-no questions/negative sentences and their responses. 4
(52) Given a sentence S = ... F... , F is a semantic focus of S if
i: F contains an element which is phonologically accented, and
ii: there is an F' such that F' contains a phonologically accented ele-
ment and "(No,) ... F'..." is a natural response to the yes-no ques-
tion/negative sentence formed from S.
The intended application of this test is t. examples like the following where, as Chomsky
observes, the question/negative sentence in (53) can be answered naturally by any of the
responses given in (54).
(53) He wasn't warned to look out for an ex-convict with a red SHIRT (?)I Was he
(54) a. (No,) he was simply told to be more CAUTIOUS.
b. (No,) he was warned to expect a visit from the FBI.
c. (No,) he was warned to look out for an AUTOMOBILE salesman.
d. (No,) he was warned to look out for an ex-convict wearing DUNGAREES.
e. (No,) he was warned to look out for an ex-convict with a CARNATION.
f. (No,) he was warned to look out for an ex-convict with a red TIE.
(53) is by assumption the yes-no question/negative sentence formed from the sentence in
(55) below. The naturalness of the responses in (54) to (53) is then taken to show that
any of the phrases in (56) constitute potential semantic foci for (55).
(55) He was warned to look out for an ex-convict with a red SHIRT.
(56) a. warned to look out for an ex-convict with a red shirt
b. look out for an ex-convict with a red shirt
c. an ex-convict with a red shirt
d. with a red shirt
e. a red shirt
f. shirt
4The formulation of the natural response test given here is based on a suggestion by Noam Chomsky
(p.c.).
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If we adopt the test as given above, then this conclusion regalding possible semantic
foci is unassailable. However, the test as stated actually makes most of the responses
given in (54) unnecessary for establishing this conclusion. According to (52), that any
of the phrases in (56) are potential semantic foci for the sentence in (55) follows from
consideration of (54f) alone as a natural response to (53). (52) states that a constituent
F is a semantic focus of a sentence if there is an F' which can substitute in for F in
the response to the question/negative sentence formed from that sentence. The only
restriction on F and on F'\other than this is that each must contain a phonologically
accented element. Suppose that we take F to be (56d). Then if we choose as our F'
the phrase wearing DUNGAREES, we derive the sentence in (54d). The fact that this
sentence constitutes a natur response to the question in (53) thus indicates that the
phrase originally chosen as F, j.e. (56d), is a potential semantic focus for (55). However,
the exact same conclusion foll ws if instead of the phrase wearing DUNGAREES we
choose as our F' the phase with a red TIE, since this phrase meets all the restrictions
required to hold of F'. Substitutipg this phrase in for F in (53) gives the sentence in (54f),
which we have already determined to be a natural response to (53). Thus, consideration
of (54f) alone is sufficient to establish that (56d) is a potential semantic focus of (55).
By the same reasoning, it is easy }o see that the naturalness of the response in (54f) is
sufficient to show that any of the hrases in (56) is a potential semantic focus for the
sentence in (53).
The ability to use a single response to a question to identify any of a number of
constituents as potential semantic f ci has two drawbacks. The first drawback is that it
is impossible to use the test as given in (52) to argue conclusively for a narrow ser antic
focus in any particular sentence. The most that can be shown is that the semantic focus
might be narrow. Consequently, the test can only be used to determine the potential
semantic foci compatible with any gi en phonological accent assignment in a sentence,
and cannot (except in extreme cases) be used to determine what the actual semantic
focus of a sentence is in a given insta ce. This of course is not a fault of the test, but
merely a limitation of its applicability. A more serious problem facing this test is that it
gives intuitively implausible results in cses in which accent location differs from what it
64
was in (53). To illustrate, consider the sentence in (57).
(57) He was warned to look out for an ex-convict with a RED shirt.
We can use the naturalness of the question/answer pair given in (58) to show that red is
a potential semantic focus of this sentence.
(58) a. Was he warned to look out for an ex-convict with a RED shirt?
b. (No), he was warned to look out for an ex-convict with a BLUE shirt.
By the reasoning employed in the previous paragraph, however, the naturalness of this
same question/answer pair can equally be used to indicate that any of the phrases in
(56a-e) is a potential semantic focus for this sentence, a conclusion which does not receive
any independent support. In the case of (53), we saw that the naturalness of the single
sentence (54f) could be used to show that any of the phrases in (56) is a potential semantic
focus for the sentence. This conclusion was plausible largely because of the fact that in
each case other than in (56f) the same conclusion could have been reached with a different
question-answer pair in which the constituent substituted in for F was completely distinct
from F. In the case of (57), on the other hand, there is no such corroborating evidence
that the semantic focus of the sentence can include anything other than the word red.
For example, none of the sentences in (54a-e) qualify as natural responses to the question
in (58a). While the test does not predict that these responses should be possible, it also
gives no explanation for why no such response in fact is possible. Thus, the only evidence
that any of the phrases in (56a-e) are potential semantic foci for (57) is the naturalness
of the question-answer pair in (58).
If the intuitive implausibility of analyzing the phrases in (56a-e) as potential semantic
foci for (57) were the sole objection to the test formalized in (52), the objection would
carry little weight. However, recall that one of the main reasons the test was needed in the
first place was to give an independent characterization of semantic focus which could be
used in the analysis of focus-related topics. If we adopt this characterization of semantic
focus for the purpose of determining what the focas-related topic of a given sentence is,
however, we find ourselves unable to explain the infelicity of several discourse fragments.
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According to the analysis developed in the previous sections of this chapter, the focus-
related topic of a sentence is generated by replacing the semantic foci of a sentence by
variables. The analysis then states that a sentence will be felicitous in a given active
context only if the focus-related topic of the sentence is instantiated in that context.
If we use the characterization of semantic focus given by the natural response test, we
predict that the sentence in (57) should be felicitous (with respect to the focus-related
presupposition of the sentence) in contexts which instantiate any of the focus-related
topics in (59), since according to the natural response test each of these qualifies as a
potential focus-related topic of (57).
(59) a. He was warned to loGk out for an ex-convict with a x shirt.
b. He wa. warned to look out for an ex-convict with a z.
c. He was warned to look out for an ex-convict x.
d. He was warned to look out for x.
e. He was warned to x.
f. He was z.
The analysis would therefore predict that (57) should be felicitous in contexts like those
given below, and yet clearly this is not the case.
(60) a. First he was warned to look out for an ex-convict with a red tie.
Then # he was warned to look out for an ex-convict with a BLUE shirt.
b. First he was warned to look out for an ex-convict wearing dungarees.
Then # he was warned to look out for an ex-convict with a BLUE shirt.
c. First he was warned to look out for an insurance salesman.
Then # he was warned to look out for an ex-convict with a BLUE shirt.
d. First he was warned to expect a visit from the FBI.
Then # he was warned to look out for an ex-convict with a BLUE shirt.
e. First he was told to be more cautious. Then # he was warned to look out for
an ex-convict with a BLUE shirt.
Adopting the characterization of focus given by the natural response test would thus
force a major revision in the analysis of focus-related topics in order to account for the
infelicity of these examples. It is difficult to see how any such analysis could be based
upon the notion of semantic focus as given by the natural response test above, however.
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In order to avoid running into problems with examples like those in (60), it would
appear necessary to restrict the possible semantic foci of the sentence in (57) to the word
red. If we are to use some variation of the natural response test to obtain this result,
clearly some changes in the formulation of the test given in (52) will have to be made.
For ease of reference, I repeat the natural response test below.
(52) Given a sentence S = ... F... , F is a semantic focus of S if
i: F contains an element which is phonologically accented, and
ii: there is an F' such that F' contains a phonologically accented ele-
ment and "(No,) ... F'..." is a natural response to the yes-no ques-
tion/negative sentence formed from S.
There are two obvious changes one could make in this formulation to obtain the desired
results. The first would be to stipulate that any given question/negative sentence-answer
pair identifies at most a single constituent as a potential semantic focus, that constituent
being the smallest constituent which satisfies the constraints on F in (52). In the original
set of examples considered above, the naturalness of (54f) as a response to (53) could then
only be used to identify (56f) as a potential semantic focus of (55) since this represents the
narrowest possible focus assignment which satisfies the natural response test. Likewise,
with (57), the naturalness of the question-answer pair in (58) could only be used to
identify red as a potential semantic focus since this again is the narrowest possible focus
assignment which satisfies (52). The account is of course stipulatory, but it will yield
the desired results. The second change one could make in the formulation of the natural
response test would be to alter the restrictions themselves. As mentioned earlier, and
as is evident in (52i), the only restriction Chomsky assumes on the relation between
a semantic focus and a phonological accent is that the former must contain the latter.
The lack of any further restrictions on this relation makes it possible to identify any of
the phrases in (56) above as a possible semantic focus for (57), an identification which
as we saw lead us into trouble. Allowing only a restricted subset of the constituents
which contain a phonologically accented element to qualify as potential semantic foci
would again restrict the class of potential semantic foci for any given sentence, making
it possible in principle at least to account for the facts considered above.
While it is possible to alter the natural response test along one of the two lines pro-
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posed, making such a change without further evidence that it is required would amount
to little more than a stipulation of facts. However, independent motivation for adopting
one of these changes comes from consideration of an alternate formalization of the natu-
ral response test based on the naturalness of a sentence as an answer to a WH question.
I give a formalization of such a test below.
(61) Given a sentence S = ... F... , if the the WH question Q formed from S
by substituting a WH phrase in for F at D-structure and raising that WH
phrase to the matrix Comp at S-structure is well-formed, then F is a potential
semantic focus of S if and only if S is a natural response to Q.
Given the well-known constraints which apply to S-structure WH-movement, this test
is unavoidably limited in its range of potential applicability. If the question formed
according to the procedure given in the test is itself ill-formed, then the resulting question-
answer pair will not be natural, but for reasons which have nothing to do with whether or
not the constituent identified as F in the answer is a potential focus of the sentence. This
is the reason for relativizing the test to cases in which the WH question is well-formed.
The need to limit any test based upon WH question-answer pairs in this fashion was
largely what drove Chomsky to develop the natural response test on the basis of yes-no
questions and negative sentences. Despite its limitations, however, the test can be used
to argue for a narrower conception of semantic focus than that derived via the original
test given in (52) above.
To illustrate how the extension of the natural response test given in (61) functions,
consider the sentence in (62).
(62) John said that Bill saw SUE.
This sentence constitutes a natural response to any of the questions given in (63) below.
(63) a. Who did John say that Bill saw?
b. What did John say that Bill did?
c. What did John say?
d. What did John do?
e. What happened?
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According to (61), it follows that all of the constituents of (62) given below are poten-
tial semantic foci of this sentence, since these are the constituents of (62) which are
substituted for by a WH expression in (63).
(64) a. Sue
b. saw Sue
c. (that) Bill saw Sue
d. said that Bill saw Sue
e. John said that Bill saw Sue
This example contrasts with the sentence in (65), where the range of potential semantic
foci as determined by (61) is much more highly constrained.
(65) John said that Bill SAW Sue.
On the surface, the only distinction between this sentence and the sentence in (62) lies in
the location of the phonological accent. However, this distinction makes a large difference
in what constituents qualify as potential semantic foci for the sentence. This can be seen
from the fact that (65) does not constitute a natural response to any of the questions
given in (63) above. Indeed, the only WH question to which (65) does constitute a
natural response is the question given in (66).
(66) What did John say that Bill did to Sue?
Given the exteasion of the natural response test in (61), we can conclude from these facts
that the only potential semantic focus of (65) is the verb saw.
When we compare the results of applying the extension to the natural response test to
(65) to with the results of applying the original test to this example, we find that the two
results diverge. In particular, according to the extension, none of the phrases in (64b-e)
is a potential semantic focus of (65), while according to the original test they all are.
Once again, when we consider the role which semantic foci play in focus-related topic
generation, we find that the narrower conception of focus - that given by the extension
in (61) - gives us the desired results. Of the following discourse fragments, only the first
is acceptable, a result which will follow directly from the analysis of interaction between
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focu-related topics and discourse contexts developed above on the assumption that the
potential semantic foci of (65) are what is determined by the test in (61), but which will
be unexplainable on the assumption tLat the potential semantic foci of the sentence are
what the test in (52) determines them to be.
(67) a. First, John said that Bill heard Sue.
Then John said that Bill SAW Sue.
b. First, John said that Bill went to the party.
Then, # John said that Bill SAW Sue.
c. First, John said that there was a party.
Then # John said that Bill SAW Sue.
d. First, John went to the party.
Then, # John said that Bill SAW Sue.
e. There was a party.
# John said that Bill SAW Sue.
If the only potential semantic focus of (65) is saw, then in order for this sentence to be
felicitous in a discourse the focus-related topic given in (68) must be instantiated in the
discourse.
(68) john said that bill R sue
Of the discourse fragments given in (67), this situation obtains only in the example given
in (a), and hence only this example is predicted to be felicitous, as is indeed the case. If
all of the phrases in (64) were potential semantic foci, however, then each of the discourse
fragments given in (67) would be expected to be felicitous, since (65) would then have as
potential focus-related topics any of the topics given in (69) in addition to that given in
(68), and one of these topics is instantiated in each of the discourse contexts in (67).
(69) a. john said that bill R
b. john said that P
c. john P
d.P
Once again, the original version of the natural response test yields a definition of semantic
focus which cannot be used in the determination of the focus-related topic of a sentence.
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Now, however, we have an separate version of the test which does yield an acceptable
characterization of semantic focus, at least for the limited range of cases to which it is
applicable.
Since both of the above tests purport to be identifying the same thing - the potential
semantic feci for a sentence - the fact that they diverge in what they identify as the
potential semantic foci for some sentences indicates that they cannot both be maintained
as formalized. If we assume that the analysis of focus-related topics developed earlier is
esaentially on the right track, then "we can use this fact to argue that the WH quc3tion
version of the test should be maintained as is while the yes-no question/negative sentence
version of the test should be modified. However, our whole reason for looking at the
natural response in the first place was to find an independent characterization of the
potential semantic foci of a sen;.ence to justify the semantic focus assignments assumed
in developing the analysis of focus-related topics. To use this anmysis .o choose between
the two tests would make the analysis circular. The most we can say is that the analysis of
focus-related topics developed above is plausible to the extent to which the WH question
form of the natural response test can be argued to take precedence over the yes-no
question/negative sentence form of the test. Fortunately, such an argument can be made.
2.4.1.2 Association with "only"
The argument I would like to make in favor of the WH question form of the natural
response test is based upon the interaction between the operator only and the focus
structure of a sentence. The sensitivity of only and similar operators to focus structure
was explored in depth in Jackendoff (1972), and has also been looked at by Anderson
(197?), Taglicht (1984), Rooth (1985,1991), Kratzer (1989), and Tancredi (1991a,1991b)
among others. While syntactic and semantic analyses of this operator differ, all analyses
agree that there is a relation between the operator itself and some focused element in
its scope, and that the focus structure assigned to a sentence affects not only the felicity
conditions of utterance, but the truth conditions as well. The above analyses are all
based on the premise that in the semantic interpretation of a sentence containing only, a
focused constituent in the scope of only gets substituted for. The usual assumption is that
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what replaces this focused constituent is a variable which is constrained to ranging over
elements of the same semantic type as that of the focused constituent. What is important
for our purposes is that this constituent is widely assumed to have to constitute a semantic
focus. When a sentence has more than one possible semantic focus assignment consistent
with its phonological accent assignment, the sentence will in general be ambiguous. To
illustrate, consider the following sentence.
(70) a. Bill only saw SUE.
b. Vxz[saw(bill, x) --+ x = sue]
c. VR[R(bill)] -- R = Ax[saw(x, sue)]
According to both versions of the natural response test considered above, both Sue and
saw Sue are potential semantic foci for this sentence. Since only is sensitive to the focus
structure of a sentence, the interpretation assigned to this sentence as a whole will depend
on which phrase is identified as the semantic focus for the sentence. If focus is assigned
narrowly to Sue in (70a), the interpretation of this sentence is that given in (b), which
can be paraphrased as Everyone that Bill saw is Sue5 (- the only person Bill saw was
Sue). If focus is assigned broadly to the entire VP, on the other hand, then the sentence
is interpreted as (c), paraphrasable roughly as Everything Bill did was see Sue (- the
only thing Bill did was see Sue).
Consider now what happens when we alter the focus structure of this sentence as in
(71).
(71) Bill only SAW Sue.
If phonological accent on saw is consistent with semantic focus being assigned to the VP,
then (71) should have an interpretation identical to that given in (70c) above, i.e. (71)
and (70a) should share an interpretation. If on the other hand phonological accent on saw
is not consistent with semantic focrus being assigned to the VP, the only interpretation
predicted to be available for this sentence would be that given in (72) below.
5 This is clearly an unnatural English paraphrase of (a), but suffices to capture the intended readit
of the sentence giv'n in (b).
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VR[R(bill, sue)] -- R = Ax, y[saw(x, y)]
By determining whether (70c) is a possible interpretation for (71), then, we can simulta-
neously determine whether phonological accent assignment to the verb saw can result in
semantic focus assignment to the VP. We can see from the following examples, however,
that such an interpretation in unavailable for (71).
(73) John only SAW Sue.
# That is, he didn't hear MARY/HEAR Mary.
If semantic focus assignment to the VP were possible in (71), we would expect the second
sentence in (73b) to corroborate the first sentence in that example, and hence we would
expect this discourse fragment to be acceptable. However, there are no circumstances in
which this expectation is borne out. If we compare this situation with that which obtains
with the sentence in (70a), we find a strong contrast in acceptability.
(74) John only saw SUE.
That is, he didn't hear MARY.
If we use the interpretation of (70a) given in (70c) to explain the acceptability of this
discourse fragment, as I believe is necessary, and if we further assume that this same
interpretation is available for (71), then the contrast between the acceptability of (74)
and (73 would be unexplainable. The easiest way to explain the distinction is be to assume
that the two sentences fail to share an interpretation. If we make this assumption, then
given the semantics for only sketched briefly above, the contrast between (73) and (74)
can be taken to show that semantic focus assignment to the VP in (71) is impossible.
If the argument just given is valid, then the conclusion of the argument - that phono-
logical accent on the verb saw is incompatible with semantic focus assignment to the VP
- argues in favor of the notion of semantic focus given by WH question version of the
the natural response test considered in the previous section. According to this version
of the test, phonological accent on the verb saw is only compatible with semantic focus
assignment to that verb itself, wlhile according to the original version of the test the same
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(72)
phonological accent should be compatible with semantic focus assignment to the VP as
well."
2.4.1.3 Refinements and Caveats
We have just seen evidence favoring the WH question version of the natural response test
in (61) over the original version of the test given in (52). However, as mentioned earlier,
the WH question version of the test is limited in its applicability, in that it can only
determine a constituent to be a potential semantic focus if a WH expression substituted
in for that constituent could be moved at S-structure to the most local Comp. This
means that for the original example considered in (55), we are left without any means
for determining whether any of the subconstituents of the embedded NP an ex-convict
with a red SHIRT are potential semantic foci for the sentence. This gap can of course
be remedied, and in fact we have already seen in brief outline two forms that such a
remedy can take. The remedy consists in revising the original version of the natural
response test so that it agrees with the WH question version in all cases in which this
latter version can be applied. The revision I adopt here is one argued for by Rochemont
(1986), which restricts the relation between semantic focus assignment and phonological
accent location by requiring that the phonologically accented element be the rightmost
element of a constituent identified as a semantic focus. The resulting version of the
natural response test is that given in (75) below.
OActually, the WH question version of the natural response test is not strictly applicable to the case
at hand, since there is no WH question which can be formed by substituting a WH expression in place
of the verb and raising that WH expression to Comp at S-structure. In order to extend the test so as
to apply to focused verbal elements, it is necessary to allow the "WH expression" which replaces the
relevant verbal constituent to consist of the dummy verbal element do together with the WH expression
what. Focus on the verb in the sentence in (i) will then be determined to be possible by the naturalness
of (i) as a response to the question in (ii), while focus on the VP will be determined to be impossible by
the unnaturalness of (i) as a response to (iii).
i: John SAW Sue.
ii: What did John do to Sue?
iii: What did John do?
While such an extension will complicate the formulation of the test given in (61), it poses no conceptual
problems.
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(75) Given a sentence S = ... F... , F is a semantic focus of S if and only if
i: F contains an element which is phonologically accented, and
ii: the phonologically accented element in F is the rightmost accentable
element in F, and
iii: there is an F' such that F' contains a phonologically accented element
which is the rightmost accentable element in F' and "(No,) ... F'..."
is a natural response to the yes-no question/negative sentence formed
from S.
For arguments in favor of this particular restriction on the relation between semantic fo-
cus assignment and phonological accent location, I refer the reader to Rochemont (1986).
We can see that this restriction will have the desired results in the problematic cases
considered above since in each of these cases the only constituents of which the phono-
logically accented elements are the rightmost elements are the constituents consisting
entirely of the phonologically accented elements themselves. I repeat the examples in
question below.
(76) a. He was warned to look out for an ex-convict with a RED hat.
h. John said that Bill SAW Sue.
In (76a), the only constituent containing red as its rightmost accentable element is the
AP dominating red, while in (76b) the only constituent containing saw as its rightmost
accentable element is the V dominating this verb. Thus in these cases the only constituent
which will satisfy the second requirement in (75) will be this AP and V respectively, and
hence these will be the only constituents which could possibly be identified as semantic
foci.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting what exactly the natural response test is and
what it is not. What it is is a test for determining when a constituent is a potential
semantic focus of a sentence, based on a relation that holds between two sentences, one a
response to another. The way the test is to be applied is to take a sentence whose semantic
focus structure is in question, construct an appropriate question/negative sentence from
that sentence and then construct a response to that question/negative sentence by making
an appropriate substitution for a particular constituent of the original sentence. What it
is not is a felicity condition for sentences occurring in discourse contexts. The test itself
makes no predictions about how the focus structure of a sentence will affect the felicity
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of that sentence in a given context, nor is the felicity of a sentence as an answer to some
question in a larger context assumed to be of any use in identifying the potential semantic
foci of a sentence. This point is worth making explicit because without the ability to
keep the natural response test separate from the question of felicity of an utterance in a
given discourse context, any explanation of such felicity based upon the focus structure
of a sentence as determined by the naiaral response test will be unavoidably circular. To
the extent to which association facts of the sort considered in section 2.4.1.2 can be used
to independently determine the possible semantic foci of a sentence, such circularity will
not be devastating to the analysis. It is not clear to me at this point, however, that a
completely general test for the potential semantic foci of a sentence can based upon the
semantics of only, and consequently avoiding circularity in the natural response test is
important.
2.4.2 Focus-Related Topics Revisited
We now have all the tools needed to tackle the main problem of this section, that of
relating the focus-related topic of a sentence to the focus structure of that sentence. I
left this problem unsolved in section 2.3.3 above, although I hinted at a solution there.
The main problem encountered in that section was that of accounting for the acceptability
of (45) in the discourse fragment given in (46), repeated here.
(45) JOHN COMFORTED Mary.
(46) MARY was CRYING, so JOHN COMFORTED Mary.
I claimed that the analysis of the interaction between focus-related topics and contexts
could be used to explain the felicity of this example only if it were possible to generate
as the focus-related topic of (45) an expression equivalent to (51), repeated here.
(51) R mary
If we analyzed the original sentence in (45) as containing two separate foci, one containing
the subject John and one containing the verb comforted, any analysis which attempted
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to generate such a focus-related topic by substituting variables in for the foci and com-
bining these variables into a one-place property would be unable to avoid violating strict
compositionality. Such a problem could be sideskirted if it could be shown that the
sentence does not in fact contain two separate foci. However, if we adopt the revised
natural response test developed above, and if we further assume that every phonologi-
cally accented element must be contained in a semantic focus, concluding that (45) does
indeed contain two foci becomes unavoidable. The simple explanation of why is that
the only constituent which contains John as its rightmost accentable element is the NP
directly dominating John, and similarly the only constituent which contains comforted as
its rightmost constituent is the V directly dominating comforted. In order to satisfy the
restrictions on the relation between semantic focus assignment and phonological accent
location in (75ii), the sentence has to be analyzed as containing two semantic foci.
The way around the problem posed by this example I claimed is to generate the
focus-related topic of the sentence directly from those elements which are excluded from
the semantic foci of the sentence. Since we have just seen that the only assignment
of semantic foci which is consistent with the phonological accents indicated is one in
which the NP John and the V comforted each constitute independent foci, and since this
assignment of semantic foci leaves Mary outside of any semantic focus, generating the
focus-related topic of a sentence from the elements excluded from semantic focus in this
instance comes down to generating the focus-related topic from the NP Mary. Suppose
then that we take this NP to be the focus-related topic of (45). The prediction we will
be led to is that the sentence in (45) should be felicitous in contexts which contain an
occurrence of Mary, since any such context will instantiate the proposed focus-related
topic according to the definition of instantiation given in (40). I believe this prediction
to be correct, although other factors of relevance will undoubtedly enter into the overall
determination of felicity of a discourse fragment. I give further contexts which support
this analysis below.
(77) a. MARY doesn't like ATTENTION. Still, JOHN COMFORTED Mary.
b. JOHN saw BILL hit MARY, so JOHN COMFORTED Mary.
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If focus-related topics are to be generated from the deaccented elements of a sentence
(i.e. from those elements excluded from semantic focus), we must give a general charac-
terization of how such generation is to proceed. For the sentence in (45), since the only
deaccented element of the sentence was Mary, I simply stipulated that this element itself
should be the focus-related topic of the sentence, without giving any indication of how
to derive such P focus-related topic. In the majority of cases, however, there will be far
more than a single deaccented element. We have already considered one such example
in (36a), repeated here.
(36) a. John BELIEVES Mary's alive.
In this sentence, the only semantic focus assignment consistent with the accenting pattern
is that in which the V dominating believe is analyzed as a semantic focus. It was noted
above that this sentence is felicitous in contexts containing an occurrence of John as well
as an occurrence of Mary's alive, but that separate occurrence of the phrases John, Mary,
and is alive in a context is not sufficient for (36) to be felicitous. That is, a discourse
fragment like that given in (78a) is felicitous, while one like that in (78b) (repeated from
(37)) is not.
(78) a. John doesn't know if Mary's alive. (However,) John BELIEVES Mary's alive.
b. Mary doesn't know if John's alive. (However,) #John BELIEVES Mary's alive.
This array of facts would receive a straightforward explanation under an extension of the
standard theory according to which the focus-related topic of a sentence is generated by
replacing the semantic foci of the sentence with variables. The resulting focus-related
topic would then be that given in (79) below, which is only instantiated in the local
context in the first of the examples considered above, and not in the second.
(79) john R mary is alive
However, we can no longer avail ourselves of such an analysis, since adopting such an
analysis leaves us with no account for the example in (45), as we have just seen. None
the less, if we are to generate the focus-related topic of this sentence from the deaccented
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elements of the sentence, the resulting focus-related topic will have to be identical to (79)
in relevant respects.
To obtain the desired results, I propose a minimal modification to the analysis of
focus-related topics given in (38) above. There, I analyzed the focus-related topic of
a sentence as the representation which results from replacing the semantic foci in the
LF representation of the sentence with variables. We can account for the facts under
consideration if we assume that the focus-related topic of a sentence is not the entire
representation which results from this substitution of variables for semantic foci but
rather a set of sub-structures derived from this representation. In the case of (45) (=
JOHN COMFORTED Mary), we want the focus-related topic of the sentence to be Mary.
In the case of (36), we need the focus-related topic to minimally include John and Mary's
alive. Both of these results can be obtained if we take the focus-related topic of a sentence
to be a set of partial LF representations, although giving a formal characterization of
this set is fairly tricky. As a first approximation to such a characterization, consider the
following.
(80) Given a sentence S and its foci F 1,..., F,, replace each Fi in the LF rep-
resentation of S by a variable xi. Call the resulting representation P. The
focus-related topic of S is then the smallest set of partial LF representations
T = {ao,..., ea} such that for each i, 1 < i < m, ai is the representation of
the Complete Functional Complex (CFC) associated with some non-variable
element in P, and every non-variable element in P is contained in some such
Applying this definition to the sentence in (36) will proceed as follows. First, we sub-
stitute a variable in for the focused verb believe, generating the representation in (81)
(ignoring details).
(81) [s John R [s Mary is alive ]
Then we identify the CFC's of the remaining elements. In this case, we end up with
three CFC's, that of the matrix subject John, that of the embedded subject Mary, and
that of the embedded predicate alive. These CFC's are given in (82).
(82) {[NP John], [NP Mary], [S Mary is alive]}
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The smallest subset of (82) which contains all of the elements John, Mary, and alive is
that which consists of the first and third elements of (82). Thus, the revised focus-related
topic of the sentence in (36) will be that given in (83) below.
(83) {[subNP John], [s Mary is alive]}
Notice that the variable substituted in for the verb is not a member of any of the elements
of the set in (82) since it is not selected by any of the heads which are used to generate
this set, and hence it appears nowhere in the focus-related topic of (36) in (83) either.
Having characterized the focus-related topic of a sentence as a set of representations
rather than as a single representation, in order to make use of this notion in determining
the conditions under which a sentence will be felicitous, it is necessary to slightly modify
the current analysis. The felicity conditions given earlier for a sentence in a given con-
text required that the focus-related topic of the sentence be instantiated in the context.
Instantiation, however, is defined in such a way that the types of elements the definition
applies to are syntactic representations, not sets of such representations. The simplest
way to correct this problem is to adjust the felicity conditions which relate a focus-related
topic to a context. I propose the following modification.
(84) A sentence S with focus-related topic {x 1,... , z,} will be felicitous in an
active context C just in case for each i, 1 < i < n, zi is instantiated in C.
Considering once again the discourse fragments given in (78) above, we can see immedi-
ately that each of the elements of the focus-related topic given in (83) is instantiated in
the active context consisting of the first sentence of (78a) and hence the felicity of this
example is expected. In the case of (78b), however, we find that the second element of
the focus-related topic given in (83) is not instantiated in the active context consisting
of the first sentence of that example. The infelicity of this example is thus exactly what
the present analysis predicts.
While the intuition behind the above treatment of focus-related topics is fairly clear,
the characterization given in (80) is still somewhat imprecise. The analysis assumes
that a syntactic representation can be given corresponding to the Complete Functional
Complex of any head, although it is not entirely clear how this is to be done. For example,
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consider cases like those in (85a-c) in which a deaccented verb selects a CP complement.
(85) BILL claimed JOHN COMFORTED Mary.
Here, there are two deaccented elements in the sentence, the matrix verb claimed, and the
embedded object Mary. This latter element is unproblematic under the current analysis.
However, the question of how to represent the CFC of the matrix verb claimed is more
difficult to deal with. According to the analysis of focus-related topics given above, the
input for generation of the focus-related topic of (85) should be the representation in
(86).
(86) x claimed y R Mary
Given that the verb selects both a subject and a complement clause, if we are to include
the complete functional complex of the verb in the focus-related topic for this sentence,
both the subject and the embedded clause must be represented. The only representation
available for the complement clause, however, is the repiesentation y R Mary. If we take
this as our representation of the complement clause in generating the focus-related topic
of (85), the focus-related topic which results will be the set containing the expression in
(86), and we correspondingly predict that (85) should only be felicitous in contexts in
which (86) is instantiated. This prediction is not borne out, however. In order for (86)
to be instantiated in a context, the context will have to contain a sentence with claim
as a predicate, and with a complement clause of claim consisting of a two-place relation
one of whose arguments is Mary. In examples like (87) below, however, we find that the
sentence in (85) is perfectly acceptable despite the fact that these conditions are not met.
(87) a. SUE claimed that MARY was CRYING. Then, BILL claimed JOHN COM-
FORTED Mary.
b. MARY claimed that JOHN is a JERK. However, BILL claimed JOHN COM-
FORTED Mary.
In (87a), we see that it is possible for the complement to claimed in the context sentence
to consist of a one-place relation holding of Mary, not a two-place relation, and yet the
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discourse fragment is still acceptable. In (87b), we find that the complement to claimed
in the context sentence need not even contain Mary in order for the discourse fragment
to be felicitous. If we take the focus-related topic of (85) to be the set consisting of the
representation in (86), we have no way of explaining the acceptability of these discourse
fragments. To avoid this problem, we clearly have to prevent assigning this set as the
focus-related tbpic of the sentence in the first place.
To account for the facts illustrated in (87), it would appear that the focus-related
topic for (85) must at most contain an unanalyzed variable as the complement to the
verb claimed. However, for the same reasons that we could not take the focus-related
topic of (45) (= JOHN COMFORTEDMary) to consist in a single unanalyzed variable, we
cannot combine the complement clause into a single variable here either. To do so would
inevitably violate strict compositionality. The only other way of generating a suitable
focus-related topic for the sentence would be to assume that the internal structure of the
complement clause simply cannot play a role in determining that part of the focus-related
topic of the sentence generated from the verb claimed.
While such an assumption might be viewed as an unwanted stipulation, there is some
independent support for this assumption. We have already seen several cases in which
the first conjunct of a complex sentence can be used to license deaccenting in the second
conjunct. To explain these cases it is necessary to assume that the first conjunct is added
to the context prior to evaluation of the second conjunct. Surprisingly, however, when
we look at complement clauses, we find that deaccenting within a complement clause
can be licensed by a verbal constituent containing the verb which selects that clause, as
illustrated in the following example.
(88) JOHN reminded MARY that BILL reminded Mary that JOHN COMFORTED
Mary.
Assuming as always that this sentence occurs context initially, the only way to account for
the deaccenting of the second occurrence of the phrase reminded Mary is to assume that
the first occurrence of that phrase has been added to the context prior to determining
the felicity of the complement clause containing the second occurrence. Since the first
occurrence of this phrase does not constitute a complete sentential unit, the conclusion
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we are forced to draw is that it must be possible to add non-sentential elements to an
active context, augmenting the context incrementally. If we assume, as seems natural,
that the felicity condition on focus-related topics must be applied to a phrase before that
phrase is added to the context, it follows that the focus-related topic of a constituent
containing an embedding verb cannot be forced to include any elements from the verb's
complement clause.
In order to incorporate these observations into the analysis of focus-related topics,
I propose to maintain in rough form the characterization of focus-related topics given
in (80) above, but to change the implicit assumptions regarding the input structure for
calculating focus-related topics. Rather than taking the LF representation of the entire
sentence to be the input to calculating the focus-related topic of the sentence, I take
the input to consist of the highest sentential constituent which has not yet been added
to the context minus any other sentential constituents contained therein. In processing
the sentence in (88), then, the first structure to be processed is that consisting of the
matrix subject, verb and object - [s [NP John] [vp reminded [NP Mary] A ]] - where
A is simply a place-marker for the embedded clause. Since there are no deaccented
elements in this clause, its focus-related topic is null, and hence the felicity condition on
focus-related topics is vacuously satisfied. After this clause is processed, it is added to
the context, and the next clause is processed. Since this clause contains two deaccented
elements - reminded and Mary - the focus-related topic for this clause will be non-null,
and according to (80) will consist in the sif,gleton set { z reminded Mary A }. This
single element contained in the focus-related topic is directly instantiated in the context,
and hence the clause satisfies the felicity condition on focus-related topics. The clause is
then added to the context, presumably by substituting in for the A in the representation
of the matrix clause. We then come to the most deeply embedded clause, whose focus-
related topic we have already determined to be the singleton set consisting of the NP
Mary. Again, this element is instantiated in the context and hence the clause satisfies
the felicity conditions in (84). In this way, the sentence as a whole comes to satisfy the
constraints on focus-related topfcs piece by piece. The analysis given is admittedly fairly
stipulative. While it appears to work, I do not at present have a principled explanation for
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why context incrementation should proceed as the analysis requires. What is clear is that
some explanation along the lines sketched here is ren.ired if constraints on deaccenting
are to be given in terms of instantiation of a focus-related topic in the local context.
What is unclear is what constraints there are on context incrementation as well as what
the input should be for calculating focus-related topics. I have only outlined one of a
wide range of possibilities. Unfortunately, I have to leave further investigation into these
issues for future research.
2.4.3 Standard Presuppositions and Focus-Related Topics
In developing the above analysis of focus-related topics, I originally assumed that focus-
related topics constitute a subclass of presuppositions of the type that Karttunen and
others have been concerned with. However, I then argued that focus-related topics should
be handled in a fashion distinct from the way Karttunen treats typical instances of
presupposition, contexts being required to instantiate rather than entail the focus-related
topic of a sentence. This raises the question of whether the types of presupposition which
concerned Karttunen and the focus-related topics which have been our primary concern
here should be treated identically, or whether they should be kept conceptually distinct.
Since we have seen that the treatment of focus-related topics cannot readily be reduced
to that of standard presuppositions, if we are to treat them identically and if furthermore
we accept the analysis of focus-related topics provided in the text, then it follows directly
that the treatment of standard presuppositions will have to be reduced to that of focus-
related topics. The question of whether the two phenomen.a can be treated identically
thus reduces to the question of whether we can use the account of focus-related topics
developed above to account for classical instances of presupposition. When we look at
the kinds of facts which standard treatments of presupposition are designed to Lccount
for, however, we find that such a reduction is highly implausible at best.
Prima facie evidence that the two notions should be kept distinct derives from dif-
ferences in the types of infelicity to which presupposition failure can give rise in the two
cases. In the types of examples which originally motivated discussion of presupposition,
such failure typically affects the potential truth or falsity of tbhe sentence which gave rise
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to the presupposition in question. This affect has been described in various ways. Under
some characterizations, ther entence is said to lack a truth value, while under other char-
acterizations it is said to have a definite truth value. A typical such case "s exemplified
in the (a) examples below, which in non-Russellian analyses are commonly assumed to
presuppose the propositions in (b). In (c), I give the sentences from (a) in contexts which
contain an explicit contradiction of the presuppositions in (b), making it impos'sible for
the context to entail that presupposition.
(89) a. The king of France is bald.
b. There is a king of France.
c. It is not the case that there is a king of France. The king of France is bald.
(90) a. John stopped beating his wife.
b. John used to beat his wife.
c. It is patently false that John used to beat his wife. Today, John stopped beat-
ing his wife.
Intuitions about the truth sta ;s of the (a) sentences in the contexts in (c) are somewhat
variable. The one fact that everyone agrees on is that if the first sentence of (c) is true, it
is not and in fact cannot be the case that the second sentence is also true. According to
some (including e.g. Frege, Strawson and others), the second sentence is not false either,
while others (including Russell, Quine) hold that it is false. Whatever one's views on
the truth-status of this sentence, the fact that it cannot be true is taken to be connected
to the fact th.t its presuppositin is not satisfied. If we wish to maintain this relation
between presupposition failure and potential truth or falsity of a sentence, however, then
it is clear that we canrot reduce the standard analysis of presuppositions to the analysis
presented above of focus-related topics. The reason Lor this is simple. Each of the
contexts given above can be naturally and unobjectionably extended via accommodation
to instantiate the presupposition of the sentence in (a). If "ye were to treat the above
instances of presupposition along the lines of focus-related topics, neither of the examples
in (c) would constitute presuppositiosn failure, and hence the explanation for ihe infelicity
cf these examples would have to be unrelated to the presuppositions of these examples.
Thus, the facts which presuppositions were originally intended to account for would have
to be given an entirely separate trtacment.
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On the converse side of this problem, we find that failure of a focus-related topic of
a sentence to be instantiated in a context never results in the sentence being incapable
of bearing a particular truth value, lending further credence to an analysis which keeps
the two types of presupposition conceptually distinct. Truth or falsity of a sentence is
completely independent of whether its focus-related topic is instantiated, as can be seen
in the following dialogue.
(91) John slapped Mary, and then
a. SUE SLAPPED JOHN.
b. SUE SLAPPED John.
c. SUE slapped JOHN.
d. Sue SLAPPED JOHN.
e. Sue SLAPPED John.
f. Sue slapped JOHN.,
g. SUE slapped John.
h. Sue slapped John.
Here, all of these sentences have exactly the same truth conditions; each of the sentences
will be true if and only if Sue slapoed John. In the context given, however, the focus-
related topic of the sentence is satisfied only in (a-c). By requiring focus-related topics to
be instantiated in the context, the infelicity of the sentences in (d-h) can be accounted for
straightforwardly. If presuppositions are invoked to explain the infelicity of the examples
in (89) and (90), and if focus-related topics are invoked to explain the infelicity of the
examples in (d-h) above, then neither one of the types of presupposition can be reduced
to the other.
2.4.4 The Necessity of DeacceUxting
The overall form of argument employed in the previous sections of this chapter has been
to show that a sentence with a given focus structure is felicitous only in certain contexts,
and that the acceptability of a sentence depends on whether the focus-related topic
constructed from the deaccented elements of the sentence is instantiated in the context.
One of the consequences of this analysis is that with respect to a given context a sentence
will generally only be acceptable under certain assignments of focus structure and will be
86
unacceptable under others. I take this consequence to be welcome. However, when we
look at particular instances in which sentences should or should not be acceptable, we
find that the analysis developed so far is not without its potential problems. The most
obvious potential problem can be illustrated with (91) (repeated here).
(91) John slapped Mary, and then
a. SUE SLAPPED JOHN.
b. SUE SLAPPED John.
c. SUE slapped JOHN.
d. sue SLAPPED JOHN.
e. sue SLAPPED John.
f. Sue slapped JOHN.
g. SUE slapped John.
h. Sue slapped John.
According to the analysis developed above, the focus-related topic will be instantiated
in the local context only for the sentences in (91a-c), and not for those in (91d-h). As
the analysis predicts, the sentences in (91d-h) are all unaccctoable in the given context.
However, the analysis also treats all of the sentences in (91a-c) identically, and yet clearly
these sentences are not all equally acceptable. In fact, only (91c) appears to be completely
unobjectionable, while (91a) and (91b) are surprisingly marginal. One might object to
the present analysis, then, on the grounds that it cannot make the distictions intuitively
felt to hold between these cases.
The oddness of the examples in (91a) and (91b) above clearly shows that the analysis
developed above is incomplete. It does not, however, argue against the treatment of
focus-related topics developed there. The felicity condition for focus-related topics gives
a necessary condition for a sentence to be acceptable, but I have nowhere indicated
that satisfaction of this condition should also be viewed ts a sufficient condition for
felicity of a given sentence. To account for the examples above, what is required is
some constraint on the use of focus of the type widely assumed to hold elsewhere in the
literature (cf. Williams (1980), Culicover and Rochemont (1984), and Rochemont (1986),
among others). Consistent with our assumptions about focus assignment from section
2.4, suppose we adopt the following hypothesis regarding the felicitous use of focus.
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(92) If a is a semantic focus of a sentence, then a must qualify either as a presen-
tational focus or as a contrastive focus in the local active context.
Whether there are other uses of focus which ought to be included in (92) is a problem I
do not wish to address at present, so I will restrict discussion to the two types of focus
mentioned. On an intuitive level, a focused constituent a is a presentational focus only
if a does not already occur in the context, while a is a contrastive focus only if there is
some element in the context which is of the same semantic type as a but which is not
itself an occurrence of a. I formalize these notions below.
(93) If S is a sentence in a context C, and S contains a constituent a which bears
the label [+F], then
a. If C does not contain an occurrence of a, a qualifies as a presentational focus.
b. If there is some ,3 in C of the same semantic type as a such that /3 is not an
occurrence of a, then a qualifies as a contrastive focus.
Given these definitions of presentational focus and contrastive focus, Lhe constraints on
the felicitous use of focus given in (92) will allow us to make the necessary distinctions
in the acceptability of the sentences in (91a-c) above, repeated here.
(91) John slapped Mary, and then
a. SUE SLAPPED JOHN.
b. SUE SLAPPED John.
c. SUE slapped JOHN.
In all of these examples, Sue qualifies as a presentational focus since the context does
not contain an occurrence of Sue. In (a) and (c), John similarly qualifies as a contrastive
focus since there is an individual in thk context with whom John contrasts. Formally,
the context contains an occurrence of Mary, which is of the same semantic type as John,
and Mary is not itself an instantiation of John and so (93b) is satisfied. When we look
at the verb slapped in (a) and (b), however, we find that this verb qualifies neitiher as
a presentational focus nor as a contrastive focus. It cannot be a presentational focus
since the same verb occurs in the context. It cannot be a contrastive focus because no
other two place predicate occurs in the context. Focus on the verb in these examples
thus violates the focus condition given in (92) above - the verb is focused but cannot be
interpreted as such in the context of utterance. The examples are consequently predicted
to be unacceptable, as desired.
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2.5 As For x ...
There remains a class of cases in which acceptable focus patterns of a sentence cannot
yet be predicted. The class of cases I have in mind are cases involving the As for x
construction. (A similar case can be made using the What about z? construction, though
I will not consider these cases here.) To see why these present a problem, consider the
following contrast.7
(94) a. MARY likes BILL, and # JOHN likes Sue.
b. MARY likes BILL, and as for SUE, JOHN likes Sue.
The unacceptability of the first example is exactly what is expected under our current
hypothesis about focus-related topics. The focus-related topic of the second sentence in
this example is the set { x likes Sue }, and the sole member of this set is not instantiated
ir' fi active context consisting of the first sentence in (94a). The problem comes when
we look at the second example, since according to the analysis developed above, the
focus-related topic of this sentence is essentially identical to that of the second sentence
of the first example. Accordingly, one would expect the discourse fragment in (94b) to be
every bit as unacceptable as that in (94a), and yet the example is perfectly acceptable.
Since the only difference between the two examples under consideration lies in the
presence or absence of the phrase as for SUE, it is clearly here that we need to look
for an explanation of the difference in acceptability between the examples. There are
two avenues available for accounting for the effect this phrase has on the acceptability of
the discourse fragment as a whole within the analysis of focus-related topics developed
above. The first would be to analyze this phrase as functioning to alter the %fcus-related
topic of the sentence it is adjoined to. The second would be to analyze it as functioning
to change the context. I will somewhat arbitrarily adopt the latter approach. From
consideration of examples like the following, it appears that the role that As for Sue
plays is a substitutive role.
'I use the name Sue instead of the pronoun her in the second sentence of these examples for ease of
exposition. The same point could be made as well with a pronoun, though at this point I prefer to avoid
problems as3ociated with pronominal interpretation which are irrelevant to the present issue. While the
use of a name here is somewhat unnatural, it does not obscure the contrast, and hence will suffice.
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(95) a. Mary likes Bill, and as for SUE, JOHN HATES Sue.
b. Mary likes Bill, and as for SUE, JOHN likes Sue.
c. Mary likes Bill, but as for SUE, I DOUBT Mary likes Sue.
All of these sentences could be explained straightforwardly if we assumed that As for
Sue functioned to replace the NP Bill in the contextual sentence with the NP Sue and
added the resulting representation to the context. However, if this is the only way to
account for the felicity of the examples in (95), we should expect the felicity of each of
the discourses to entail that Mary likes Sue, since this proposition is being added to the
context. Such an implication is clearly lacking in these discourses, however, making such
an analysis highly implausible.
The basic idea behind the analysis proposed - that As for Sue functions to substitute
Sue in for some expression of the same semantic type in the active context - can be
maintained if we can find a way to avoid adding the representation which results to
the active context. The way I propose for doing this is to assume that active contexts
contain (focus-related) topics in addition to more complete LF representations. The As
for construction will then operate on focus-related topics, altering them directly via the
substitution mechanism already mentioned and adding the altered focus-related topic
directly to the context. Felicity of an As for sentence with respect to focus-related topic
instantiation coudk! be reduced to the general analysis of focus-related topics if we modify
our definition of instantiation slightly. The definition as it stands states that a sentence
is instantiated in a context only if its focus-related topic is identical to a potential focu's-
related topic of some other sentence already contained in the context. If we simply
assume that potential focus-related topics of a sentence are automatically part of the
context, then we could redefine instantiation so that the focus-related topic of a sentence
is instantiated in a context only if that focus-related topic already occurs in the context.
By making this minor change, the explanation of the felicity of As for sentences and that
of the felicity of other sentences fail together.
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Chapter 3
VP Deletion: The Solution
3.1 Introduction
In chapter 1, I noted a general problem facing analyses of VP deletion. The problem,
it will be recalled, was the following. The primary data which motivates all current
analyses of VP deletion is data which shows that there are restrictions on the possi-
ble interpretation of an elided VP. This data shows that ambiguities in an antecedent
clause do not multiply in VP deletion contexts. Once an interpretation is fixed for the
antecedent, the elided VP must receive the sa.m interpretation. Such data have been
offered as conclusive evidence that the LF representation of an elided VP must receive a
unique interpretation, a conclusion with which I agree. Williams (1977) and Sag (1976)
further argue that the constraints %n interpretation of an elided VP must result directly
from the analysis of VP deletion itself. We saw, however, that the VP deletion data finds
a close parallel in examples containing a VP which has been deaccented but not deleted,
and that none of the analyses of VP deletion discussed in chapter 1 can be extended in a
principled fashion to account for the deaccenting data. I took this fact as indication that
the general approach taken by Williams, Sag and others to the problem of VP deletion
was ill-founded, and that the correct analysis should be based upon a general account
of constraints on deaccenting. At that point, I left the VP deletion problem without a
solution, and turned to constructing an account of these constraints in chapter 2. There,
I argued that the deaccented elements of a sentence determine the focus-related topic of
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the sentence, with felicitous use of a sentence within a given active context depending
upon the focus-related topic of the sentence being instantiated in that context. In this
chapter, I return to the original problem of accounting for restrictions on interpretation
of the type found to hold in VP deletion and VP deaccenting contexts. I show that the
similarities between these two types of cases can be given a principled explanation if we
adopt this analysis of focus-related topic.
The form of argument used to motivate the analysis of focus-related topics in the
previous chapter is based upon the felicity or infelicity of a sentence in a given context.
Calculation of the focus-related topic of a sentence is taken to be independent of any
antecedent. This means that restrictions imposed by a context on the interpretation:
of a sentence with a given focus-related topic have to be accounted for indirectly. The
general form such an explanation will have to take is the following. Surface sentence Sx
has as potential logical forms pc,...*, , which will be associated with focus-related topics
P1,..., P, respectively. Of these topics, the context of utternace C only instantiates (say)
Pi. In order for S to be felicitous in C, then, the actual logical form of S must be ps.
While the context will play a role in disambiguating S, the role is not that of supplying
an interpretation to S, but rather that of filtering out various potential interpretations of
S.
3.2 General Form of the Solution
To summarize briefly the situation we were left with in chapter 1, I repeat below the
basic cases which were found in need of explanation there.
(96) a. John likes flying planes because BILL does.
b. John said he is brilliant before BILL did,
c. John likes flying planes because BILL likes flying planes.
d. John said he is brilliant before BILL said he is brilliant.
e. John likes soaring gliders because BILL likes flying aircraft.
f. John said he is brilliant before BILL said he is a smart guy.
4I use the term "surface sentence" to refer to a string of words with a given phonological accent
assignment.
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As noted in that chapter, all of the theories of VP deletion considered provide an account
of the interpretations available for the VP deletion sentences in (96a,b), but all would
have to be modified to account for (96c,d), and none of the analyses could be extended
in a principled fashion to account for the deaccenting sentences in (96e,f). The account
of deaccenting given in the previous chapter, however, now gives us a way of handling all
these cases.
3.2.1 Simple A mbiguity Resolution
To illustrate how the analysis of focus-related topics from the previous chapter can be
used to explain the restrictions on interpretation in each of these examples, consider first
the sentence in (96c). I take the two LF representations associated with the subordinate
clause of this sente,-ce to be those givtn below.
(97) a. Bill likes [s PRO flying planes]
b. Bill likes [NP flying planes]
According to the analysis under consideration, the focus-related topic of the subordinate
clause will be derived from the expressions in (98) below, which one depending on the
interpretation independently assumed for the subordinate clause.2
(98) a. z likes [s PRO flying planes]
b. z likes [NP flying planes]
Assuming as always that the active context at the point where the subordinate clause is
processed consists entirely of the superordinate clause, the discourse fragment in (96c)
will only be felicitous if the relevant focus-related topic in (98) is instantiated in this
local context. According to the definition of instantiation given in (2.3.1) in chapter 2
(repeated below), the context will inooantiate the relevant expression in (98) only if it
contains some logical form which has this expression as a potential focus-related topic.
21 am simplifying the discussion here by assuming that there is a single focus-related topic for the
entire sentence. Treating the controlled complement clause separately from the embedding clause in the
(a) examples will make no substantive differences in the account of these examples, and so the added
complication would only serve to obscure matters rather than clarify them.
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(99) A context C instantiates a focus-related topic a if and only if C contains
some expression 3 such that a is identical to some potential focus-related topic
of 3.
7 is a potential focus-related topic of P if there is some expression 13'
which differs from 3 at most in its focus structure such that the focus-related
topic of q' is y.
With this much as background, we are now ready to consider specific cases.
Syntactically, the surface sentence in (96c) is associated with four different LF rep-
resentations, depending on how the superordinate and subordinate VPs are analyzed. I
give these four LF representations in (100).
(100) a. John likes [S PRO flying planes] because Bill likes [s PRO flying planes]
b. John likes [s PRO flying planes] because Bill likes [NP flying planes]
c. John likes [NP flying planes] because Bill likes [s PRO flyipg planes]
d. John likes [NP flying planes] because Bill likes [NP flying planes]
While each of these LF representations is syntactically well-formed, they do not all behave
alike with respect to the felicity condition on focus-related topics. In (100a,c), the focus-
related topic of the subordinate sentence will be the expression given in (98a). In (100a)
this expression is clearly instantiated in the context consisting of the superordinate clause,
and hence the original sentence is predicted to be felicitous under this interpretation. In
(100c), on the other hand, this expression is not directly instantiated in the context.
Similar remarks apply to the sentences in (100b,d), where the focus-relatcd topic (98b)
is directly instantiated in the local context in the latter example but not in the former.
The two interpretations represented by (100a,d) are exactly the two interpretations of the
original sentence which were found to be acceptable, and the analysis of focus-related
topics from the previous chapter gives us a straightforward explanation for why they
are acceptable - these are the two examples in which the focus-related topic of the
subordinate clause is directly instantiated in the active context of the superordinate
clause.
While the acceptability of the sentences in (100a,d) can be explained directly within
the analysis of focus-related topics under consideration, explaining the infelicity of the
examples in (100b,c) requires a more complicated argument, for reasons given in section
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2.3.1. As mentioned above, the focus-related topic of the subordinate sentence in these
examples is not instantiated in the context of the superordinate clause. However, I argued
in section 2.3.1 that in certain instances it must be possible to augment a context via
accommodation, and that in these cases what was required for a sentence to be felicitous
was for the focus-related topic to be instantiated in the augmented context. In order
to explain the unacceptability of the examples in (100b,c), then, it must be shown that
accommodation cannot save these examples.
I argued in section 2.3.1 that the proposition accommodated must be calculable as
an implicature of the sentence in question in the (broad) context in which the sentence
occurs. I also argued that the acceptability of a discourse fragment does not depend
on whether such implicatures can be mechanically calculated, since this is always pos-
sible. Rather, I showed that calculation of an implicature of the required form will in
general require cert- n assumptions to be made regarding a speaker's beliefs, and I ar-
gued that the acceptability of a given discourse fragment is best viewed as dependent on
the plausibility of attributing to a speaker the beliefs required to make that discourse
f:agment well-formed. To explain the unacceptability of thc. sentence in (96c) under the
interpretations indicated in (100b,c), then, it is necessary to show that the assumptions
needed to make the discourse fragment well-formed are assumptions which are themselves
unacceptable. This can be done as follows. I assume that the proposition which must
be accommodated in order for the discourse fragment to be felicitous is the proposition
John likes [NP flying planes]. In order for this proposition to be accommodated, it must
be calculated as a conversational implicature of the subordinate clause in the context of
the subordinate clause. A plausible means by which this implicature could be calculated
would be as follows. Suppose (96c) to have been uttered by a speaker who is follow-
ing the Cooperative Principle. The subordinate clause has a focus-related topic of the
form z likes [NP flying planes]. It is part of the conventional meaning associated with
focus-related topics that in order for a sentence to be relevant within a given context, the
focus-related topic of the sentence must be instantiated in the context. This situation
does not obtain, however. In order for the subordinate sentence to be relevant, then, it is
necessary to add some proposition to the context which does instantiate the focus-related
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topic of the sentence. A speaker who utters (96c) with the intended interpretation indi-
cated in (100b) can generally be taken to know this to be so and to know that his audience
knows this to be so. His audience can thus plausibly take him to intend for his listeners
to add some proposition to the context in order to make his statement relevant, and to be
capable of determining which proposition he intends them to add to the discourse. Since
the only proposition which can be taken to be in the context is the proposition John
likes [s PRO flying planes], the speaker must assume that his audience can figure out the
relevant proposition from this context alone. They can do this if they assume that the
speaker assumes that John likes [NP flying planes] follows from John likes [S PRO flying
planes]. If they make this assumption, then they can conclude that the proposition the
speaker intends for them to accommodate is the proposition that John likes [NP flying
planes]. They can thus take the speaker to have implicated first that he or she takes
the inference from John likes is PRO flying planes] to John likes [NP flying planes] to
be valid, and second (and consequently) that John likes [NP flying planes]. Since it is
necessary to be able to calculate the second implicature in order for (96c), under the
interpretation given in (100b), to obey the felicity condition on focus-related topics (=
(39) of section 2.2.3), and since calculation of this second implicature is dependent upon
the assumption that the speaker accepts the inference specified above as valid, a person
who utters (96c) with this as intended interpretation commits himself to the validity of
this inference. However, this inference - that John likes [NP flying planes] follows from
John likes [s PRO flying planes] - is certainly not a logically valid inference, nor is it
likely to be taken as valid in normal discourse settings. The original sentence can only
be as ielicitous as this inference (or some similarly implausible inference) is unobjection-
able. Since this inference is in fact fairly implausible, the original discourse fragment
under the interpretation in question is predicted to be correspondingly unacceptable. As
the reader can verify, a similar reasoning process can be gone through to account for the
unacceptability of (96c) under the interpretation indicated in (100c) as well.
We are now ready to consider the slightly more complicated case given in (96e),
repeated here.
(96) e. John likes soaring gliders because BILL likes flying aircraft.
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Once again I take the sentence to be syntactically four ways ambiguous. I indicate the
four potential readings for this sentence below.
(101) a. John likes [s PRO soaring gliders] because Bill likes [s PRO flying aircraft]
b. John likes [s PRO soaring gliders] because Bill likes [NP flying aircraft]
c. John likes [NP soaring gliders] because Bill likes [S PRO flying aircraft]
d. John likes [NP soaring gliders] because Bill likes [NP flying aircraft]
The focus-related topic of the subordiaate sentence I take to be one of the expressions
given in (102), again which one depending on the interpretation associated with the
subordinate sentence.
(102) a. x likes [s PRO flying aircraft]
b. z likes [NP flying aircraft]
This example differs from (96c) in that here none of the LF representations given in (101)
directly satisfies the felicity condition on focus-related topics. I claimed earlier, however,
that the interpretations indicated in (101a,d) are felicitous, while those in (101b,c) are
not. In order to account for this distinction, it must be shown that the context can be
readily augmented in the former cases in such a way that the focus-related topics will
be instantiated, but that such augmentation of the context is problematic in the lattez
cases.
As argued above, propositions can only be accommodated into a context if they can
be calculated as implicatures of the sentence in question in its context of utterance. In
the cases in (101a,c), the most likely candidate for such an implicature is that given in
(103a), while in the cases in (101b,d) the most likely candidate for such an implicature
is that given in (103b).
(103) a. John likes [s PRO flying aircraft]
b. John likes [NP flying aircraft]
As is generally the case, in each of the four cases it .s possible to calculate the relevant
proposition to be an implicature. However, the four cases differ in what commitments
they force upon an utterer of the sentence in question. In the case of (101a), the speaker
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would be committed to holding that people who like to soar gliders like to fly aircraft.
Since soaring gliders is a particular instance of flying aircraft, this commitment represents
a generic truth and as such is unproblematic. In the case of (101b), however, the speaker
would be committed to holding that people who like to soar gliders like aircraft that fly,
and in (101c) that people who like gliders that soar like to fly aircraft, neither of which
is unobjectionable. Finally, in (101d), the commitment the speaker would have to make
is that people who like gliders that sore like aircraft that fly. Like the first example, this
commitment is unproblematic; gliders that soar are a sub-type of aircraft that fly, so it is a
generic truth that a person who likes the first type of object also likes the second. Taking
the felicity of the examples to be dependent on the degree to which these commitments
are acceptable, the analysis of focus-related topics under consideration once again gives
us a. natural account of the distinction between the four cases.
3.2.2 Pronoun-Induced Ambiguities
The case of (96d) is more complicated, though it too can be handled in a fashion similar to
that in which (96c) was handled. The key to accounting for the strict and sloppy readings
available for this sentence is to distinguish syntactically between two distinct treatments
of a pronoun, one similar to what Sag and Williams call a referential interpretation
and one closer to what they call a bound variable interpretation. As mentioned in
footnote 6 of chapter 1, the term "referential" is highly misleading in describing possible
ik,terp:etations of a pronoun. All the explanations argued for by Williams and Sag to
restrict possible readings of pronouns in VP deletion sentences were intended as syntactic
explanations (broadly construed). Reference, however, is a non-syntactic notion. The
referent associated with a referring expression is a real-world individual, not an abstract
mental representation. Real-world individuals, however, have no place in a theory of
syntax whose objects are necessarily abstract. In particular, whether two expressions
end up denoting the same real world individual or different real world individuals can
play no direct role in the syntactic determination of the grammaticality of a sentence.
At most, a syntactic representation can determine coreference with respect to a given
theory of interpretation which relates abstract syntactic representations with real world
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objects.
While this point is important, it is equally important not to lose sight of the contri-
bution Williams and Sag made in distinguishing what appear to be two separate ways
in which a pronoun can function syntactically. In order to make use of this distinction
in an explanation of the restrictions on pronominal interpretation in VP deletion and
deaccenting environments, we must find a way of reanalyzing this distinction in appro-
priately syntactic terms. Like Williams and Sag, my main objective will be to encode
the function of a pronoun directly in the syntactic representation of the pronoun. Re-
strictions on interpretation of a pronoun in a deletion or deaccenting environment will
then be handled by requiring that the pronoun in the deletion/deaccenting site function
in the same way as that in the phrase which ultimately licenses the deletion/deaccenting.
While the underlying idea is the same as that pursued by Sag and Williams, however,
the specifc analysis I adopt differ from theirs in two important respects. In the case of
so-called referential pronouns, I argue that the interpretation assigned to a pronoun must
be uniquely determinable from the syntactic representation not only when the pronoun
is dependent on some other expression in the sentence but also when it is not. If two
"referential" pronouns are completely identical in their syntactic representation, it will
follow that they are interpreted identically as well, which in turn will ensure that what-
ever referent is associated with the one will also be associated with the other. In this
way, coreference will fall out as a consequence of the analysis, but it will play no direct
role in the analysis. In the case of bound variable pronouns, I argue that interpretation
of a pronoun as a bound variable is dependent on that pronoun being linked (in the sense
of Higginbotham (1983)) to some other element in the sentence. Adopting the technical
treatment of linking spelled out in Heim (1992) in which linking is represented using
indices, I show that if two pronouns are syntactically identical and one of the pronouns
is linked, then the other pronoun must be linked as well. Strict and sloppy readings of
pronouns in deletion and deaccenting environments will then fall out from the syntactic
identity requirement imposed as part of the restrictions on deaccenting/deletion.
There are two aspects of Heim's (1992) index based analysis of linking which I will
be exploiting in the treatment of VP deletion and deaccenting sentences involving pro-
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nouns. The first is the requirement that all "referring" expressions, including minimally
all pronouns and proper names, bear an index, with interpretations assigned directly to
indices rather than to the expressions bear!ng them. Under this view, the expressions
which bear indices function merely as restrictions on the value assigned to the index.
The second is the division of occurrences of indicies into two types - those that are free,
and those that are bound.3 Free occurrences of indices are assigned unique guises, where
a guise is semantically an individual concept, i.e. a function from worlds to individuals.
For our present purposes, guises can equally well be thought of as discourse referents in
Kamp's (1981) theory of Discourse Representation, or as files in Heim's (1982) theory of
File Change Semantics. Bound occurrences of an index are treated as variables which
for Heim range over individuals. I depart from Heim here in treating them as variables
ranging over guises, though this distinction is largely immaterial to the discussion at
hand. The most important aspect of Heim's analysis for our present purposes is the
restriction she posits on the interpretation of an index - that all occurrences of a given
index must be treated identically. While Heim makes this restriction explicitly only for
free occurrences of indices, I will modify this restriction so that it applies to bound oc-
currences of indices as well. What this means interpretationally is that if one occurrence
of an index i is assigned a guise F, then all other occurrences of i must likewise be as-
signed F. Similarly, if one occurrence of i is treated as a variable over guises, all other
occurrences of i must be treated as variables over guises as well. This distinction between
different types of occurrences of indices makes it possible to account for restrictions on
interpretation of pronouns in deaccenting/deletion environments by simply requiring that
deleted/deaccented pronouns bear the same index as their overt counterpart. Treatment
as a variable over guises or as a unique guise will fall out from the above restrictions on
index interpretation. What remains, then, is to formally capture the distinction between
bound and free occurrences of indices.
As mentioned above, Heim's (1992) analysis of referential dependencies is largely a
3 A similar distinction is drawn in Fiengo and May (1991) between a-occurrences of an index (= free
occurrences here) and /3-occurrences of an index (= bound occurrences here). Indeed, with respect to
interpretation of indexed expressions, Heim's analysis and that of Fiengo and May are near notational
variants. Both analyses incorporate ways of making the distinctions I wish to exploit. The motivation
for choosing Heim (1992) as a basis for discussion is mostly a matter of personal taste.
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reformalization of Higginbotham's (1983) linking analysis stated in terms of indices. For
Higginbotham, if an element a is linked to another element 0, then a depends on 0 for its
interpretation, in that whatever interpretation is assigned to P is automatically inherited
by a. This notion of linking is inherently asymmetric. Such an asymmetric notion cannot
be represented with standard notions of indexing, however. Under standard indexing
schema, indexed expressions bear a single index. For any two indexed expressions, there
can be only two possible relations that hold between them in terms of indexical value
- either the two expressions bear occurrences of the same index or they do not. Both
of these relations, however, are completely symmetric - if a bears an occurrence of the
same index as 3, then p bears an occurrence of the same index as a, and similarly with
occurrences of different indices. To represent the asymmetric relation of linking in terms
of indices, Heim allows expressions to bear two separate indices, which she distinguishes
as inner indices and outer indices. Inner indices are the ones I have discussed above,
which function either as variables over guises, or as particular guises. Outer indices
function to identify dependency (i.e. linking) relations. Inner indices are obligatory for
all definite NPs, while outer indices are optional, giving rise to the following two indexing
possibilities.
(104) a. [NPi]
b. [NPilj
Linking is then defined in terms of identity of indices as follows:
(105) a. P3 is linked to a iff a's outer index = p's inner index.
With this machinery in place, it is now possible to formalize the desired distinction
between bound and free occurrences of indices - an occurrence of an (inner) index is
bound if and only if it is linked, i.e. if and only if that same index occurs as the outer
index of some other expression. Otherwise, an occurrence of an index is free.
To see how the above analysis works, consider some of the possible derivations asso-
ciated with the sentence Bill said he is brilliant. Assuming that both outer and inner
indices are assigned by S-structure, the S-structure representations available for this sen-
tence will be the following.
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(106) a. [Bill1 ]2 said he1 is brilliant
b. [Bill1]2 said he 2 is brilliant
c. [Bill1] 2 said he 3 is brilliant
While Heim assumes that expressions bearing outer indices must undergo QR in the
mapping from S-structure to LF, we can ignore this complication here and treat the
representations in (106) as the LF representations available for this sentence as well.
The free indices in these examples are the indices 1 and 3. In interpreting these LF
representations, then, these indices will each be associated with a unique guise, say F
and G respectively. In contrast, the index 2 on the pronoun in (106) is bound, and
will consequently be treated as a variable over guises. Representing variable binding as
binding by a A-operator, the above LF representations will result in the following partial
interpretations.
(107) a. FBil said Fhe is brilliant
b. Firn Ax[z said x is brilliant]
c. FBil said Ghe is brilliant
(The notation FBir is intended to denote a guise F which in Heim's terms is presupposed
to pick out an individual who is (a) "Bill".) Once these representations are fully inter-
preted, they will of course denote only two distinct propositions. (107a,b) will denote the
proposition in (108a), where b denotes the individual picked out by the guise F in the
world of evaluation, while (107b) will denote the proposition in (108b), where c denotes
the individual picked out by the guise G in the world of evaluation.
(108) a. [said(b,brilliant(b))]
b. [said(b,brilliant(c))]
Having just outlined the analysis I will be assuming for pronominal interpretation, we
can now return to the original question of this section, that of explaining the restrictions
on interpretation found to hold in (96d) (repeated here).
(96) d. John said he is brilliant before BILL said he is brilliant
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According to the analysis developed in chapter 2, this discourse fragment should only
be felicitous if the focus-related topic of the subordinate clause is instantiated in the
active context consisting of the superordinate clause. To simplify the discussion of this
example, suppose temporarily that the subordinate clause is associated with a single,
complex focus-related topic, ignoring for the moment the complications which arose in
section 2.4.2 regarding the focus-related topic of sentences with embedded clauses. If we
take this focus-related topic to be generated from the LF representation of the subordinate
clause, as we have been assuming in general, there will be three possible focus-related
topics for this clause corresponding the the three possible LF representations given in
(106). I give these focus-related topics below, where I assume that substitution of a
variable in place of a focused NP at LF replaces both the NP and its inner index, but
leaves its outer index.
(109) a. [z] 2 said [he1 ] is brilliant
b. [z]2 said [he 2] is brilliant
c. [z]2 said [he 3] is brilliant
In each case, this focus-related topic will be instantiated in the context only if the LF
representation of the superordinate clause is derived in the same manner as that of the
subordinate clause. As a result, the only non-redundant LF representations for (96d)
which will satisfy the felicity condition on focus-related topics will be the following. 4
(110) a. [John 4] 2 said [he 2] is brilliant before [Billl]2 said [he 2] is brilliant
b. [John 4]2 said [he 3] is brilliant before [Bill1 ]2 said [he3] is brilliant
c. [John 4]2 said [he 4] is brilliant before [Bill,] 2 said [he 4] is brilliant
d. [John 4]2 said [he,] is brilliant before [Bill] 2 said [he1] is brilliant
Taking the free occurrences of the indices 1, 3, and 4 to be associated with guises which
denote the individuals Bill, Sam, and John respectively in the world of utterance, the
above LF representations will be satisfied only in the following circumstances.
4I add one example here which is not strictly speaking already represented above, that in (110c).
In reality, there will be as many well-formed LF representations for the subordinate clause as there
are distinct combinations of indices having the same pattern of occurrence as the indices in (106). I
will systematically minimize the number of such LF representations under consideration by eliminating
redundant indexing patterns. Since the examples here contain an additional referring expression, and
hence an additional non-redundant indexing pattern, I add a representation in which the pronoun bears
this index. Hence the four LF representations corresponding to the three LF representations in (106).
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(111) a. John said John is brilliant before Bill said Bill is brilliant.
b. John said Sam is brilliant before Bill said Sam is brilliant.
c. John said John is brilliant before Bill said John is brilliant.
d. John said Bill is brilliant before Bill said Bill is brilliant.
Of course, under distinct assignments of guises to the free occurrences of the indices 1,
3, and 4, the circumstances in which the sentence will be true are different. However,
beyond these, there are no further circumstances in which this sentence is true. Notice
that these are the exact restrictions which were found to hold in (96d). The analysis thus
gives us a way of accounting for the restrictions on interpretation which obtain for this
sentence.
The above analysis was based on the simplifying assumption that the focus-related
topic of the subordinate clause in (96d) consists of (a set containing) a single expression,
composed of a variable, a verb, and an embedded clause. I argued in section 2.4.2,
however, that in general we cannot assume that a complex sentence is associated with
a single focus-related topic of this sort. The examples used to make that argument are
repeated below.
(87) a. SUE claimed that MARY was CRYING. Then, BILL claimed JOHN COM-
FORTED Mary.
b. MARY claimed that JOHN is a JERK. However, BILL claimed JOHN COM-
FORTED Mary.
The problem with generating (a set consisting of) a single focus-related topic for the
second sentence in these examples is that any such topic will necessarily contain Mary as
an argument of a two-place predicate contained in an embedded clause which itself is an
argument of the verb claimed. According to the felicity condition on focus-related topics,
in order for this sentence to be felicitous in these contexts, the contexts should have to
contain a sentence with this same structure. Neither of the context sentences in (87)
manifests this structure, however, and yet the discourse fragments in (87) are perfectly
acceptable. To overcome this problem, I stipulated that the felicity condition on focus-
related topics must be allowed to be satisfied incrementally, with the focus-related topic
of the embedded clause having to be instantiated separately from that of the embedding
104
clause. It is a consequence of this revision to the basic analysis, however, that the
simplified assumption adopted in the explanation of the restrictions on interpretation for
the sentence in (96d) cannot be maintained, and the account given above must be revised
accordingly.
If the most deeply embedded clausal argument in (96d) must be treated separately
with respect to focus-related topic assignment, and if we maintain that the input for
determining the focus-related topic of an element is the LF representation of that element,
then under the analysis of pronominal interpretation sketched above, the focus-related
topic of this clause will have to be one of the expressions given below.
(112) a. [he 1] is brilliant
b. [he 2] is brilliant
c. [he3] is brilliant
d. [he 4] is brilliant
The only thing distinguishing these representations is obviously the value of the index
assigned to the pronoun. While these indices may well be interpreted differently within
the larger sentence - the first, third and fourth are free in the LF representations in (110)
in which they occur while the second is bound - if all we have to look at in determining the
focus-related topic associated with these clauses is the clauses themselves, this distinction
cannot be made within the representation of the focus-related topic. All that will be
visible there will be a pronoun with an inner index.
Given the constraints on interpretation of indices outlined in the discussion of Heim's
analysis, it turns out that the inability to distinguish between occurrences of bound
indices and occurrences of free indices among the potential focus-related topics in (112)
is not a problem. We saw in chapter 2 that in order for a sentence to be felicitous in
a context, its focus-related topic has to be instantiated in that context. The definition
of instantiation is based on identity between two expressions - the actual focus-related
topic of the sentence in question, and a potential focus-related topic of some sentence
contained in the context. In giving this characterization of instantiation, I glossed over
the question of how to determine when two referring expressions are identical. In the
present case, by assuming that the notion of identity includes identity of indexical value,
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we can derive all the restrictions on possible interpretations of the sentence in (96d). To
see how, consider the following candidate LF representations, the first two of which are
identical to (110a,b) above.
(113) a. [John 4]2 said [he 2] is brilliant before [Bill]z2 said [he 2] is brilliant
b. [John 4]2 said [he 3] is brilliant before [Bill 1]2 said [he 3] is brilliant
c. [John 4]3 said [he 2] is brilliant before [BillRI 2 said [he 2] is brilliant]
By assumption, the focus-related topic of the most deeply embedded clause in (113a,c)
will be that given in (112b), while that of the most deeply embedded clause in (113b)
will be (112c). In all of the examples, this focus-related topic is directly instantiated by
the embedded clause of the superordinate sentence, and hence all of these examples will
satisfy the felicity condition on focus-related topics. However, when we subject these
representations to interpretation, it turns out that only the first two representations
are interpretable. As we already saw, assuming a proper assignment of guises to free
indices, the circumstances under which (113a,b) will represent true propositions will be
circumstances in which one of the following obtain.
(111) a. John said John is brilliant before Bill said Bill is brilliant.
b. John said Sam is brilliant before Bill said Sam is brilliant.
But what of the LF representation in (113c)? If we ignored the values of the indices in
this example, we might be tempted to assign this representation an interpretation which
would be verified by the following circumstance (John, Sam and Bill all assumed to be
distinct individuals).
(114) John said Sam is brilliant before Bill said Bill is brilliant.
However, assigning such an interpretation would require treating the free occurrence
of the index 2 as a specific guise and treating the remaining occurrences of this index
as a variable ranging over guises. Since all indices are required to receive a unique
interpretation, and since no index can simultaneously function as a unique guise and as
a variable over guises, it follows that the LF representation in (113c) cannot be given a
coherent interpretation.
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The above illustration does not yet show that an interpretation verified by the circum-
stances indicated in (114) cannot be generated under our present assumptions. It does
show that one potential method of generating such an interpretation which might have
been considered at first glance to be plausible is not allowed under the present analysis.
It is fairly simple to show from here, however, that no other potential LF representation
for (96d) will both have the interpretation needed to be verified by (114) and satisfy the
felicity condition on focus-related topics. In order to have an interpretation verified by
(114), the inner index on the first occurrence of the pronoun he will have to be interpreted
as a unique guise denoting Sam. The inner index on the second occurrence of he, however,
will have to be interpreted either as a unique guise denoting Bill, or as a variable bound
ultimately by the subordinate subject Bill. In the case in which the indices on each of
the pronouns is free, since Bill and Sam are assumed to be distinct individuals, it follows
that the guise which denotes the one will have to be distinct from the guise which denotes
the other, and hence the corresponding indices will have to be distinct. In the case in
which the index on the second pronoun is bound, since no index can be interpreted both
as a unique guise and as a variable over guises, it again follows that the indices will have
to be distinct. If the indices on the two pronouns are necessarily distinct, however, the
first indexed pronoun will not instantiate the second, so the focus-related topic of the
most embedded clause will not be able to be instantiated in (96d) as a whole.
The above explanation of the restrictions on the interpretation of (96d) depended
crucially on our being able to restrict possible index assignments in two distinct ways.
The first way is to restrict the class of interpretable LF representations by requiring that
distinct occurrences of an index be interpreted identically. This restriction blocks multiple
occurrences of an index where one of the occurrences is interpreted "referentially" (i.e. as
denoting a unique guise) and another occurrence is interpreted as a variable over guises.
The second way of restricting possible index assignments is to require identity of indexical
value between indexed expressions in determining whether a given focus-related topic is
instantiated. Here as before, the felicity condition on focus-related topics acts to filter
out well-formed, interpretable LF representations which happen to be infelicitous in the
discourse context.
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It should be evident at this point that the above explanation can be used to predict
the entire range of interpretations possible for the sentence in (96d). It is worth being
clear on one issue which I have not yet addressed, however. I claimed above that distinct
occurrences of an index must be interpreted identically. In the case where one occurrence
of the index is given a unique guise as its interpretation, all other occurrences of that index
have to be given the same unique guise as interpretation, blocking bound occurrences
of the same index. I have said nothing further, however, about restrictions on bound
occurrences of an index. As the reader has no doubt noticed, in order to account for a
sloppy identity reading of (96d) under the proposed analysis, it must be possible for the
pronoun in the superordinate clause and that in the subordinate clause to bear the exact
same index despite the fact that they are bound by different expressions. That is, the
only representation which will give rise to a sloppy reading and simultaneously satisfy
the felicity condition on focus-related topics is that given below.
(115) [John 4]2 said [hez] is brilliant] before [Bill1 12 said [he 2] is brilliant]
I see no reason for blocking such accidental coindexing here, and since the only way to
account for the sloppy reading of the example in question is to allow it, I do so. Since
all other combinations of index assignments to the referring expressions in (96) raise no
further substantive issues, and since the cases considered in detail so far provide all the
tools necessary to account for the remaining interpretations available as well as for the
restrictions found to hold, I leave it to the reader to work through the remaining cases
at his or her leisure.
Accounting for the example in (96f) requires nothing beyond what we have already
seen to be necessary so my discussion of it will be brief. I repeat the example here for
ease of reference.
(96) f. John said he is brilliant before BILL said he is intelligent.
This example differs from (96d) only in requiring that some LF representation be accom-
modated into the active context prior to determining whether the focus-related topic of
the subordinate clause is instantiated. The LF representation which is accommodated
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must contain an occurrence of the phrase he is intelligent, with the index assigned to
the accommodated pronoun identical to that assigned to the subordinate pronoun. We
must be able to determine the interpretation assigned to this pronoun based upon the
interpretation of the superordinate clause, reasoning roughly that if John said [he,] is
brilliant, then yp [hey] is intelligent. There are several such paths one could take, a few
of which I illustrate below. Here the arrow (==>) is meant to indicate that the proposition
denoted by the LF on the right is to be inferred from that on the left, and the # in the
final two examples is meant to indicate that this inference would generally be considered
to be faulty.
(116) a. [John 1 ] said [he1] is brilliant =' [John1] indicated [he1] is intelligent
b. [John1] 2 said [he 2] is brilliant => [John,] indicated [he1] is intelligent
c. [Johnl] said [he1] is brilliant - [Johnl12 indicated [he2] is intelligent
d. # [John1 ] said [he1] is brilliant = [John1] indicated [he 2] is intelligent
e. # [John1 ] said [he3] is brilliant = [John 1]2 indicated [he 2] is intelligent
Here, the acceptable paths of reasoning are those in which the guise ultimately assigned
to the pronoun is identical in the LF representations on either side of the =#, assuming
that the linking of one index to another identifies the interpretation of the former with
that of the latter. In the case in which the binding expression denotes a unique guise (as
with proper names), the bound expression as well will end up denoting that same guise.
This means that the only change that will generally be allowed in the indexing of the
pronoun is a change between a pronoun whose inner index is identical to the inner index
of John and a pronoun whose inner index is identical to the outer index of John.
If we look at the effect this change can have on the range of circumstances predicted
to verify the sentence in (96f), we find that allowing this change in indexical structure
between the sentence originally contained in the context and that accommodated into
the context is completely innocuous. Under the above assumptions about restrictions
on accommodation, in addition to LF representations parallel to those of (96d) in (110),
each of the following LF representations will be predicted to make a discourse fragment
consisting of (96f) felicitous.
109
(117) a. [John1 ] said [he,] is brilliant before [Bill4 ] said [he 4] is intelligent
b. [John,] said [he,] is brilliant before [Bill 4]2 [he 2] is intelligent]
c. [John1 ]2 said [he 2] is brilliant] before [Bill 4] said [he1 ] is intelligent
The circumstances by which the interpretations of these representations will be verified
are independently predicted to verify the sentence in (96f). These representations simply
license a strict reading of the subordinate pronoun (coindexed with John) from a bound
variable pronoun in the antecedent, and a sloppy reading from a "referential" one. Each
of these readings is already predicted to be available, however, so accommodation will
not increase the number of expected readings for the sentence.
We have seen that accounting for the interpretational restrictions in VP deaccenting
cases is relatively straightforward given both the analysis of focus-related topics devel-
oped in the previous chapter and a sufficiently articulated theory of the interpretation of
"referring" expressions like that discussed above. The account given can be summarized
as follows. Interpretation of a sentence containing deaccented material is syntactically
unconstrained. Hence, any syntactic ambiguities present in the non-deaccented counter-
part of a sentence are also available for the deaccented sentence as far as the syntax is
concerned. The felicity condition on focus-related topics, however, filters out most of
these potential interpretations for the sentence by requiring that the focus-related topic
of a sentence be instantiated in the local active context. The definition of instantiation
is based upon the notion of identity, where the actual focus-related topic of aL sentence
will be instantiated in its local active context if and only if it is identical to a potential
focus-related topic of some sentence contained in that context. This restriction ensures
that the LF representation of the deaccented parts of a sentence will occur in some sen-
tence in the active context. When this deaccented material can be assigned one of several
distinct LF representations, the felicity condition on focus-related topics will have the
effect of forcing the actual LF representation assigned to that material to be identical to
that assigned to corresponding material in the context. This analysis accounts directly
for ambiguity resolution in cases like (96c) since here there is a clear reason to want to
allow both the superordinate clause and the subordinate clause to be associated with
two distinct LF representations. I argued that the same analysis can be directly applied
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to account for the restrictions on interpretation of (96d) as well by requiring that the
values of the indices assigned to the referential elements contained in each of two phrases
must be identical if the phrases themselves are to be identical. If the interpretation of
indices were left unconstrained, this relativization of identity to index assignment would
do little to restrict the possible readings of a deaccented sentence since it would always be
possible for the relevant occurrences of NPs to be frivolously coindexed. However, under
Heim's theory of index interpretation, such frivolous coindexing is largely eliminated by
the requirement that each indexical value be given a unique interpretation. This puts a
tight constraint on the range of interpretable LF representations, and hence restricts the
range of possible input representations to the felicity condition on focus-related topics,
which then acts to filter out most of these alternative interpretations. The uniqueness
requirement on interpretation of indices and the felicity condition on focus-related topics
thus act in tandem to restrict the range of readings available for sentences like (96).
Having developed the above analysis of the restrictions on interpretation in deaccenting
environments, the obvious next question to ask is whether this analysis can be used to
account for the restrictions on interpretation in VP deletion cases as well. I turn to this
question immediately.
3.3 Specifics of VP Ellipsis
The above account of the restrictions on interpretation found to hold in deaccenting en-
vironments was based on the premise that deaccenting of a phrase is only felicitous when
an identical phrase occurs previously in the discourse, where identity is checked at the
level of LF. The same basic account can be used to explain restrictions on interpretation
in VP deletion environments as well by ensuring that a deleted VP will be identical with
some antecedent VP at LF. This still leaves open the question of how to ensure that such
identity obtains, allowing in principle for either a post S-structure copying based analysis
along the lines of Williams (1977), or a PF deletion based analysis along the general lines
of Sag (1976) (cf. chapter 1 for discussion). Under either approach the explanation for the
near identical restrictions in the two classes of cases - those in deaccenting environments
111
and those in VP deletion environments - will be principled in that each will derive from
identity restrictions. As we will see below, under a deletion based analysis it is possible
to go further by reducing VP deletion to deaccenting. In this section, I will sketch two
specific analyses of VP ellipsis, one of which will be a copying based analysis and the
other of which will be a deletion based analysis. In developing these two alternative
analyses, I am more concerned to show the commitments one is forced to make under
either type of approach, and am not so much concerned with defending one approach
over the other.
3.3.1 Copy Based Theories of VP Ellipsis
The main advantage of a copy based approach to generating lexical material at LF for VP
ellipsis sentences is the simplification it affords in the PF component. Under a copy based
approach, phonologically empty VPs are base generated as such, perhaps containing
internal syntactic structure, but lacking any lexical material. The copy operation which
supplies lexical material to these VPs is assumed to apply after phonological spellout,
leaving the VP empty at the level of PF. Since the input to the PF component on
this analysis contains no lexical material in the "elided" VP, there is no need for a
deletion operation at this level, and hence there is no need to postulate PF constraints
on VP ellipsis. All substantive issues relating to VP ellipsis on such an approach are
restricted to those parts of the grammar responsible for determining the ultimate semantic
interpretation of the elided VP. This leaves basically three questions to be answered: (i)
what is the base generated structure of an empty VP?, (ii) where does copying apply?,
and (iii) what gets copied? The questions are of course related, though they are at least
partially independent of each other.
For the first question, there are essentially three possibilities to consider. The empty
VP could be a pronominal-like element akin to pro, it could be an unstructured empty
category, or it could be a fully structured VP with empty terminal elements. The first
option appears to be highly unlikely. It is a well-known fact about VP ellipsis that an
elided VP can "contain" the trace of a a WH-expression which has been raised out of
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the VP. This fact is illustrated in the following dialogue.
(118) A: Who did John introduce to Mary?
B: I don't know. Who did PETER e ?
Overt pronouns, however, cannot contain WH-traces, as illustrated in (119). Further-
more, the most likely candidate for an overt pro-verbal element - so - likewise cannot
contain a variable bound by a WH-expression, as illustrated in (120).
(119) a. A: John introduced Bill to Mary.
B: PETER did it too.
b. A: Who did John introduce to Mary?
B: I don't know. *Who did PETER do it?
(120) a. A: John introduced Bill to Mary.
B: PETER did so too.
b. A: Who did John introduce to Mary?
B: I don't know. *Who did PETER do so?
If empty VPs were pronominal-like elements, then the distinct behavior of empty VPs
and of the overt pronominal-like elements in the above examples would be unexplainable.
I take these examples to argue strongly against a pronominal-like analysis of empty VPs.
This leaves two other options to be considered - unstructured empty VPs, or structured
VPs with empty terminal elements.
Consider first the former alternative - that VPs are base generated as a single, unan-
alyzable empty element. Under such an analysis, the connection between a WH-phrase
and its trace would only exist after the antecedent VP is copied into the empty posi-
tion, which by assumption only occurs after phonological spellout (i.e. after S-structure).
This means that the relation between a WH-expression and a trace contained in a copied
VP cannot be established by movement of the WH-expression out of the VP prior to
S-structure since there would be no possible source for the WH-expression to move out
of.6 Such an analysis thus predicts that the effects of a constraint such as subjacency,
"lHaik (1987) argues for an analysis of VP deletion in which an empty VP is treated as an unanal-
ysed empty element. To account for subjacency effects, Haik assumes that such empty VPs can count
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which is commonly taken to constrain D-structure to S-structure movement, should be
able to be nullified in a VP ellipsis context. This prediction is not borne out, however,
as can be seen in the following example.
(121) A: Who did Bill call on the phone yesterday?
B: I don't know. ??Who are people asking you whether hedid 1?
called on the phone f
The VP ellipsis example is no better than the corresponding example containing an overt
VP, both examples exhibiting standard subjacency effects. The subjacency effects could
be accounted for by forcing the WH-expression to be base generated in a position adjacent
to the empty VP since then the WH-expression in (121B) would have to move across
the intermediate Comp between D-structure and S-structure in the ellipsis case as well
as in the overt case. However, it is difficult to see what motivation there could be for
forcing the WH-expression to be base generated in that position in the first place, and
without independent motivation, such an explanation would constitute little more than
a restatement of the facts. Thus, while the existence of subjacency effects in VP ellipsis
contexts does not constitute a knock-down argument against analyzing empty VPs as
unanalyzable empty elements at D-structure, it does make such an analysis suspect.
We are left, then, with an analysis in which phonologically empty VPs have the
complete syntactic structure of their overt counterparts, but with empty terminal nodes
in place of lexical items. This is essentially the analysis adopted in Williams (1977).
We can see immediately that the first of the above two problems is simply not an issue
under this third analysis since there is no reason to expect a fully structured VP to act
like a pronominal element. The second problem can also be avoided if we assume that
the WH-expression in the VP ellipsis version of (121B) is base generated in the same
structural position as it is in the non-deleted version. Since WH-movement in this case
essentially as WH traces with respect to S-structure constraints, but that at LF they are replaced by
full-fledged VPs containing a true WH-trace which is used for assigning an interpretation to the phrase
as a whole. While this analysis gives a technical solution to the problem of accounting for subjacency
effects like those illustrated below in (121), it offers no principled restriction on the syntactic function
of empty elements, in particular leaving unexplained why an empty VP can act syntactically as a WH
trace when it is semantically nothing of the sort.
114
is obligatory, the WH-expression will have to raise out of the VP by S-structure, but
such movement will violate subjacency in both the VP ellipsis case and in the overt VP
case. We thus expect the two examples to be identically ungrammatical, which is exactly
what we found to be the case. Since this is the only one of the three alternative analyses
originally considered which is readily compatible with the above facts, I will proceed
on the assumption that under a copy based analysis of VP ellipsis, an elided VP must
be represented at D-structure as having the complete internal syntactic structure of a
normal overt VP, but with empty terminal nodes in place of lexical items.
We can move on now the the second of our three original questions; where does
copying occur? In order for a copy based analysis of VP ellipsis to constitute a substantive
alternative to a deletion based approach, copying must be a post-S-structure operation.
This much we have already been assuming. However, we can further narrow down the
range of possibilities by considering the interaction between VP ellipsis and sentences
containing multiple WH-expressions like that in (122).
(122) I wish I knew who brought what to the party.
The first possibility one might consider for copying would be to allow copying to apply
immediately to S-structure representations in the LF derivation of a sentence. Under
such an analysis, what would be copied would presumably be another S-structure repre-
sentation of a VP from the previous discourse context. Assuming (122) to be the source
of the antecedent VP for such copying, this analysis would potentially result in the VP
brought what to the party being copied. LF WH-movement would then apply to the
WH-phrase in the copied VP just as in the antecedent VP, and thus we would expect
the WH-expression in the VP ellipsis sentence to be able to function just as it does in
the antecedent sentence. In the examples in (123) modeled after similar examples found
in Hirschbiiler (1982), however, we see that this prediction is not borne out.
(123) a. A: I wish I knew who brought what to the party.
a. *who did e. p
b. B: Me too. I have no IDEA { b wh(o athe party).
The crucial example here is that of (123Ba). If copying applied at S-structure, then
all else being equal we would expect this example to be identical to (123Bb). We find,
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however, that the former is ungrammatical while the latter is perfectly acceptable. This
distinction thus mitigates against allowing copying to apply to S-structure representa-
tions. If we assume that the copying operation applies at LF instead of at S-structure,
the problem posed by (123) can be readily avoided. Since WH-expressions which are in
situ at S-structure presumably raise at LF to a [+WH] Comp, the LF representation of
the VP in (123A) will contain a trace in place of the WH-expression what. If we attempt
to copy this VP directly into the empty VP of (123Ba), however, the resulting represen-
tation will be ill-formed, since the trace of what from the antecedent will be unbound in
the copy. The distinction between the (a) and (b) examples in (123B) can thus be taken
as evidence that copying must apply to LF representations. As we will see in the section
3.3.2 below, this conclusion is not a necessary one, though the explanation offered is the
most straightforward way of handling the data.
In order for the explanation just given for the unacceptability of (123Ba) to go
through, the ordering relation of LF WH raising before copying must be an obligatory
one. The easiest way to ensure this ordering is to have copying apply to the output of LF.
If we adopt this assumption, then the explanation of the ungrammaticality of (123Ba)
leads to an interesting prediction with respect to quantified expressions in VP ellipsis
contexts. The explanation implicitly assumes that the copying operation can only copy
a VP, and not a WH expression which has been raised out of the VP. If we generalize
from this case to other cases of LF raising such as Quantifier Raising, whenever some
expression such as a Quantifier Phrase has been raised out of a VP, that VP should only
be able to be copied into an empty VP which is within the scope of the raised QP. When
copying is across sentences, of course, there is no possibility of the copied VP being within
the scope of a quantifier from a preceding sentence. Consequently, the only way for the
copy to be well-formed is if the QP in the antecedent VP does not raise out of the VP
at LF prior to copying. If we take the scope of a QP to be its c-command domain at
LF, then it follows that QPs in intersentential VP ellipsis contexts should never be able
to have scope outside the copied VP which contains them at S-structure. Note that this
prediction does not carry over to deaccenting cases, since deaccenting does not involve
a copying operation. Indeed, the acceptability of the (b) example in (123B) indicates
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clearly that the source of the unacceptability of the (a) example must derive from re-
strictions on copying which do not apply to deaccenting in general. Thus in examples
containing deaccented QPs, any scope assignment should be possible as long as there is a
suitable antecedent expression in the context in which the identical scope assignment is
instantiated. Intuitions about such examples are unfortunately subtle, though I believe
the expected distinction can be seen in examples with quantified expressions just as in
multiple WH examples like those above. I give a relevant illustration in (124).
(124) a. The doctor/lawyer conference was an abysmal failure. On the first day, some
lawyer objected to every proposal.
b. Then on the SECOND day, some DOCTOR did.
c. Then on the SECOND day, some DOCTOR objected to every proposal.
It is fairly clear that a wide scope reading of the QP every proposal is possible in the
deaccenting example in (c) provided that the corresponding QP in the second sentence
of (a) is also given wide scope. With the example in (b), the facts are less clear, though
the wide scope reading of the copied QP, if possible at all, is clearly less readily available
than it is in (c). If such a reading is in fact unavailable in (b), then this example offers
support to an analysis in which the copying operation applies to LF representations in
which scope assignments have already been fixed. If such a reading is available, on the
other hand, a copy based analysis would have to be significantly complicated in order to
account for the distinction between these cases and the corresponding WH cases above.
I argued in chapter 1 that in order to give a principled account of the restrictions
on interpretation present in both VP ellipsis cases and in VP deaccenting cases, the
explanation for the two would have to be identical. Since it is impossible to explain
restrictions in deaccenting cases in terms of restrictions on ellipsis, I argued that the
explanation given for both cases would have to derive from restrictions on deaccenting
instead. In the examples considered in this section, however, we have seen that the
ellipsis cases are in fact more highly restricted than the deaccenting cases. I argued
that the additional restrictions can be handled by assuming that copying applies to LF
representations, and that the copying operation only copies material contained within a
VP at that level. If this is correct, however, it would appear to undermine the reduction
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of constraints on VP ellipsis to those on deaccenting. While treating copied VPs as
deaccented will not lead to any incorrect predictions, if the LF representations that
are copied are the same LF representations which are used to determine whether or
not a given deaccented phrase is instantiated in a context, treating copied material as
deaccented will not add any constraints to the interpretation of a deleted VP beyond
those already implicitly imposed by the copying mechanism itself. That is, ambiguity
resolution will in essence be secured redundantly by both the copying mechanism and by
constraints on deaccenting.
Summarizing the results of this section, I have argued that under a copy based analysis
of VP ellipsis, the D-structure representation of the empty VP must (be allowed to) have
the full internal structure of its antecedent, differing from the antecedent only in that none
of the [-WH] terminal nodes contains any lexical material. Copying can apply no earlier
than S-structure, and we have some reason for believing that copying must apply after
LF raising of WH expressions. The most natural way to enforce such an ordering is to
only allow copying to apply to complete well-formed LF representations. The resulting
analysis is by no means the only copy based analysis which has a potential for being
adequate, and to the extent that alternative explanations can be given for the examples
in this section, many other possibilities will undoubtedly present themselves. While a
copy-based analysis of VP ellipsis may be acceptable from a technical standpoint, from
a theoretical point of it makes the explanation for the constraints on interpretation in
VP ellipsis contexts necessarily distinct from the explanation given for the corresponding
constraints in VP deaccenting contexts. In both cases, the explanation is given in terms
of identity between two expressions, though in the ellipsis case this identity is secured
by the copying mechanism, while in the deaccenting case it is enforced by the felicity
condition on focus related topics. The explanations are similar, but neither one can be
reduced to the other. This is not so much an objection to a copy based theory of VP
ellipsis as much as an observation about the form of explanation possible under such a
theory.
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3.3.2 Deletion Based Theories of VP Ellipsis
As mentioned above, the alternative to a copy based theory of VP ellipsis is a deletion
based theory, i.e. one in which a phonologically null VP is base generated as a full lexical
VP and gets deleted in the phonological component. The conditions under which dele-
tion is possible are presumed to be identity conditions of a sort, and deletion is taken
to apply after S-structure. Sag's (1976) analysis discussed in chapter 1 was one such
theory. In distinction to a copy based analysis, under a deletion based analysis questions
related to the derivation of LF representations are essentially orthogonal to questions
of VP deletion. While constraints on deletion will determine a range of potential D-
structures associated with any given VP ellipsis sentence, once the D-structure has been
determined, the derivation of the corresponding LF representation is subject to no addi-
tional constraints beyond those needed for independent reasons in the grammar. Thus,
a VP ellipsis sentence and its overt counterpart are predicted to behave identically with
respect to the semantic component. Taken in one sense, this prediction is of course false.
That is, if one takes the counterpart of a VP ellipsis sentence to be any sentence made up
of the same words organized thematically into the same gross syntactic structure, then
differences of interpretation will arise within a given context. The sentences with overt
structure will have a far wider range of potential interpretations generable by varying the
focus structure of the sentence. By taking the overt counterpart of a VP ellipsis sentence
to be one which preserves focus structure as well as thematic organization, however, much
of this discrepancy disappears. From this perspective, the analysis of focus-related topics
from the previous chapter can be seen as laying the groundwork for making a deletion
based analysis of VP ellipsis plausible.
If we adopt the structure of grammar assumed in the syntactic literature since the Ex-
tended Standard Theory in which Logical Form (LF) and Phonetic Form (PF) comprise
two distinct branches of the grammar which interact only indirectly via the syntactic level
of S-structure, a deletion based theory can be considered adequate only if all necessary
constraints on deletion can be stated within the PF component. Thus, while syntactic
features can be made use of, aspects of a derivation which are confined to the LF com-
ponent of grammar are in principle inaccessible. Put differently, only those aspects of
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interpretation which are visible at S-structure in the syntax can possibly play a role in
constraining deletion in the phonological component. This is an important restriction to
keep in mind, especially in light of the fact that the most detailed deletion based analysis
of VP ellipsis in the literature - the analysis of Sag (1976) - directly violates this re-
striction by allowing deletion to be constrained by identity of interpretation. Of course,
it might be that the organization of the grammar standardly assumed is incorrect, and
that it is in fact necessary to allow the PF component to have direct access to the LF
component. Unless such a reorganization of the grammar is absolutely forced upon us,
however, on general methodological principles it should be avoided.
The most important question which a deletion based analysis of VP ellipsis must
address is under what conditions deletion is possible. Given an independent need to
represent deaccenting in syntax, the simplest answer one can envision is that deletion is
possible whenever deaccenting is possible, i.e. that VP ellipsis is no more than an extreme
case of deaccenting where a VP ceases to be audible altogether. Prima facie examples
seem to argue against such an approach, however, since there are clear cases in which a
VP can be deaccented but where the interpretations available for the resulting sentence
are not available for the corresponding VP ellipsis sentence. A modified version of the
examples in (97a,c) discussed at the outset of this chapter illustrates this point.
(97) a. John likes soaring gliders because BILL does.
c. John likes soaring gliders because BILL likes flying aircraft.
Whatever other similarities there are in the interpretations of these two sentences, they
clearly do not share an interpretation. However, if all deaccented VPs were allowed to
be deleted, then we would expect that the D-structure representation underlying (97c)
could also serve as the underlying representation for (97a), and the two sentences would
consequently be expected to share an interpretation.
The problem posed by (97a,c) above can be avoided if in addition to requiring that a
deleted VP be deaccented we further assume that a deleted VP must be composed of the
same lexical items as some antecedent VP in the context. On such an assumption, the
D-structure representation of (97c) would not meet the conditions for deletion. Conse-
quently, there would be no well-formed derivation with the D-structure representation of
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(97c) and the PF representation of (97a), and the absence of a shared reading between the
two sentences would thus be explained. While such an analysis goes a long way toward
accounting for when VP ellipsis is possible and for what interpretations are available for
a sentence containing a deleted VP, there is a class of examples which cannot be handled
under this analysis as it stands, and which in fact pose a serious challenge to any deletion
based analysis of VP ellipsis. The type of problem I am referring to is a subclass of cases
in which a single quantified expression is interpreted as binding two variables - one in an
overt VP and one in a deleted VP. I illustrate below.
(126) a. The teacher spoke with each student before the principal did.
b. Vz : student(z) The teacher spoke with x before Vy : student(y) the principal
spoke with y.
c. Vz : student(x) The teacher spoke with x before the principal spoke with x
I assume that the sentence in (a) is ambiguous between the readings in (b) and (c),
though this assumption is not important. What is important is the availability of the
interpretation in (c). Under this interpretation, all that is required for the sentence in
(a) to be true is that for each individual student a, the teacher spoke with a before the
principal spoke with a. If such an interpretation is in fact available for this sentence, then
this sentence stands as a counterexample to the analysis under consideration. According
to this analysis, deletion of a VP at PF is possible only when the VP and its antecedent
are lexically identical. Since quantifier raising does not occur prior to S-structure in
English, this means that the only potential source for the sentence in (a) should be that
given in (127) below.
(127) The teacher spoke with each student before the principal spoke with each
student.
The problem is that this sentence does not have (126c) as a possible interpretation. If the
D-structure representation of (127) is the only possible source for VP ellipsis sentence in
(126a) as the analysis predicts, then, the availability of the interpretation in (126c) for
this latter sentence cannot be explained.
If (126a) is to be handled by a deletion based theory of VP ellipsis, then a D-structure
representation like that of the following sentence will have to be admitted as a potential
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source for (126a).'
(128) The teacher spoke with each student before the principal spoke with him/that
student.
While such a D-structure will clearly allow for deaccenting of the subordinate VP on a
reading in which the pronoun is bound by the quantified expression at LF, the superor-
dinate and subordinate VPs are obviously not lexically identical at PF. The challenge
for a deletion based theory of VP ellipsis is then to state the conditions for deletion so
that the PF representation of the subordinate VP in (128) meets these conditions in the
context of the superordinate VP.
It was cases like this which led Sag (1976) to import a semantic identity condition
into the theory of VP ellipsis. I have argued above, however, that no adequate deletion
based analysis of VP ellipsis can make essential use of purely semantic information of
the sort which Sag employs. 7 To allow (128) as a D-structure source for the sentence in
(126a), we clearly have to abandon the notion that VP ellipsis requires lexical identity
with an antecedent at PF in favor of some looser restriction. Suppose, then, that we
allow deletion of a VP when that VP is non-distinct from its antecedent, in some sense
to be made precise. Such an analysis can be made to handle the problematic case under
consideration provided either that we analyze each as non-distinct from that, or that we
analyze each student as non-distinct from him at PF.
Given the above analysis of index assignment and interpretation based on Heim
(1992), there is an obvious solution to the problem of defining non-distinctness. As-
sume for the sake of argument that the underlying representation of the VP ellipsis
sentence in (126a) contains a pronoun in the subordinate clause. According to the above
analysis, indices are assigned to all definite NPs and quantified expressions by the level
of S-structure. f we assume that the QP each student is assigned an external index, in
COne could equally well conceive of a D-structure source for (126a) which contaiaed a base generated
empty category in place of the pronoun, though I will ignore this possibility.
'Recall from chapter 1 that Sag's allowed VP ellipsis to apply under identity up to the point of
alphabetic variance. This constraint will only be satisfied for sentences like (128) at the level of LF,
since it is only at this point that the quantified expression raises and binds a variable left behind in its
D-structure position, hence the essential use of purely semantic information.
122
order for the sentence to be interpreted in such a way that the QP binds the pronoun,
this outer index of the QP will have to be identical to the inner index of the pronoun, as
illustrated below.
(129) The teacher spoke with [each student]1 before the principal spoke with [him1].
If we analyze distinct elements bearing occurrences of the same index as non-distinct, then
allowing for deletion to apply to the sentence in (126a) under the assignment of indices
given in (129) will be unproblematic. The only change that is required is to allow identity
of index value not to care about the position of the index. If we assume that an element
can only be bound by a quantified expression if it is in the scope (c-command domain)
of that quantified expression at LF, then in order for this S-structure representation to
be mapped onto a well-formed LF representation, the quantified expression will have
to raise to a position where it binds the pronoun. Ignoring irrelevant details, the LF
representation for this sentence will then be the following.8
(130) [each student]1 [ The teacher spoke with t, before the principal spoke with[him,] ]
By treating the two VPs in question as non-distinct at PF, it is thus possible to give an
explanation of the formerly problematic interpretation of (126a).
There is still one major problem which a deletion based analysis of VP ellipsis must
face, and that is the problem of deletion of WH expressions in multiple WH sentences
like that of (124), repeated here.
(124) a. A: I wish I knew who brought what to the party.
b. B: I wish I did too. I have no IDEA b wo brougt what (to the part).
This example was u;3ed in section 3.3.1 to argue that under a copy based analysis of VP
ellipsis, copying must apply after LF WH raising. It was assumed that if copying applied
at S-structure to (124Ba), the resulting representation would be indistinguishable from
that of (124Bb) and hence once copying applied there could be no way of teasing the two
sIncorporated into this representation is Higginbotham's (1983) assumption that linking is automatic
under movement.
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examples apart. On a deletion based analysis of VP ellipsis, however, the two sentences
in (124B) would presumably derive from the same D-structure representation and would
hence have identical LF representations and interpretations. In order to account for the
unacceptability of the ellipsis example in (124Ba), a deletion based theory must be able
to block deletion from applying altogether to the embedded VP of (124Bb). Since on
the surface the deleted VP and its antecedent appear to be identical, however, blocking
deletion from applying here is an enormous challenge to any deletion based theory.
The first approach one might consider for blocking deletion from applying in the above
case is to stipulate that WH expressions are obligatorily focused even when they do not
appear to bear phonological accent. Under such an analysis, the embedded VP bought
what (to the party) could not be analyzed as a deaccented constituent since it contains
a focused element, and hence we would not expect it to be able to delete. The problem
with such an approach is that it leaves the first sentence in (124B) - I wish I did [e] too
- a complete mystery. The source for this sentence contains two WH expressions, both
of which get deleted. Under the proposed analysis, then, we would expect this sentence
to be as bad as or worse than (124Ba), and yet this sentence is impeccable.
The only way I can see of altering the conditions on deletion so as to make the
required distinctions for the case just considered is to not allow deletion to break up
relations between in situ WH expressions and the Comp they raise to at LF. Stating this
requirement purely within the PF component, however, is not a trivial task. The first
thing that is required in order for such an analysis to be possible is that an in situ WH
expression must be directly related (no later than) at S-structure to the Comp to which
it raises at LF. To describe this relation, I will say that a WH expression is bound by the
Comp to which it eventually raises, leaving the representation of this binding relation
unspecified. Next, we have to relativize the notion of non-distinctness to this relation
in such a way that a VP containing a WH expression which is unbound within that
VP can never qualify as non-distinct from another VP, while one containing only WH
expressions which are bound within the VP can. Finally, we have to make sure that the
resulting definition of non-distinctness applies only to overt WH expressions and not to
their traces, since as we have already seen in (119) (repeated here) VP ellipsis is perfectly
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acceptable in sentences in which the deleted VP contains a WH trace.
(119) a. A: Who did John introduce to Mary?
b. B: I don't know. Who did PETER?
A definition of non-distinctness which meets these requirements is given below.
(131) Two expressions a and P/3 are non-distinct at PF if and only if:
i. a and / are similar, and
ii. if 7 is a WH expression occurring in a and 7' the corresponding WH
expression occurring in /, 7 and y' must be bound within a and 3
respectively.
a and # are similar if and only if
i. a and /3 are lexical elements and a = /, or
ii. a = [74]j and # = [6k]l (i,j,k, Il optional), and {i, j} n {k, l} # 0, or
iii. the immediate constituent structure of a is syntactically identical to
that of / and each subconstituent of a is non-distinct from the corre-
sponding subconstituent of Pf.
I leave the notion of two expressions corresponding as well as that of their being identi-
cally bound unformalized here. In rough outline, I take correspondence to be a relation
between positions within syntactic constituents, where it is a minimal requirement for
two positions to correspond that they be of the same syntactic category and that the
sets of syntactic constituents they are contained in be identical.
The definition of non-distinctness given above can be seen as a minimal specification
of the constraints required in order to make a deletion analysis of VP ellipsis based on
PF constraints possible. The definition may require further refinements, but no aspect
of the definition can be eliminated without sacrificing empirical coverage. The definition
is undeniably stipulatory at this point, though I do not currently see a way of giving a
more principled deletion based account of VP ellipsis.
One final potential problem for a deletion based analysis should be noted. In the
previous section, I argued that the scopal possibilities of quantified expressions differed
depending on whether or not the QP was contained in a VP which was deleted or in
one which was deaccented. There I argued that a deaccented QP can clearly have scope
outside a deaccented VP which contains it, while it is less clear whether a deleted QP
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can have scope outside the elided VP it is contained in (at D-structure). The relevant
examples are repeated here.
(125) a. The doctor/lawyer conference was an abysmal failure. On the first day, some
lawyer objected to every proposal.
b. Then on the SECOND day, some DOCTOR did.
c. Then on the SECOND day, some DOCTOR objected to every proposal.
Examples of this sort are crucial to determining whether VP ellipsis should be handled
as deletion or as copying. If quantifier scope possibilities are more highly restricted in
the VP ellipsis example than in the deaccenting example, then a deletion based account
will be hard pressed to account for these facts. The only way to do so would be to
represent quantifier scope at S-structure, and only allow deletion to apply when the
scope of a quantified expression is within the deleted VP. If on the other hand the
quantifier scope possibilities are identical for these two examples, i.e. if a wide scope
reading of the QP every proposal is available in (125b) just as it is in (125c), then a
deletion based analysis will have an advantage over a copy based analysis, since the
unavailability of such an interpretation was predicted under a copy based analysis in the
previous section. It is lamentable that judgments in these cases are so murky. If clearer
examples cannot be produced, it may prove impossible to give a clear argument which
distinguishes empirically between a deletion based analysis and a copy based analysis of
VP ellipsis.
Summarizing the results of this section, I have argued first and foremost that in
order for a deletion based analysis of VP ellipsis to be acceptable, any constraints on
deletion must be statable entirely within the PF component of the grammar. I argued
that two basic constraints will suffice to account for the majority of cases of VP ellipsis -
that the deleted VP must be deaccented and that it must be lexically identical to some
antecedent VP. This account had to be modified in two ways, however, first to account
for certain cases of VP ellipsis in which the deleted VP contains a variable bound from
outside that VP and second to account for cases in which the deleted VP contains a
WH expression. To handle the first set of cases, I assumed that the deleted VP is
base generated with a pronoun in the position of the bound variable. I then redefined
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the conditions under which VP ellipsis can apply so as to require non-distinctness of a
deleted VP with its antecedent rather than identity, where non-distinctness in the case of
two indexed expressions depends only on one of the values of the indices assigned to each
expression being identical. To handle the second set of cases, I stipulated that deletion
cannot apply to a VP containing a WH expression unless that VP also contains the Comp
which binds the WH expression. The need for this last stipulation is a clear drawback
to a deletion based analysis of VP ellipsis. However, on the conceptual side, under a
deletion based analysis, the connection between the restrictions on VP ellipsis and those
on deaccenting examined in chapter 1 is a principled one - deaccenting is seen as a
precondition to deletion, and consequently all restrictions on deaccenting automatically
carry over to VP ellipsis sentences.
3.3.3 Alternate Deletion-Based Analysis
The above deletion-based analysis of VP ellipsis was based on the assumption that dele-
tion must be directly constrained by some kind of identity criterion at PF. The an lysis
given, however, overlooks one crucial problem. In discussing cases of deaccenting, I
argued that it had to be possible to augment the active context via a process akin to ac-
commodation in order to license the focus-related topic of sentences such as (97c) above
(repeated here).
(97) a. John likes soaring gliders because BILL does.
c. John likes soaring gliders because BILL likes flying aircraft.
The reason it is necessary to accommodate a proposition into the context in (97c) is that
the definition of instantiation is based on identity, and there is no sentence in the context
at the point where the subordinate clause is processed which contains the necessary
identical material. In order to account for the absence of an identical reading between
these two examples, I outlined above an account of VP deletion based on identity at PF,
the idea being that a sentence whose underlying representation was that of (97c) would
not contain an antecedent VP identical to the VP to be deleted, and hence deletion
would be blocked. However, we must now ask why it isn't possible to accommodate a
127
proposition into the context which will satisfy the PF identity requirement, just as we
had to accommodate a proposition into the context to satisfy an identity requirement to
license the deaccenting in (97c). Unless we can give a reason why such accommodation
should be disallowed, the above deletion-based analysis will not be able to provide an
explanation for why the sentences in (97a,c) fail to share an interpretation, and the
analysis itself will consequently be called into question. In this section, I propose an
explanation for why such accommodation will not generally be possible for VP ellipsis
sentences, an explanation which takes as given only the constraints on deaccenting argued
for in chapter 2. Having given such an explanation, I will then show that PF identity
constraints like those outlined in the preceding section can be dispensed with altogether.
The resulting analysis will then constitute a true reduction of constraints on VP deletion
to those on deaccenting.
Once a VP ellipsis sentence is determined to have a particular D-structure represen-
tation, there is no way to prevent generation of an implicature of the form needed to
license deaccenting and consequent deletion of that VP. To explain the interpretational
differences between sentences like those in (97a,c) above, then, we have to show that
the former sentence cannot be determined to have the same D-structure representation
as the latter. If all that were at issue were syntactic well-formedness, one could simply
stipulate that the D-structure representation had the required form and we would be
forced to abandon the deletion-as-deaccenting analysis without giving it further consid-
eration. However, we are concerned here not only with syntactic well-formedness, but
with discourse felicity as well, where part of what goes into determining whether a dis-
course is felicitous is whether what the discourse participants have intended to convey
can reasonably well be figured out. It is this fact that I intend to use to explain the
differences noted above.
In assigning an interpretation to a sentence like (97a), the only clues one has to go
on are contextual clues and knowledge of grammar. By assumption, the contextual clues
available to help in assigning an interpretation to this sentence are restricted to those
present in the sentence itself. As for one's knowledge of grammar, I take it to be part of a
native English speakers knowledge of grammar that the focus-related topic of a sentence
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must be instantiated in a context. This knowledge can thus be exploited in determining
the interpretation of the sentence in (97a). Being faced with an utterance of (97a), then,
one could plausibly figure out the intended interpretation by reasoning as follows. The
speaker uttered (97a) without giving any clues outside his utterance what interpretation
(and hence what D-structure representation) he intended. Since he and I both know that
VPs can be deleted if and only if they can be deaccented, and VPs can be deaccented
only if their LF representations are instantiated in the context, his intended meaning
must be one with an LF representation which is instantiated in the active context. Since
the only LF representation contained in the active context is that of the superordinate
clause, the speaker must have intended the interpretation of the elided VP to be identical
to that of one of the VPs in the superordinate clause. Since the superordinate clause
contains two VPs - soaring gliders and likes PRO soaring gliders - I have to make a guess
from here as to which VP the speaker intended me to choose, though since the choice
comes down to one of two it should be relatively simple to determine which the speaker
intends. The above reasoning process is somewhat abbreviated, but it is precise enough
for our present purposes.
Suppose now that we were to try and determine whether the speaker might have
intended some different interpretation for the elided VP - say the interpretation likes
flying aircraft. How could be determine this to be so? The reasoning would have to
go something like this. The speaker uttered (97a) without giving any clues outside his
utterance what interpretation (and hence what D-structure representation) he intended.
Since he and I both know that VPs can be deleted if and only if they can be deaccented,
and VPs can be deaccented only if their LF representations are instantiated in the con-
text, his intended meaning must either be one with an LF representation which is already
instantiated in the context, or one based on which I can calculate an implicature which
will instantiate it. If I assume the speaker intends the interpretation to be likes flying
aircraft, then I can calculate such an implicature in the manner illustrated in section
3.2.1. However, the same is true if I assume that he intends the interpretation to be likes
objects, has desires, is not averse to flying, or any of a large (perhaps infinite) number
of other expressions. The only way I could possibly choose a single interpretation from
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among these myriad possibilities would be for the speaker to further specify the exact
interpretation intended. Since he is capable of going through this same reasoning process,
if this were the reasoning process he intended me to go through, then he would know
that I would be incapable of figuring out his intended meaning without his specifying
that exact meaning, and would thus be violating the maxim of Quantity by using the VP
deletion sentence in question. Since I have no reason to assume that he is violating this
maxim, the speaker must be assuming that his utterance is sufficient for me to determine
his intended meaning, and hence that the reasoning process I will use to do so will not be
that outlined above. Since the reasoning process outlined in the preceding paragraph is
simpler, and since it allows me to identify a particular interpretation as that intended by
the speaker, blocking the reasoning process in the current paragraph is unproblematic.
If we generalize from the above explanation of the unavailability of (97c) as an in-
terpretation for (97a), we conclude that the only LF representation we can assign to an
elided VP will be one which is already directly instantiated in the local active context.
That is, the interpretation assigned to an elided VP can never be one which requires that
some further sentence be accommodated into the context in order for the VP ellipsis sen-
tence to be felicitous. This conclusion is undoubtedly a bit too extreme, though for the
types of cases we have been considering it is not unreasonable. The literature is scattered
with examples in which VP deletion is claimed to be possible when there is no syntactic
VP in the context with which the elided VP could be identical, cases of passive VP an-
tecedents for active deleted VPs or other similar mismatches. I find none of the examples
particularly convincing as grammatical instances of VP ellipsis, although in each of the
examples it is possible to determine a unique most likely intended interpretation for the
elided VP, which on the present analysis could only be generated via accommodation.
Rather than block accommodation altogether, then, it would be better to only allow
accommodation when no other means of determining a potential interpretation would be
possible. I will not go into the details of this distinction at this point, though it is clear
that such an explanation will have to be given in order for the analysis of this section to
be plausible. Rather, I will stick to the simpler characterization of the solution according
to which VP deletion sentences simply cannot induce accommodation.
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The challenge posed by the examples originally considered in (97a,c) was to explain
the lack of any shared interpretation for the two sentences. The analysis of section 3.3.2
above could only give such an explanation if it could be assumed that accommodation
were possible in (97c) but impossible in (97a). I have just given some reason to expect
this to be the case. Having done so, however, it turns out that much of the original
motivation for adopting PF constraints on deletion disappears. These constraints were
posited to account for the fact that interpretational possibilities for VP ellipsis sentences
are a subset of the collection of interpretational possibilities for well-formed sentences
containing a deaccented VP in place of the elided VP. The above analysis just provided
an explanation for this very fact, however, by showing that only when an elided VP is
identical to some VP in the context will it (in general) be possible to determine a unique
interpretation for a VP ellipsis sentence. The analysis forces identity of interpretation
without having to directly constrain deletion.
3.4 Pronominal Interpretation Revisited
In each of the two analyses of VP ellipsis just outlined, the explanation for restrictions
on interpretation in VP ellipsis environments is dependent upon an elided VP having
to be identical with some antecedently occurring VP. Under a copy based analysis of
VP ellipsis, this identity comes about directly via the copy operation which supplies
the material to the VP directly from some antecedent. Under a deletion based analysis
as well identity is enforced, although the way in which it is enforced is more indirect.
In order for a VP to be deleted it must be deaccented as well, and a VP can only be
deaccented if that identical VP occurs in the active context (a restriction which follows
from the definition of instantiation). The fact that an elided VP must be identical to
some antecedent VP under both approaches makes it possible to consider analyses of
pronominal interpretation abstracting away from the particulars of the analysis of VP
ellipsis assumed. In section 3.2.2, I outlined an analysis of indexing and interpretation
of indices based on the theory of Heim (1992), and I showed how this analysis can be
used to account for the interpretational possibilities of one fairly basic example. In this
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section, I turn to consideration of a wider range of cases of pronominal interpretation
within VP ellipsis and VP deaccenting environments considered in the literature, and I
show that the analysis adopted above gives the desired results in all of these cases. In
the process, I will compare the above analysis to two other competing analyses, that of
Fiengo and May (1991), and that of Kitagawa (1991). Finally, I turn to consideration of
certain cases which are problematic for the analysis.
3.4.1 Eliminative Puzzles
Fiengo and May (1991) discuss a wide range of cases of pronominal interpretation in
ellipsis contexts which they group under the heading Eliminative Puzzles of Ellipsis.
The label is meant to suggest that VP ellipsis is somehow responsible for eliminating
interpretations of a sentence which are available for its non-deleted counterpart, a view
very close to that arrived at above. The solution they offer for the problems is also in many
ways similar to the general solution I presented above, although there are some important
differences. The most striking difference between their approach and that advocated here
lies in the characterization of identity that they assume. In the analysis sketched above,
identity of two expressions can be determined locally simply by comparing the expressions
in question. For an analysis of VP ellipsis, this means that the licensing conditions for
deletion (or alternatively the conditions under which reconstruction is possible) need
only look at the internal structure of the VP in question. Fiengo and May, on the other
hand, argue that when a VP contains a pronoun which is formally dependent on another
element in the sentence, identity can only be established by taking into consideration the
binder of the pronoun. To facilitate discussion, I give a brief comparison of the analysis
of Fiengo and May and that developed above based on Heim (1992).
On the analysis developed above, there are two distinct interpretations available for
indices. An index can either be free or it can be bound. In the former case the index is
associated with a unique guise which determines a referent in a given world of evaluation,
and in the latter case it is treated as a variable ranging over such guises. Fiengo and May
make this same distinction in terms of types of occurrences of indices. An a-occurrence
of an index under their analysis is equivalent to a free occurrence of an index under
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the above analysis, while a #-occurrence of an index under their analysis corresponds
to a bound occurrence of an index. In developing the above analysis, I argued that
all occurrences of a single index must be of the same type - either all free (hence all
designating the s me unique guise), or all bound (hence all designating the same variable
over guises). I further argued that identity is sensitive to index value. From this, it
followed that the occurrence of a pronoun in an elided VP and that of a pronoun in an
antecedent VP must be of the same type in order for the two VPs to be identical. Fiengo
and May make a similar restriction on VP identity by requiring that the type of index
on two pronouns contained in separate VPs must be the same in order for the two VPs
to count as identical. However, at this point their analysis diverges from that expounded
above. If the pronouns each bear an a-occurrence of an index, then each index is required
to have the same value in order for the two VPs to count as identical. If they bear /-
occurrences of an index, however, identity of indexical value is not required. Rather,
what is required is that the two pronouns enter into identical dependencies. Without
going into too many technical details, two dependency relations F and G are analyzed
as being identical if and only if there is some structural description containing both the
dependent element and antecedent in F which is identical to a structural description
which contains both the dependent element and antecedent in U, where a structural
description is taken in the standard sense "as an n-ary linear factorization, < category1,
category2 , ... , categoryn >, of a structure S, in the sense defined in Chomsky (1955)."
If two VPs contain pronouns with f-occurrences of an index, and if the antecedents of
these pronouns are outside the VPs in question, it follows that identity between the two
VPs cannot be determined strictly by looking at the VPs alone. With this much as
background, I turn to consideration of data which Fiengo and May offer in support of
their analysis, the eliminative puzzles.
The first such example that Fiengo and May consider is one which they identify as
the Multiple Pronouns Puzzle. The example they consider is the following.
(132) Max said he saw his mother and Oscar did too.
The claim they make regarding this sentence is that under an interpretation in which
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each of the overt pronouns is dependent on Maz, the sentence is verified only by the
situations in (133a-c), and not by that in (133d)."
(133) Max said Max saw Max's mother and
a. Oscar said Max saw Max's mother too.
b. Oscar said Oscar saw Oscar's mother too.
c. Oscar said Oscar saw Max's mother too.
d. Oscar said Max saw Oscar's mother too.
They show that these facts are a natural consequence of their analysis of pronominal
interpretation and restrictions on VP ellipsis. As mentioned above, VP ellipsis is only
possible under their analysis if the VP in question is identical in relevant respects to its
antecedent. The readings indicated in (133a-c) are thus predicted to be available only
if the VPs of the sentences which give rise to these interpretations are identical. The
only candidate representations for this sentence which have a possibility of satisfying this
restriction are the following. (Recall that a-occurrences in Fiengo and May's analysis
are treated like free indices under the above analysis, and f/-occurrences are treated like
bound indices.)
(134) a. Max? said he? saw his? mother and Oscarx said he? saw his? mother too
b. Max? said he4 saw hiso mother and Oscar* said he4 saw his4 mother too
c. Max? said he4 saw his? mother and Oscar2 said heg saw his? mother too
d. Max? said he? saw hiso mother and Oscar2 said he? saw hisq mother too
In (134a-c), the VPs in question come out as identical in all relevant respects. In (134d),
however, they do not. In (134a), the identity between the VPs is obvious, and hence
needs no comment. In (134b), the dependencies involving the pronouns in the two VPs
9 As earlier, I use the notion of verification by a situation to identify potential interpretations of a
sentence. The basic idea behind this view is that in order for a situation to verify a sentence under a
given interpretation, the fact that the situation obtains must be sufficient evidence for determining that
the sentence is true under that interpretation. It is of course more appropriate to consider the situations
as situation types, in which the names used are thought of as guises which denote individuals in a world
of evaluation rather than as actual individuals, and to replace verification by a situation with verifiability
by a situation type where a sentence under a given interpretation is verifiable by a situation type if and
only if for every assignment of individuals to guises, the sentence is true under that assignment whenever
the situation in question obtains in the world of evaluation. I'll avoid this complication in the discussion,
though I take it to be a necessary way of looking at the notion of potential interpretation.
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are identical, so these VPs too will count as identical. (134c) is simply a mixture of
the two cases just considered. The first pronoun has a f-occurrence of an index so the
dependency relation it enters into must be identical in each of the two VPs, as it is,
while the second pronoun has an a-occurrence of an index and so must have the same
indexical value in both VPs, a condition which is again satisfied. These two VPs are
thus also determined to be identical under Fiengo and May's analysis. (134d) is similar
to (134c) in many respects, with one crucial difference. In the second VP in (134d), the
pronoun with the f-occurrence of an index is dependent on the subject NP Oscar, which
is two clauses up, while in the first VP it is dependent on the pronoun he which is only
one clause up. This difference, Fiengo and May argue, is sufficient to block the two VPs
as being analyzed as identical. Furthermore, there is no other representation of the two
VPs which will have the intended interpretation and in which the two VPs will come out
as identical, and so the lack of a reading indicated in (133d) is explained."1
If we adopt Fiengo and May's rendering of the facts, then some explanation along
the lines they give will be necessary. In particular, it will probably be necessary to make
reference to identity of dependency relations to explain the data. However, I find their
assumptions regarding the interpretational possibilities of (132) highly suspect. There
can be no question that it is difficult to interpret a person who utters (132) out of the
blue as having intended to convey a proposition which would be verified by the situation
described in (133d). However, the question of whether the sentence has such an inter-
pretation is a separate issue. As I did earlier, I assume here that contextual information
can help to disambiguate a sentence but cannot supply an otherwise unavailable inter-
pretation to that sentence. By adopting this assumption, we can show that this fourth
interpretation is possible by showing a situation in which such an interpretation is readily
available. To illustrate this, I will use a sentence which is minimally different from that
given in (132), although the changes are irrelevant to the predictions of Fiengo and May's
analysis as well as here. Consider, then, the following situation. On Sunday at noon, a
jewelry store is robbed, and the burglar gets away. On Monday, Max gets brought into
'oI am ignoring many details of Fiengo and Mays analysis here. The reader interested in these details
is urged to look at Fiengo and May (1991), especially chapters 2 through 4.
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the police station as a suspect in the robbery, where he is questioned by a detective.
During the questioning, Max protests to the detective, "I couldn't have committed the
robbery because I was with my mother at the time the robbery occurred." That same
day, Max's friend Oscar hears that Max was arrested for the crime and decides to try
to help him out by giving Max an alibi. As fate would have it, the alibi Oscar chooses
to give for Max is that Max was with his (Oscar's) mother at the time the robbery oc-
curred. The detective finds the situation fairly amusing and tells his colleagues the story.
To show that he has understood the situation, one of the colleagues offers the following
as a summary of the story.
(135) (So,) Max said he was with his mother (at the time of the robbery) and Oscar
did too.
In the situation described, the interpretation one would naturally assign to (135) is
parallel to the suspect fourth reading of (132) given in (133d) above. Since the only
differences between (135) and (132) are irrelevant to the interpretation of the pronouns
contained in these examples, we can conclude that in (132) as well the suspect fourth
interpretation is possible. The facts in need of explanation are thus different from what
Fiengo and May took them to be, and consequently the explanation give for them will
have to differ. Rather than try to modify Fiengo and May's analysis, I will give such an
explanation in terms of the analysis developed earlier in this chapter.
Given the possibility of the four readings indicated in (133), it should be readily
apparent how to account for them within the assumptions of the analysis developed above.
I give the LF representations below which will produce the relevant interpretations.
(136) a. [Maxx] said [he1 l saw [his1 ] mother and [Oscars] said [he1 ] saw [his1 ] mother
too
b. [Max1 ]2 said [he 2] saw [his2] mother and [Oscars] 2 said [he 2] saw [his 2] mother
too
c. [Max1]2 said [hez] saw [his1] mother and [Oscars] 2 said [he 2] saw [his1] mother
too
d. [Max1 ]2 said [hex] saw [his 2] mother and [Oscars] 2 said [he1] saw [his2 ] mother
too
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In each of these LF representations, the VPs of the first and second conjuncts are straight-
forwardly identical. In (136a), each of the pronouns in the first conjunct is free, but each
is assigned the same index as Max. Since distinct occurrences of the same index are all
assigned the same unique guise, and since guises determine unique referents in any given
world of evaluation, all three expressions will be necessarily coreferent. Furthermore, the
pronouns in the elided VP must bear the same index, either in order to satisfy the felic-
ity condition on focus-related topics, or because they derive from a copying procedure.
Since no index can serve simultaneously as a unique guise and as a bound variable, the
occurrences of the pronouns in the elided VP will not be allowed to be bound, leaving
the representation of the second conjunct in (136a) as the only possible representation
compatible with that of the first conjunct. In all of the other examples as well, the
LF representation given for the second conjunct is the only one possible given the LF
representation of the first conjunct. Since there are no other non-redundant LF repre-
sentations of the first conjunct which will force coreference between Max and the two
pronouns, the analysis adopted here predicts that all and only the readings indicated in
(133) should be available for this sentence. 11
The second puzzle Fiengo and May mention is the Dahl Puzzle, attributed to Dahl
(1972). This puzzle revolves around the readings available for the following sentence.
(137) Max thinks he's strong, Oscar does too, but his father doesn't.
Again, the interpretations to consider are those in which he in the first conjunct is taken
to be Ma'. 12 What Dahl noticed is that when the second conjunct is given a sloppy
interpretation (= Oscar thinks Oscar's strong), the third conjunct can be given a strict
reading with respect to the second conjunct, provided that the pronoun his is understood
" Actually, there are several more representations to be considered in which one or both of the pronouns
in the relevant VP has been raised at LF via QR. While this possibility makes available a whole host of
other legitimate LF representations, in each the indices on the pronouns vAil be identical to what they
are in one of the four representations given in (136), and hence these ad.iitional LF representations will
not introduce truth-conditionally distinct readings, as the reader can verify.
12On any other interpretation of the pronoun, the only possible readings for the sentence will be
across the boards strict readings, where the interpretation of the pronoun his in the third conjunct
is unconstrained. This is exactly what is predicted under the present analysis since the index of the
pronouns in the deleted VPs of the second and third conjuncts would be identical to that in the first,
and hence all three would be associated with the same unique guise.
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as identical to Oscar. That is, the third clause can be interpreted as (roughly) Oscar's
father doesn't think Oscar's strong. Fiengo and May show how this interpretation can
be captured under their analysis by assuming that the pronoun in the elided VP has a
/3-occurrence of an index. The analysis they give associates the sentence in (137) with
the LF representation in (138).
(138) Max1 thinks hej is strong, Oscar2 thinks heg2 is strong too, but his" fathers
doesn't think he4 is strong
Here, the VP of the second conjunct is identical to that of the first since the dependencies
involving the pronouns are identical. The pronoun in the third conjunct, however, is not
in a dependency identical to that of any of the other pronouns in the sentence, and so
it would appear that it should not be possible to associate this LF representation with
the VP deletion sentence in (137). Fiengo and May permit such an association, however,
by positing an additional licensing condition for #-occurrences of an index predicated on
identity of indexical value. Since the value of the index of the pronoun in the VP of the
third conjunct is identical to that of the pronoun in the second conjunct, and the two VPs
are otherwise identical, by this additional licensing condition the second conjunct will
license the ellipsis of the VP in the third. The pronoun in the third conjunct, however,
also has to be in a dependency relation in order to be interpretable, and the NP Oscar is
too far away to count as a licensing antecedent.' 3 There are two possible antecedents for
this pronoun, however, namely the pronoun his and the NP his father. By choosing his
as the antecedent for the elided pronoun, we derive the LF representation given in (138),
which gives the reading Dahl observed to be possible. If we were to choose his father
as the antecedent for the pronoun, the LF representation of the sentence would again
be well-formed, though the interpretation associated with this representation would be
inherently contradictory.
At a fairly high level of abstraction, the account of the facts under the above analysis
is roughly identical to that given by Fiengo and May. However, because of the differences
'SFiengo and May assume that an element in a syntactic position p can be the licensing antecedent for
a pronoun with a 3-occurrence of an index only if a quantified expression in the position p could bind
the pronoun. Since quantified expressions cannot bind outside a conjunct, it follows that an NP in one
conjunct cannot license a pronoun with a #-occurrence of a variable in another.
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in how variable binding is treated, it is possible to analyze the VPs in each of the three
conjuncts as strictly identical under the above analysis and still capture the Dahl reading
of the sentence in (137). The relevant representation which captures this reading is given
below.
(139) [Max]]2 thinks [he2] is strong], [Oscar 3]2 thinks [hez] is strong] too, but [[hiss]2
fathers] doesn't think [he 2) is strong)
As under Fiengo and May's analysis, the elided pronoun in the third conjunct will have
to be bound. Since its index is interpreted as a variable over guises, and since it cannot
be bound by anything outside the third conjunct, it must be bound within that conjunct.
This will only be the case if one of the expressions in the third conjunct raises via QR
at LF, and the associated A-operator binds the pronoun. If we choose the pronoun his
as the expression which undergoes QR, we can obtain the representation in (139). There
is an important difference between the two analyses which arises at this point, however.
For Fiengo and May, it is an automatic result of the binding of he by his that his ends
up coindexed with Oscar. Under the above analysis, on the other hand, such coindexing
is not forced. This leaves open the possibility of assigning some other arbitrary index to
that pronoun. If the sentence is interpreted in such a way that his is taken to denote
Sam, then, the above analysis leads to the prediction that the third conjunct should be
interpretable as Sam's father doesn't think Sam's strong. If his is used deictically, uttered
with an accompanying gesture toward Sam, then I believe that just such an interpretation
is available for (137). This can be seen especially clearly in (140).
(140) Max thinks he's strong, Oscar does too, but HIS FATHER doesn't, so neither
does HE.
Since Fiengo and May's analysis cannot account for this interpretation, the possibility of
such an interpretation argues in favor of the above analysis of pronominal interpretation
and against that of Fiengo and May.
One final example considered by Fiengo and May is the following.
(141) John said he is crazy before the teacher did, and Bill did too.
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In this sentence, there are two separate deletions sites, hence two pairs of VPs which
must be identical at LF. The VP of the superordinate clause of the first conjunct must
be identical to that of the subordinate clause of that conjunct, and the VP of the entire
first conjunct must be identical that of the second conjunct. As Fiengo and May point out,
when the overt pronoun is interpreted as John, there are the three possible interpretations
for the sentence as a whole indicated below.
(142) a. John said John is crazy before the teacher said John is crazy, and Bill said
John is crazy before the teacher said John is crazy.
b. John said John is crazy before the teacher said the teacher is crazy, and Bill
said Bill is crazy before the teacher said the teacher is crazy.
c. John said John is crazy before the teacher said John is crazy, and Bill said Bill
is crazy before the teacher said Bill is crazy.
Fiengo and May's analysis of these interpretations is unproblematic. For the uniform
strict reading indicated in (142a), they assign the overt pronoun he an a-occurrence of
the index assigned to John. For the uniform sloppy reading indicated in (142b), they
assign this pronoun a fl-occurrence of the index assigned to John, and reindex the pronoun
in the (elided) subordinate clause so that it is bound by the NP the teacher. For the
mixed reading indicated in (142c), they again assign the overt pronoun a #-occurrence
of the index assigned to John, but the pronoun in the subordinate clause keeps this spale
index. The resulting LF representations are given below.
(143) a. John1 said he? is crazy before the teacher 2 said he? is crazy, and Bills said he?
is crazy before the teacher2 said he' is crazy too.
b. John1 said he4 is crazy before the teacher2 said he4 is crazy, and Bill 3 said he'a
is crazy before the teacher 2 said heg is crazy too.
c. John1 said he4 is crazy before the teacher2 said hea is crazy, and Bills said heg
is crazy before the teacher2 said hea is crazy too.
The analysis developed above makes the same predictions in a largely similar fashion.
The first reading is generated by assigning John and he in (141) the same free index, while
the second and third readings are generated by assigning the pronoun he an index bound
by a A-operator which applies to John. The-distinction between the two readings under
140
this analysis derives from a difference in the part of the LF representation associated with
the NP the teacher. If this NP is raised via QR and the A-operator left behind in the
process ends up with the same index as the pronoun, then the resulting representation
will give rise to the interpretation indicated by (142b). Otherwise, the interpretation
that results will be that indicated by (142c). I give illustrative LF representations below.
(144) a. [John,] said [he1] is crazy before [the teacher 2] said he1 is crazy, and [Bill3]
said [hel] is crazy before [the teacher 2] said he1 is crazy too
b. [John,] 4 said [he4] is crazy before [the teacher 2]4 said [he 4] is crazy, and [BiUll] 4
said [he 4] is crazy before (the teacher 2]4 said [he 4] is crazy too
c. [Johnx] 4 said [he 4j is crazy before [the teacher2] said he4 is crazy, and [Bill3]4
said [he 4] is crazy before [the teacher 2] said he4 is crazy too
Other LF representations are predicted to be possible for this sentence as well, but there
are no others which will have interpretations truth-conditionally distinguishable from
those given here.' 4 Thus, the present analysis accounts nicely for the interpretations
available for this sentence.
3.4.2 Pseudo-sloppy Identity
In the preceding section, I argued for the analysis of pronominal interpretation based
on the analysis of Heim (1992) and for an accompanying analysis of VP deletion and
deaccenting based on identity of indices over the analysis proposed by Fiengo and May
(1991). There were two cases which were seen to differentiate the theories in question,
both of which I claimed argued in favor of the former analysis. The facts in each case
were fairly subtle, however, and one might well balk at making any grand claims on the
basis of these facts alone. However, there is another class of cases in which the facts are
much clearer, and these facts once again support the analysis adopted here over that of
"Again, there are cases which will differ from (144a) only in the value of the index assigned to the
various occurrences of the pronoun he, although all occurrences of the pronoun must be assigned the same
index in such cases. This would yield a class of readings identical to the uniform strict interpretation in
(144) except (possibly) for the individual denoted by the guise associated with the pronouns.
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Fiengo and May. These are cases first considered by Kitagawa, two of which are given in
the (a) examples below.
(145) (= Kitagawa's 20)
a. Sam wants Mary to advertise his daughter before Bill does.
b. Sam wants Mary to advertise Sam's daughter before Bill advertises Bill's
daughter.
(146) (= Kitagawa's 22)
a. Sam wants Mary to ask Sue to advertise him before Bill does
b. Sam wants Mary to ask Sue to advertise Sam before Bill asks Sue to advertise
Bill.
Here, the interpretations of interest are those indicated by the sentences in (b). These
interpretations are similar to sloppy identity sentences in that the pronoun is treated like
a variable bound by the subjects of each of the clauses. It differs from the sloppy identity
interpretations previously considered, however, in that antecedent-pronoun relation in
the overt clause is not identical to that in the elided clause. The problems this causes for
Fiengo and May's analysis should be readily apparent. The only way in which they can
account for sloppy-like readings of a pronoun is by assigning the pronoun a fl-occurrence
of an index with distinct values given to the index of the overt pronoun and that of the
elided pronoun. Thus, to account for the relevant interpretation of (145a), they would
have to associate this sentence with the following LF representation.
(147) Sam 1 wants Mary to advertise his._l daughter before Bill advertises his4
daughter.
The problem with such a representation is that the dependency between the first occur-
rence of the pronoun his and Sam is not identical to the dependency between the second
occurrence of the pronoun and Bill, and hence the elided VP will not count as identical
to its antecedent under their analysis. Since there is no other possible representation of
this sentence which captures the desired interpretation and which does satisfy Fiengo and
May's identity criteria for VP deletion, this example stands as a strong counterexample
to Fiengo and May's analysis.
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Under the analysis adopted here, the availability of the interpretations given in (145b)
and (146b) for the respective (a) sentences is exactly what is expected. The LF repre-
sentations which give rise to these interpretations are the following.
(148) a. [Sam1]2 wants Mary [ PRO to advertise [his2 ] daughter before [Bi113] 2 advertises
[his2] daughter]
b. [Sam1] 2 wants Mary [ PRO to ask Sue PRO to advertise [him 2] before [Bill 3] 2
asks Sue PRO to advertise [himz] I
In each representation, the VP in the deletion site is exactly identical to the immediately
embedded VP of the superordinate clause, as required by the analyses of VP ellipsis
developed in section 3.3 above.
While the analysis outlined and defended in this chapter goes a long way for account-
ing for the interpretational possibilities of pronouns in VP ellipsis contexts, there remains
one type of example that the analysis cannot handle, which I illustrate with the sentence
in (149).
(149) Sam wants Bill to advertise his daughter before Mary does.
Pccording to the analysis under consideration, it should be possible to interpret this
sentence so that the antecedent of the overt pronoun is taken to be Bill while that of the
elided pronoun is taken to be John, as in the interpretation indicated in (150).
(150) Sam wants Bill to advertise Bill's daughter before Mary advertises John's
daughter.
Such an interpretation will be generated by the LF representation given in (151) below,
which according to the present analysis is predicted to be well-formed.
(151) [Sam1]2 wants [Bill3] [PRO] 2 to advertise [his2] daughter] before Mary adver-
tises [hisz] daughter]
It is highly dubious that such an interpretation exists for this sentence, however, and
in this case building up an intricately contrived circumstance which would favor such
an interpretation does nothing to help bring such an interpretation out. The only way
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I can see at present of accounting for this example within the theory developed is to
require that the dependency between the second pronoun and its binder not include that
between the first pronoun and its binder, where inclusion is defined in terms of path
containment (cf. Pesetsky (1982)). Why dependency relations should make a difference
here when they haven't made any difference elsewhere I have no way of explaining. Since
such an explanation can obviously be made to exclude this example, and since there is
no principled reason I can see for why such an explanation should be adopted, I leave
the details of the analysis unspecified until the analysis can be properly motivated.
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